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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in Applied Microeconomics
by
Chuan Chen
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2019
Professor Barton H.Hamilton, Chair
The rst chapter of this dissertation quanties to what extent business accelerators can
reduce the venture market frictions for early-stage startups. With a novel non-transferable
utility two-sided matching framework, this study shows that business accelerators can close
the gaps due to entrepreneurs' gender and experience, but not so much for the dierences due
to locations. The second chapter studies the relative importance of screening compared to
training in the total value creation by business accelerators from the perspectives of market
participants. The estimates suggest that the value created by screening, which reects
through the improvement of nancing in short-term after graduation, represents less than
1/6 of the total value created by business accelerators. Further, such ratios are especially
low for top programs like Y Combinator and TechStars. The third chapter investigates
the eects of auditor oce location on the client and auditor surplus. Using a two-sided
matching market model, we nd that, while both clients and auditors bear the costs of
geographic distance, auditors disproportionately bear costs. Although distance exerts costs
on clients, clients incur distance costs to gain auditor expertise.
ix
Chapter 1
Can Business Accelerators Level the
Playing Field for Startups
The unequal access to venture nancing and business expertise increases inequality and
hinders innovation. This paper examines whether and to what extent a business accelerator
can level the playing eld for entrepreneurs. With a novel dataset covering the universe of
U.S. accelerators from 2008 to 2011, I estimate the value created by accelerators for dierent
groups of entrepreneurs by exploiting preferences revealed during the admission process of
for-prot accelerators. I develop a two-sided matching framework to control for sorting and
selection. I nd accelerators, to a certain extent, can level the dierence between startup
values due to the founder's experience and gender but cannot oset the advantage of founding
a startup in Silicon Valley. Through counterfactual analysis, I nd external nancial supports
of equity-free accelerators have limited ability to assist entrepreneurs who face high diculty
to join accelerators. I do nd, however, that direct capital injection to accelerator graduates
can improve the admission rates of inexperienced entrepreneurs.
1
1.1 Introduction
Beginning with the work of Schumpeter [137], economists have viewed entrepreneurs as a
primary engine of economic growth. Entrepreneurs innovate through the formation and de-
velopment of startups, which are key drivers of productivity.1 However, despite their import-
ance to the economy, entrepreneurs face a variety of market frictions, and many promising
startups fail due to challenges in acquiring venture nancing or inadequate human capital.2
Recent research has highlighted the fact that these challenges may be particularly acute for
female entrepreneurs, rst-time founders, and founders not present in startup hubs like
Silicon Valley.3 It is inecient for the economy to have growth opportunities for startups
depend on a founder's demographic characteristics instead of the startup's viability (Hsieh
et al. [92]). Consequently, the economic growth generated by startups may be distributed un-
equally across geographic regions and entrepreneurial success may vary substantially across
groups. Addressing market frictions, business accelerators (accelerator hereafter), such as
the Y Combinator, emerged in 2005 with the assistance of venture nancing and business
training.4 Just one decade later, these accelerators have become an important player in
entrepreneurship: about one-third of early-stage venture funding went to accelerator-backed
startups.5 With capacity constraints, accelerators admit the best applicants, and prior liter-
ature (e.g., Gonzales-Uribe and Leatherbee [81], Yu [151]) has demonstrated that accelerators
make these good startups better.6 However, we have limited knowledge on whether and to
1See Acs and Audretsch [2] for the role of startups in innovation and Acemoglu [1] for the importance of
innovation to economic growth.
2See e.g. Amit et al. [8] and Lerner and Schoar [107] for the diculties entrepreneurs face in acquiring
nancing. Hsu [93] and Gompers et al. [80] discuss the human capital issues faced by many startups.
3See Dutt and Kaplan [56] for a discussion of female entrepreneurs, Gompers et al. [80] on the advantage
of experienced founders, and Glaeser et al. [78] for the location eects on startups.
4The accelerator is dened as a structured program oering xed-term and cohort-based training, which
include mentorship, and other educational components to participants in exchange for a small share of equity,
typically 5%. Section 2 provides more details.
5Source: https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/one-third-of-us-startups-that-raised-a-series-a-in-2015-
went-through-an-accelerator
6The average acceptance rate is below 5% in the US.
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what extent the accelerator can assist entrepreneurs who face acute market frictions.7
In response, I estimate the value created by accelerators for dierent groups of entre-
preneurs (such as those facing market frictions) by exploiting preferences revealed during
the admission process of for-prot accelerators. Under rational expectations, the choice of
prot-maximizing agents builds on the expected startup values at graduation8. Without
accelerators, startups founded by female entrepreneurs, rst-time founders, or entrepreneurs
not present in startup hubs tend to have a lower valuation. However, the preference exhibited
by accelerators may not depend on these demographic characteristics if the accelerators can
alleviate the challenges for these entrepreneurs. Due to sorting and interdependence between
market participants' choice sets, traditional discrete choice models, like probit or logit, are
biased when applied to the accelerator admission process, which is a market with two-sided
selections. Because the accelerators set the amount of equity and seed to each startup before
the admission starts, this market is a non-transferable utility (NTU) two-sided matching
game (Roth and Sotomayor [135]), which excludes negotiation on utility transfers between
matched agents (similar to the school-student and patient-doctor matching). I propose a
framework to identify the market participants' preferences by comparing actual startup-
accelerator matches with other potential but not realized matches. My approach accounts
for the endogenous matching process explicitly; thus, it can be used for causal inference.
Compared to transferable utility (TU) matching models (e.g., Choo and Siow [37]), the
NTU approach is less restrictive because any matching that can be rationalized by some
prole of preferences under TU can also be rationalized by some NTU stable matching
(Chiappori and Salanié [35]). Without data on all applicants and potential applicants, exist-
ing NTU matching estimators (e.g., Boyd et al. [27], Agarwal [3]) do not work well because
7A few papers (e.g.Dutt and Kaplan [56]) have qualitatively studied the accelerator's impact on female
entrepreneurs. While also connected to the topic of gender, this paper conducts a quantitative approach to
a broader group of entrepreneurs' demographic characteristics (gender, experience, and location).
8Without assumption on prot-maximizing agents with rational expectation, the matching model still
works, but the interpretation for results may change. I check the validity of this assumption in Section 1.7.
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they require information on all market participants to generate consistent estimation.910
My approach builds on a pairwise comparison mechanism (Fox [64, 66]) and examines the
relative ranking of a pair of choices, which are independent of other alternatives. I use a
maximum score estimator (Fox [66], Manski [111, 112]), which imposes a weaker assumption
on unobserved quality and allows for the presence of multiple equilibria.
Due to challenges in data and methodology, much of the existing literature evaluates
the treatment eects of a single or a homogeneous group of accelerators by comparing the
startups that completed accelerators to those that did not (e.g., Hallen et al. [87], Gonzales-
Uribe and Leatherbee [81], Yu [151], Winston-Smith and Hannigan [149]). With a novel
dataset covering the universe of the U.S. for-prot accelerators and their participants from
2008 to 2011, I examine the heterogeneity of accelerator value creation by recovering the
agents' utility functions for each potential accelerator-startup match.11 I form these match
utilities based on the observable features of the accelerator (e.g., accelerator tiers12 and
cohort sizes), the startup (e.g., business age and founder characteristics), and macroeconomic
conditions (nancial crisis). Under the assumption of risk-neutral agents, the recovered
match utility represents the expected startup value at graduation, which is above $1.5m on
average.1314
9Even if the researcher has information on all potential applicants for all accelerators, the market size is
too big for tractable computation.
10Menzel [114] proposes a method to estimate a random sample of a large market. Sørensen [139] imposes
strong assumptions on market size.
11While data on non-participants is useful for comparing the accelerator value creation with outside options,
it does not contribute to this research question.
12To control for accelerator quality dierences, I include xed eects for three tiers of accelerators. Tier 1
consists of the two superstars (Y Combinator and TechStars), Tier 2 includes other well-known accelerators,
and the remaining accelerators are in Tier 3. Although the categorizing rule is endogenous based on ex-post
performances, I do not impose quality ranking based on the tiers in estimation. Further details are in the
data section.
13Without risk-neutral agents, the magnitudes of the estimates have dierent interpretations than what
is presented here. However, the results are still informative to understand the relative importance of various
factors in the utility function.
14The gure is close to $2m for Tier 1 graduates and lower at $1.2m for Tier 3. Note that the calculated
value ignores the unobserved quality and is therefore likely to be downward biased due to selection. Further,
because of sorting, this bias tends to be larger in better accelerators.
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I nd female-led startups have similar valuations compared to their male counterparts in
most accelerators, but women suer a gender dierence worth about a half million dollars
in the top accelerators, Y Combinator and Techstars. On the other hand, the lack of prior
startup-founding experience costs rst-time founders about $300k in an average accelerator,
but such a disadvantage disappears in high-quality (Tier 1 and 2) accelerators. Finally, I
nd startups from startup hubs have an advantage worth about $110k in the accelerator
market.
With the recovered model primitives, I evaluate potential nancial support to entrepren-
eurs with disadvantages in accelerators. Institutions and philanthropic funds have shown a
growing interest in supporting accelerators (GALI [73]), and many of the institution-backed
accelerators oer free programs to startups by taking no equity. However, the impact of this
support is hard to predict in the NTU market due to two countervailing forces. Directly,
the support increases the value of the startup which receives the assistance. Indirectly, the
support changes the market equilibrium and forces some agents to pick their inferior choices.
I nd that oering equity-free accelerators to female entrepreneurs, rst-time founders, or
accelerators outside startup hubs does not increase the admission rates of entrepreneurs who
face higher diculty to join accelerators. The average value increase for the startups foun-
ded by these entrepreneurs is also lower than the subsidy size. However, I nd providing
a USD 150,000 capital injection, which is widespread in the top accelerators nowadays but
rare in the others, to accelerator graduates established by rst-time founders can increase the
admission rates of inexperienced entrepreneurs by 3.5% and female entrepreneurs by 7.1%.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides institutional
details of the accelerator market. Section 2.4 describes the data and basic summary stat-
istics. Section 1.4 motivates and presents the two-sided matching model and associated
maximum score estimator. Section 2.5 discusses the main results. Section 1.6 presents the
counterfactual analysis results for the two types of policy interventions. Section 1.7 examines
5
the variations among startup performance after graduation. This section provides a validity
check on the assumption that the revealed preference reects accelerator's ability to assist
entrepreneurs with higher diculties. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Details
1.2.1 What is an Accelerator
Business accelerators are sometimes called seed accelerators or startup accelerator. I
identify individual accelerator programs mainly from Seed-DB (www.seed-db.com), which
is one of the best known and most signicant public repositories of accelerator programs.
Seed-DB denes accelerator as a program that satises the following criteria: 1) has an open
application process; 2) invests in companies, typically in exchange for equity, at the pre-
seed or seed stage; 3) holds cohorts or "classes" of startups, not an on-demand resource; 4)
provides a program of support for the cohorts, including events and company mentoring; 5)
focuses on teams, and not individual mentoring. The Seed-DB denition covers very similar
programs as those under an alternative denition proposed by Cohen and Hochberg [39].15
Accelerators target early stage startups but not nascent ones. They are not intended for
businesses worth more than tens of million dollars nor nascent entrepreneurs who do not have
a solid product or idea yet. Following the early programs, many accelerators invest a small
amount of seed money in exchange for equity. But unlike traditional venture capitalists,
who condentially negotiate with entrepreneurs, accelerators announce their oerings to the
public and entrepreneurs can easily nd such information online.
As shown in Figure 1.1, the whole procedure of accelerators starts with a public an-
nouncement of the details and terms of the program, including information on application
15Cohen and Hochberg [39] dene accelerators as a xed-term, cohort-based program, including mentor-
ship and educational components, that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day.
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requirements, resources provided, seed investment, equity share, class size, location, and
schedule. Once announced, these terms are not subject to negotiation. Startups submit
their applications to accelerators. The admission process is competitive. Applicants to pop-
ular programs see the acceptance rate of 1% to 2%, and the average number is around 4%
for the U.S. market.16 Admitted entrepreneurs start the program together at the same time
and in the same location. The program lasts for a xed period, often three months, during
which accelerators oer mentorship, network opportunities, and other business support. At
the end of the program, accelerators hold a Demo Day in which each startup pitches to a
group of potential investors. After graduation, rms are ocially o the hook in terms of
participating in the accelerator, but they can, and often do, become involved in the alumni
community.
Y Combinator launched the world's rst accelerator in 2005, followed by TechStars in
2006. Both have evolved over the yearsY Combinator started in Cambridge, MA then
also in Mountain View, CA. In 2009, it consolidated into a single entity in Silicon Valley
with a bigger cohort size. TechStars used a dierent approach. It has grown to 40 dierent
programs worldwide as of April 2018, since its rst launching in Boulder, Colorado. Yet still,
they both remain as the very best accelerators. As summarized by Hathaway, the growth in
U.S.-based accelerators took o after 2008.17 The number reached 170 programs in 2014 and
held mostly steady afterward. Accelerators have attracted much attention thanks to their
outstanding performance. Pitchbook.com reported that about one-third of Series A venture
funding went to accelerator-backed startups in 2015.18 Consistent with my back-of-envelope








1.2.2 Accelerator Value Creation
Prior literature (e.g., Yu [151], Winston-Smith and Hannigan [149]) has demonstrated that
accelerators create positive treatment eects to early-stage startups with assistance on ob-
taining venture nancing and business training.
Venture nancing is an essential source for startups to accumulate physical assets (see
Da Rin et al. [45] for a survey). Unlike the investment from venture capitalists, the amount
of seed money from accelerators is small and often considered as a stipend for the founders
during the program (Hallen et al. [87]). Instead, the accelerator serves as intermediary
connecting startups and investors in the venture market. Specically, accelerators reduce
the information asymmetry in the market. With the cohort structure, accelerators have a
cost advantage to apply thorough screening (Ramakrishnan and Thakor [131]). By taking
small equity with seed investment, they send credible signals to outside investors (Breadley
et al. [28]). In addition, many accelerators oer education to improve entrepreneurs' pitching
skills and help them to network with potential investors.
Human capital, dened more generally as managerial capital, is also critical for rm
performance (e.g., Bloom and van Reenen [25]). The accelerator oers a platform to facilitate
knowledge and resource sharing from experienced mentors/investors with startups. With
economies of scale, this mechanism lowers the cost of gathering experienced mentors, oering
networking events, and providing valuable business supports. Further, creating a community
19Each year there are about 400,000 new rms registered in the U.S. Around 10% of them, or 40,000,
are medium to high tech startups (based on Kauman Firm Survey). According to F6S.com (one of the
biggest accelerator program network), the average acceptance rate of accelerators is about 4% in the U.S..
While successful applicants applied 3.3 times before admitted, unsuccessful startups applied 1.8 times. To
be conservative, assume each accelerator takes 20 startups per year (GUST 2015 reported 2,968 startups
graduated from 111 accelerators in the U.S.), 170 accelerators across the country would receive applications
from 30,000 unique startups per year.
20Source: https://alexiskold.net/2014/08/19/top-10-reasons-to-join-and-not-to-join-an-accelerator/
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of people who share similar interests in the entrepreneurship world, the accelerator can
generate a long-lasting impact on its graduates.
In an ecient market, we would like to focus the nancing and business training to
founders with the best idea and inner ability. However, due to market frictions on informa-
tion and access to knowledge, we do not know the underlying distribution of startup quality,
and therefore provide the limited resource to those we think are good based on prior exper-
iences. Notably, an essential part of the investment decision builds on the startup founders'
demographic characteristics, causing acute market frictions for female entrepreneurs (Dutt
and Kaplan [56]), rst-time entrepreneurs (Gompers et al. [80]), and founder not in startup
hubs (i.e., CA, MA or NY) (Glaeser et al. [78]). While evidence suggests that accelerators
speed up the growth of high-quality startups, it is unclear whether those startups would be
able to grow without accelerators. Specically, we have scant knowledge on whether accel-
erators can assist startups with potential but may be ignored by traditional investors due to
the founders' demographic characteristics.
Notwithstanding the limited understanding of accelerators, there is a growing interest in
using accelerators to assist entrepreneurs who face high diculties. According to the 2016
report by Global Accelerator Learning Initiative (GALI [73]), which covers more than 164
accelerator programs globally, about 40% of the accelerators received philanthropic funding
in 2015, and over 19% relied on philanthropy for at least half of their total funding. Very
few programs (7%) generated revenue from equity returns.
1.2.3 Value Determinants of Accelerator Admission Decisions
Without an established business, the early-stage startup quality largely depends on its found-
ing teams' ability to generate and execute high-quality ideas (Stross [141]).21 Because in-
21Labor literature often includes the education level to capture human capital dierences. In my dataset,
over 99% of entrepreneurs are college graduates. According to Y Combinator (Stross [141]), the only in-
formation on education concerns whether the entrepreneur entered a college. I tested model controlling for
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vestors do not observe an entrepreneur's ability, they make investment decisions partly based
on their prior knowledge/experience of founders with similar demographic characteristics,
raising a specic challenge for people who are not traditional entrepreneurs or who are
associated with low-quality rms due to historical reasons. One example is the female en-
trepreneurs, who are known to have disadvantages in raising venture nancing (e.g., Kanze
et al. [98], Eddleston et al. [59]). To examine whether women still have disadvantages in
accelerators, I study the impact of Female Founder - an indicator of whether at least one
founder in the team is female in the accelerator admission market.22
First-time founders, who lack business knowledge, also face a greater challenge of attract-
ing traditional investors as opposed to serial entrepreneurs (e.g., Hsu [93], Gompers et al.
[80]). While prior literature (e.g., Hallen et al. [87], Gonzales-Uribe and Leatherbee [81])
demonstrates that the accelerator creates a positive treatment eect for both experienced
and inexperienced entrepreneurs, it is unclear whether accelerators prefer serial entrepren-
eurs. To capture this, I control the Inexperienced Founder - an indicator of whether no
members of the founding team have prior entrepreneurship experience.
Besides, founder's general work experience, as may be captured by the entrepreneur's
age, is a signal for startup quality too. In contrast to the majority of entrepreneurs in the
U.S. start their business around their forty-year-old (Azoulay et al. [12]), the average founder
age in my sample is less than thirty, especially in the top programs. Hincapié [89] argues
one reason for the late entry into entrepreneurship is the uncertainty of own ability, which
can be mitigated by experience accumulation. From this perspective, the accelerators may
create more value for younger participants by providing feedback (Yu [151]). I explore this
feature by studying the eect of average age of the startup founding team.
Community support is essential for startup growth (e.g., Glaeser et al. [78], Audretsch and
whether the founder has a graduate degree and found the education impact is close to zero.
22One could argue it would be better to study rms with female founders only. Unfortunately, I have
limited observations with a founding team of all women.
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Lehmann [11]). While many local governments provide generous assistance to promote en-
trepreneurship, we still nd the majority of successful startups comes from startup hubs like
Silicon Valley. A potential reason is that rms founded in startup hubs have better networks
to help with obtaining talent and support (Kenney [99]). I examine whether accelerators
can substitute this disadvantage for rms established outside startup hubs by studying the
Founded Outside Startup Hubs - an indicator of the startup founding location. In this
paper, I dene the startup hubs to be MA, CA or NY.
The cohort-based structure is an essential feature of accelerators. While the economies of
scale can help accelerators to pool resources and increase protability, larger class size is not
necessarily benecial for individual startups. While it can create more prominent peer and
network eects, large class size reduces the eectiveness of education (Angrist and Lavy [9]).
I include a log cohort size to capture the value variation in this perspective. I also include
xed eects of each accelerator tiers to capture additional quality dierences. Further, the
investment of the Start Fund (see appendix for details) to every Y Combinator graduates in
2011 improves the accelerator's value with direct capital injection. I capture its eect with
an indicator of such events.
Macroeconomic conditions, especially the venture investment environment, can aect
accelerator value creation. I control this external eect with an indicator called One Year
After Crisis. This indicator equals to one if the accelerator program happens before July
2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of NBER denition. I
use this time point because 1) According to PitchBook, while venture investment deals came
back to the upward trend in 2009, the recovery only speeded up since the third quarter of
2010, especially for the market of early startups which are targeted by Angel/Seed and
Early VC. 2) The accelerator applications and admissions were decided at least several
months ahead of the actual program. Graduates from 2009 programs were unlikely to be




I construct a novel dataset covering U.S. accelerators that existed from 2008 to 2011.23 I
study this time frame because the majority of currently well-known accelerators emerged
during this period, and it allows me to collect ex-post startup performance up to ve years.
To have all accelerators maximize nancial return, I exclude accelerators with dierent utility
functions, such as those with restrictions on the community they serve and those that do
not take any equity. The exclusions are unlikely to cause a signicant impact as they only
represent about 2% of the data. I also dropped startups with missing information on founder
characteristics. Hereafter, I dene a program as a cohort of accelerators. Some accelerators
run multiple programs in various locations across years. In total, I identied 74 programs,
representing 27 accelerators and 776 startup graduates.
I use CrunchBase, AngelList, CapitalIQ, CBinsights, VentureXpert, and Linkedin to get
the details of each program and its participants. Data on private rms often lack crucial
information and may suer a self-reporting bias since successful startups are more likely
to release information to the public. To mitigate such concern, I cross check each rm
by searching for related news and press releases. The bias of self-reporting is mild in this
paper because I have found information even for failed startups, thanks to the publicity and
popularity of accelerators.
Data on non-participants of accelerators is helpful to understand the value added by
accelerators relative to other options. However, it is not necessary for this paper to generate
consistent estimates (details in the model section). Since my focus is on whether founders'
demographic characteristics aect their admission in accelerators, the non-participants data
23I collected data from 2005, the founding year of the rst accelerator. I restricted attention to observations
after 2008 as there were only two programs (Y Combinator and TechStars Boulder) before 2008.
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does not contribute to my research question either.
To characterize accelerators, I collect information on their location, size, and terms oered
(amount of seed investment and equity share). For each startup, I obtain its business age,
location, founders' background (gender, education, and entrepreneurship experience), and
operation (acquired, dead or operating) and nancing status.
To further capture some unobserved dierences among accelerators, I categorize accel-
erators into three tiers and control the xed eects of each. The rst tier includes the two
widely acknowledged superstars in this market - Y Combinator and TechStars. The second
tier consists of all the accelerators who received ranks from the Seed Accelerator Ranking
Project (SARP) except for the two in the rst tier.24 All the rest of the accelerators are
in the third tier. While all Tier 1 and Tier 2 accelerators are still running, six of the Tier
3 accelerators stopped or joined other accelerators as a chapter. Note that I do not impose
any restriction on the quality ranking across tiers and the model estimates do not depend
on the endogenously generated categorizing rule of tiers.
1.3.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 shows a summary of programs and startups across accelerator tiers.
The accelerator participants are early-stage startups - mostly rms before any venture
capital nancing. Better accelerators, as indicated by the tiers, tend to take lower equity and
24SARP is led by Yael Hochberg and probably the only ranking conducted by economics researchers.
Although the exact ranking criteria are unknown to the public, according to the website, The goal of
our project is to provide greater transparency regarding the relative performance of programs along multiple
dimensions that may be of importance to entrepreneurs. Many of the metrics in question, such as fundraising
and valuations, are metrics accelerators and startups are reluctant to publicize out of concern for negative
competitive eects should they become widely known to investors and competitors. As an independent, non-
partisan research entity run by academics, we collect this sensitive data in condence, distill it down, and
provide information on the relative success of the programs and of the phenomenon as a whole  without
revealing individual deal details. Our rankings are meant to provide guidance for entrepreneurs who are
considering going through an accelerator, and who are wondering how they dier on performance across
various categories. SARP has been running since 2013, and the ranking is available since 2015. See:
seedranking.comcom
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have bigger classes. A potential reason is that better programs have a lower cost of pulling
resources to sponsor larger programs and create a higher total return. Additionally, Tier 1
accelerators take lower equities from startups but do not give the highest seed investment.
The second tier programs are the most generous ones regarding startup valuation (calculated
as seed/equity).
In my dataset, about 37% of the accelerator programs are found in startup hubs (CA,
MA, NY). This pattern is similar to the geographic distribution of accelerators in 2015, in
which about 40% of all accelerators in the U.S. located in the well-known technology startup
hubs and major cities of San Francisco-Silicon Valley, Boston-Cambridge, and New York.
The accelerator participants are signicantly younger than non-participants. Azoulay
et al. [12]reported that the average age of startup founders in the U.S. is 41.9. High-tech
founders are a bit younger but still around 39 to 40, and this age range is not very dierent
in startup hubs. If we interpret age as a proxy of general work experience, this indicates
that accelerators' assistance may be a substitute for human capital accumulation over time.
Further, while some consider accelerators are designed for rst-time entrepreneurs25, I nd
one-third of accelerator participants have founded some company before. While not reported
in the table, over 99% of entrepreneurs in my data have college degrees. About 35% of them
also have graduate degrees, close to the gure of comparable non-participants during the
same period (see appendix). The female participation rate, which is at 10% on average and
below 5% in Tier1, is low because 8%~16% of startups, which received rst venture funding
during the same period, are founded by women.26
Most early accelerators focus on high-tech startups, especially in the IT related elds,
aiming to generate a higher return and social impact. While high-tech is still a focus, new ac-





heterogeneity in concentration and purpose, the majority of accelerators follow the frame-
work of Y Combinator and TechStars. As of 2016, Y Combinator had invested in about 940
companies, including some well-known unicorns such as Dropbox and Airbnb.27 Y Combin-
ator has a combined market capitalization of over $65b. About 170 Y Combinator graduate
startups have been acquired with the estimated total value of over $3b. However, not all
accelerators have matched Y Combinator's success. For example, neither South Carolina's
NextStart nor Minnesota's Project Skyway lasted for more than two years. While NextStart
closed quietly, Project Skyway turned into the Skyway Fund and started traditional angel
investing after its second cohorts nished in 2012.
The rst two rows of Table 1.2 show the ve-year in operation rates, which is the per-
centage of graduates that are still in operation and have not yet been acquired, and the
ve-year exit rates, which is the percentage of graduates that have been acquired. Financing
performance, including portions of startups which obtained venture nancing within one
year, ve years, and 2nd-5th year after graduation, are reported in the last three rows. Tier
1 accelerators dominate in all the performance measures reported. Compared to those from
Tier 3, graduates from Tier 2 accelerators enjoy better venture nancing.
1.3.3 Reduced-form Evidence
Assuming accelerators are the only decision-makers in the admission market, one can use
a probit model to study the revealed preference of accelerators.28 Specically, I form all
potential matches between accelerators and startups and construct the dependent variable
as the indicator of whether the match is observed in data. Table 1.3 reports the estimation
results.
The ndings indicate assortative patterns such that relocation is costly and Tier 1 creates
27Dropbox is the rst public rm which graduated from an accelerator as of April 2018.
28The alternative approach, which studies the preference of startups when the entrepreneurs are the
decision makers, is irrelevant to the research question.
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higher value for inexperienced entrepreneurs. The results also suggest that accelerators prefer
startups with experienced founders outside of startup hubs, while the entrepreneur gender
has no signicant impact. The prediction power of this model is low, at around 27%.
Table 1.4 shows the OLS estimates for the ex-post performance of accelerator graduates.
While Tier 1 and 2 graduates see better nancing after graduation, the heterogeneity only
exists within one-year after graduation (the short run). Older startups tend to live longer and
have a higher chance of obtaining funding in the short term. The experience, age, and gender
of entrepreneurs have no signicant correlations with the startup ex-post performance. I do
not nd that startups from startup hubs associate with higher value creation.
The preference of for-prot accelerators depends on the expected startup performance
after graduation. From this perspective, the two table results conict with each other in
several dimensions. For example, Table 1.3 indicates the startup age has no signicant
correlation with rm value at graduation while Table 1.4 suggests it positively associates
with the ex-post performance.
While the OLS ndings are inconclusive due to the concern of endogenous sorting, the
probit results are also biased by abstracting away from the market competition. The probit
model assumes the admitted startups are the accelerator's most preferred candidates, but in
reality, many accelerators admit sub-optimal choices because their most preferred startups
joined other accelerators. The following section proposes a two-sided matching model to
address this issue.
1.4 A Two-Sided Matching Model
1.4.1 Why Use a Matching Model
The accelerator admission is a match between the accelerator and startups. It is instructive
to observe that each startup deliberates among many viable alternative accelerators, and each
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accelerator considers viable startups from their pool of applicants. Through the equilibrium
channel, the values of possible alternative matchesboth implicit and explicit applications
provide a bound for the value of each realized match. Formalizing this intuition, this paper
analyzes the market participants' utility function with a revealed preference approach. I
use the characteristics of each startup and accelerator's alternative matches to estimate the
value of the matches that do occur.
Competition exists on both sides of the accelerator market. Because accelerators have
limited capacity, they only admit the best startups. At the same time, accelerators compete
to attract the good (desirable) candidates because each startup can only join one accelerator.
By assuming that each agent's decision is independent and has no externalities, standard
discrete choice models, such as logit and probit, cannot accommodate markets with two-
sided selection and competition in the choice set (See Mindruta et al. [116] for a detailed
discussion). To address this challenge, economists have developed two-sided matching models
to capture this market structure explicitly.
I model the accelerator admission as a two-sided matching game (Roth and Sotomayor
[135]). Each accelerator-startup match creates a joint match value and the match value
is split according to the pre-announced equity-share and seed investment, which are con-
sidered exogenous in this paper.29 Agents from both sides of the market maximize payos
by choosing matches with agents on the other side.30 In equilibrium, agents have no feasible
deviations to match with other partners and weakly increase the payos for all participants.
In the estimation, I construct counterfactual matches to each pair of observed matches within
the same market by switching their partners. Comparing pairs of observed matches with
their counterfactual matches yields sets of inequalities required by the equilibrium condition.
29This is based on the fact that such terms are xed once the accelerators announce them.
30To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, this paper abstract away from potential gain from comple-
mentarity in the accelerator portfolio. It is dicult for the accelerator to make decisions based on the
portfolio given a large number of applications. In reality, it is not rare to see two direct competitors in the
same cohort (Stross [141]).
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Given these inequalities and a parametric form for the match value function, I choose the
parameter vector that maximizes the fraction of inequality sets that hold. This is the max-
imum score estimator I propose in this paper. Compared with similar estimators as in Fox
[66] and Akkus et al. [6], this estimator studies non-transferable utility matching games, in
which neither the uniqueness or the competitiveness (eciency) of equilibrium is guaranteed.
1.4.2 Non-Transferable Utility Two-Sided Matching Model
The most common, and arguably the most important, criteria to separate dierent types of
matching model is between TU and NTU utility models (Chiappori and Salanié [35]). Under
TU matching games, matched agents endogenously decide their internal transfer from one
side to the other. An example is the CEO-company matching in which agents of both sides
negotiate terms of the compensation package. For other markets, such as student-school
matching, transfers are simply excluded, and NTU framework would make more sense rather
than TU models. The NTU model ts the accelerator market because all equity-share and
seed amount are not subject to negotiation between agents, similar to the school-student and
patient-doctor matchings. Further, Chiappori and Salanié [35] point out that TU matching
is more restrictive than NTU matching. In fact, any matching that is rationalizable by some
prole of preferences under TU is also rationalizable by some NTU stable matching.
Compared to TU matching, the number of empirical researches on NTU is much smaller
(Graham [82]). The challenges mainly come from two features of NTU matching models.
First, there exist multiple equilibria without strict model assumptions, and second, the
NTU pairwise stable condition, which will be explained in details later, indicates that four
possible underlying mechanisms can generate the same matching pattern. The latter raises
a signicant concern for many empirical models as researchers often only have access to
matched data in practice. Prior literature makes various simplifying assumptions. Boyd
et al. [27] rule out multiplicity and the underlying match-forming mechanism by assuming
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the status quo assignment is the product of the Gale and Shapley [72] deferred acceptance
algorithm (with rms proposing). Sørensen [139] imposes a xed utility sharing rule for all
possible matches in the market to guarantee a unique equilibrium. He gets rid of the second
challenge by restricting positive correlation between rst stage matching value and second
stage ex-post performance of such matching. Agarwal [3] restricts one side of the market
as having a homogeneous preference to the other side to guarantee a unique equilibrium.
His sign restriction and assumption of covariates with conditional full support address the
second challenge of identication.
Matching models can also be categorized by the capacity size of each agent on both
sides of the market. If one agent can only match with at most one partner, it is one-to-
one matching; if agents on one side can match with multiple agents on the other side, it is
many-to-one matching; it is many-to-many matching if both sides can partner with multiple
agents. The accelerator admission market ts into the two-sided many-to-one NTU matching
framework.
In this paper, I propose a maximum score estimator for the two-sided NTU matching
model. I show that the total match value is identied with only data on matched pairs if there
is enough variation in the sharing rule and there exists some non-trivial (with the parameter
not equal to zero) covariate with full support. This approach has several advantages: 1) it
does not suer the curse of dimensionality, 2) it is consistent with an endogenous dataset,
and 3) it allows for the existence of multiple equilibria.
1.4.3 Model Setup and Functional Form
During the accelerator admission process, I assume agents on both sides of the market share
a total match surplus Uas for a given match between the accelerator a and the entrepreneur
s. Denote the match between a and s as (a, s). Let Uaas be the payo for a from match (a, s)
and U sas be the payo for s from match (a, s). Agents in the market maximize their expected
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payos, which can be written in the following forms:
U sas = (1− Ea) ∗ Uas + βtta
Uaas = Ea ∗ Uas − βtta
where Ea is the equity share of the accelerator a and ta is the seed investment from the
accelerator a. Both Ea and ta are exogenous. βt is a parameter capture the relative import-
ance of the seed investment. By separating ta from Uas, I assume the seed investment as a
stipend for entrepreneurs, which does not increase the rm value. This assumption is not
important for the model identication and can be changed.31
Under additional assumptions that the for-prot accelerators and entrepreneurs make
decisions based on the expected nancial return of startups and all agents are risk neutral,
the total match surplus can be interpreted as the expected startup value at graduation. This
interpretation does not necessarily exclude non-rm related utilities such as access to the
accelerator network or having a high-quality entrepreneur as a mentor in the future. The key
assumption here is the utility is divided according to the equity share. Because the model
relies on agent's choices to infer the accelerator value creation, this approach recovers the
value created from the standpoints of the startup founder and the accelerator holder.32
Let the observed covariates of entrepreneur be Xs, accelerator covariates be Xa, and their
31Here I abstract away from potential individual costs on both sides of the market. The individual costs
do not aect the estimation if the startup (accelerator) faces the same individual costs for all possible
accelerators (startups). Startup's individual cost includes the founders' time and living expenses during the
accelerator program. It may also include migration spendings if the startup needs to relocate. Since the
majority of accelerator programs last for three months, the cost variation on time spending is small. Due to
data limitation, I assume the living costs are very similar across accelerators. The migration cost includes
the rm's moving expenses and potential business loss. This cost can directly reduce the rm valuation and
is therefore controlled by a relocation dummy in Uas. I assume the accelerators face the same cost across all
possible startup candidates.
32The model identication allows agents from each side of the market to have separate utility functions
as in the case of Agarwal [3]. I impose the current approach because 1) with fewer parameters to recover,
this model has lower requirements on data; 2) although it has a stronger assumption, this model ts the
accelerator market features.
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interactions be Xas. Let X





where Xasβx captures the deterministic part of the match value and ε
as is the unobserved
quality of each potential match. The model primitives are the vector of β = {βx, βt}.
Some additional model assumptions: 1) It is a static model in which all observables are
exogenous. 2) Each year is a separate market.33 Agents on one side of the market can only
be matched with agents from the other side of the same market. 3) Some accelerators run
multiple programs in various locations across years. I model the matching between programs
and startups. 4) Each program can admit multiple startups but each startup can only join
one program. 5) All agents have complete information about the market.
1.4.4 Model Identication And Estimation
Assuming the observed matching is an equilibrium, any two pairs of observed matches should
satisfy the pairwise stable condition (Roth and Sotomayor [135]). Following previous nota-
tions, let a and a′ be two dierent accelerators and s and s′ be two dierent startups. The
four agents are in the same market so there are two potential pairs of matches: {(a, s) (a′, s′)}
and {(a, s′) (a′, s)}. Let the {(a, s) (a′, s′)} be a stable match (observed) then the pairwise
stability condition indicates at least one of the following conditions to hold (see appendix
for details):























33This assumption is made for convenience and does not aect the model result's consistency
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In estimation, I randomly pick two pairs of matches in the same market each time as an
observation, and construct the sample as {(ai, si) (a′i, s′i)}, where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., N and N is
the sample size.34 Note that each time the pairwise stable condition depends on the agents'
preference over binary choices - whether she should stay with current partner or switch to
the alternative partner.
The proposed estimator builds on the so-called rank order property, similar to those in
Fox [64, 66]. For any two pairs of observed matches, (a, s) and (a′, s′), denote fa(a, s : β) =
Ea ∗ Xasβx − βtta, so that Uaas = fa(a, s : β) + Ea ∗ εas. Similarly, dene fs(a, s : β) =
(1 − Ea) ∗ Xasβx + βtta. The rank order property says that 1) fs(a, s : β) > fs(a′, s : β)
if and only if Prob(U sas > U
s
a′s) > 50%, and 2) fa(a, s : β) > fa(a, s
′ : β) if and only if
Prob(Uaas > U
a
as′) > 50%. The intuition is that the deterministic value of a given match
agrees with the unobserved value in expectation. A sucient condition for the rank order
property is that εas follows a distribution consists with the median independence feature as
in Manski [111, 112], such that Median(εas|Xas) = 0.
Following a rank order property, the pairwise stability condition can be transformed in
to the following maximum score estimator after some simple algebra.
Denote Ci = {(ai, si), (a′i, s′i)} and C̃i = {(a′i, si), (ai, s′i)} for each possible pairs i. Let
Sta(Ci, β) = 1 if and only if 1[fa(a, s : β)− fa(a, s′ : β) < 0|Ci, β]1[fs(a′, s′ : β)− fs(a, s′ :
β) < 0|Ci, β] = 0 and 1[fa(a′, s′ : β) − fa(a′, s : β) < 0|Ci, β]1[fs(a, s : β) − fs(a′, s :
β) < 0|Ci, β] = 0; Otherwise, Sta(Ci, β) = 0. With the intuition that the true β maximize
the number of times the deterministic value correctly indicates the pairwise stability as the
34Because the sample does not need to be i.i.d., one can pick all possible pairs of matches in the data when
the data size is small.
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(1[Sta(Ci, β) = 1]− 1[Sta(C̃i, β) = 1])
The model is unidentied without additional information because all four conditions
of the pairwise stability, which represent dierent underlying preferences respectively, can
generate the same matching pattern. Following the intuition in Tamer [143], I show the
identication with exclusion restrictions on each side of the market. The intuition is to
have one of the four conditions bind for some non-trivial subset of the observed matching.
In practice, I use the variations of equity-share and seed, which are exogenous once the
admission starts, among dierent accelerators to identify parameters that relate to one side
of the market. For the other side, I use the startup age, which is non-trivial in the value
creation and has enough variation conditional on other observables (see appendix for detailed
evidence).
Based on the pairwise comparison mechanism, the estimator only requires the relative
ranking of the two given choices in each observation. Because the relative ranking does
not depend on the existence of other possible choices, the estimator is consistent with non-
random samples. This feature is critical when not every agent is matched in the market and
researchers only observe matched pairs. Details on the identication and estimator features
are provided in the appendix.
1.4.5 Subsampling and Condence Intervals
I follow Akkus et al. [6] to obtain subsampling and condence intervals for the maximum
score estimator. Normalizing the startup age to have a parameter of +1 and−1 respectively, I
estimate the matching models by running the dierential evolution optimization routine from
40 dierent starting points (20 each for the positive and negative normalization respectively)
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and selecting the coecient vector that yields the highest value for the objective function.
For valid inference, I generate the condence intervals using the subsampling procedure
described by Politis and Romano [129] and Delgado et al. [51] to approximate the sampling
distribution. I randomly conduct 100 of these subsamples with size at about one third of
the total data set. .
For each of the subsamples, I estimate the parameter vector as for the whole dataset.
Call the estimate from the sth subsample β̂s and the estimate from the original full sample
β̄. The approximate sampling distribution for the parameter vector can be computed by
calculating β̃s = (ns/N)
1/3(β̂s − β̄) + β̄ for each subsample, where N and ns are the total
sample size and given subsample size respectively. I take the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th
percentile of this empirical sampling distribution to compute 95% condence intervals for all
of the estimates.
1.5 Main Results
Table 1.5 presents the estimates of the match value function. Model 1 includes no interactions
between observed factors of the two sides of the market. Model 2 extends Model 1 to study
the heterogeneity with interactions. The reported parameters are normalized to +1 of the
startup age as it generates the highest score. The positive parameter of startup age indicates
that the accelerator cannot fully oset the advantage of older rms, which tend to have lower
risks (see Appendix A.2). However, as indicated by the parameter's magnitude, this factor
is not very important in the accelerator value creation function.
For a convenient interpretation, I re-normalize the coecients to the dollar value based
on the Start Fund parameter, which represents a $150k increase. The rightmost column of
Table 1.5 reports the dollar-normalized value. One caveat of this approach is that the Start
Fund oer is a convertible debt which is not entirely cost-free to the startups. Therefore, the
24
calculated value is likely to be lower than the agent's actual dollar amount. Alternatively,
I can normalize to the seed investment value. However, this approach gives a more biased
result because the seed investment does not play an essential role in the accelerator value
creation. Nevertheless, the result after normalization based on the Start Fund parameter
indicates the seed investment worth $40k on average, close to the average seed investment
size.
1.5.1 Preferences For the Entrepreneur's Gender, Experience and
Location
Female entrepreneurs face a higher challenge to obtain venture nancing even after control
for rm quality (Dutt and Kaplan [56]). Model 1 of Table 1.5 reports that women also have
disadvantages in the accelerator market. While Model 2 also presents a negative coecient
of for Female Founder, I nd women benet from the cohort structure as indicated by
the positive coecient of the interaction between the female founder and cohort size. This
nding is consistent with the results of Linehan and Scullion [108], which reports that women
face diculties in networking in maledominated industries such as the venture investment
market. Considering that all but one accelerator program have cohorts with at least four
startups, the sum of parameters of log(Cohort Size)*Female Founder and Female Founder
is close or above zero, indicating women have no disadvantage in Tier 2 and 3 accelerators.
In Tier 1, female-led startups see a substantial disadvantage worth about half a million
dollars. One potential explanation is that Tier 1 accelerators discriminate against women.
In response to the criticism of admitting very few female entrepreneurs, Paul Graham, co-
founder of Y Combinator, points out that they have far fewer female applicants (Stross
[141]) although the acceptance odds for women is higher. Another potential explanation is
that because women tend to prefer a less competitive environment (Niederle and Vesterlund
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[120]), they may gain less in the fast paced program of top accelerators.35
Without accelerators, serial entrepreneurs (Hsu [93], Gompers et al. [80]) tend to produce
better business and attract more venture investors. In the accelerator market, Model 1
reports that the prior entrepreneurship experience does not matter on average. However,
with the decomposition of Model 2, I nd this is only true in Tier 1 and 2 accelerators. The
similar magnitudes of Inexperienced Founder, Tier 1*Inexperienced Founder, and Tier
2*Inexperienced Founder point out that the experience with the best accelerators levels the
dierence between experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs. The insignicant parameter
of founders' age, which is another proxy for entrepreneurs' experience, supports this result
by indicating that accelerators are helpful to reduce uncertainty for young entrepreneurs.
Accelerators can promote the local entrepreneurship ecosystem (Fehder and Hochberg
[62]) by pooling regional resources to focus on startups with high potential. Model 1 and
2 generate dierent ndings for the startup founding location eect. Because Tier 1 ac-
celerators concentrate in startup hubs, rms founded in startup hubs, which also tend to
have higher rates of inexperienced and male entrepreneurs36, see lower cost to join these
accelerators. Therefore, after the decomposition in Model 2, the positive parameter of the
indicator of startup founding location ips to negative. The result suggests that accelerat-
ors still prefer rms founded in startup hubs, indicating that the pooled resources are not
sucient to replace the better environment in places like Silicon Valley. On the other hand,
relocating rms to participate accelerators in startup hubs is not optimal either because such
relocation costs are around USD 670,000 (on average).
35 The top programs are very competitive (https://alexiskold.net/2014/08/19/top-10-reasons-to-join-and-
not-to-join-an-accelerator/). Stross [141] points out that the weekly updates with mentors and peers create
a high-pressure environment in Y Combinator.
36Correlations are 0.017 and 0.057 respectively.
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1.5.2 Other Findings
The negative coecient of log(cohort size) in Table 1.5 indicates that the adverse education
eects dominate the positive peer/networking eects for individual rms in a large cohort.
Based on this nding, it is not surprising to see that Y Combinator shrank its class size
in 2012.37 With a coecient of 0.15, slightly lower than 10% of Tier 1 average total match
value, the oer of the Start Fund's convertible debt creates value but not a signicant amount
in relative scale for the Tier 1 programs.
As indicated by the parameter of macroeconomic condition dummy One-Yr-Aft-Crisis,
which equals to one when the general venture investment condition is poor (during the crisis
and one year after its ocial end), the accelerators create higher value when there are fewer
outside options. There are two potential reasons: 1) because there are limited alternatives
outside, more resources, such as high-quality mentors, contribute to improving the training
of accelerators during the crisis; 2) the accelerator improvement in nancing becomes more
critical because the chance to obtain funding outside is small. After careful research, I do
not nd any signicant resources added, which might improve the accelerator's training,
concentrated around the end of the nancial crisis. Since accelerators attract applicants
through public media channels, such improvement is unlikely to be condential or only
internally announced. Further, I nd an increasing trend in the long-term performance
across graduates over years, conicting with the better resource argument.38
Assuming nancial return maximizing risk-neutral agents, the match value represents the
expected startup value at graduation. Table 1.6 shows a summary of the value captured by
deterministic parts across accelerators.
On average, the accelerator participants anticipate startups at graduation to be worth
more than one and a half million dollars based on my calculation using deterministic factors.
37Source: http://seriousstartups.com/2012/12/03/ycombinator-shrinks-class-size-too-smaller/
38The 5-year survival rates: 38.96% for 2008, 39.00% for 2009, 37.30% for 2010, and 47.53% for 2011; The
5-year funding rates: 33.77% for 2008, 37.00% for 2009, 44.16% for 2010, and 57.88% for 2011.
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Although the actual expected value is likely to be higher because the matched startups tend
to have better draw in the unobserved quality, the calculated value is already much higher
than the startup's valuations reected through calculating seed/equity. The nding again
supports that the seed investment is not a key component in the accelerator value creation.
Pitchbook reported that the median valuation of seed-round startup during the same period
is about $3m to $4m.39 Considering that the rms covered in the Pitchbook report are
generally one or two years older than the accelerator graduates and about 30% to 40% of
accelerator graduates fail, the calculated results are likely to be close to the real value.40
The Tier 1 accelerators have signicant advantages in value creation, about 15% higher
than Tier 2 and 40% higher than Tier 3. The edges are not entirely due to the sorting eect.
Instead, the program quality premium, as captured in the Tier 1 dummy, contributes to 13%
of Tier 1 value creation.41
1.6 Policy Evaluations
The previous ndings indicate that the accelerator admission still depends on the entrepren-
eur's demographic characteristics, although such dependency is lower than that of traditional
investors. To address this issue, external nancial supports, such as oering equity-free accel-
erators for certain groups of startups, are popular in the accelerator market.42 For example,
Rockhealth and Portland Seed Fund oer each rm $20k and $25k respectively but do not
take any equity. However, the eect of nancial support is hard to predict due to two coun-
tervailing forces. On the one hand, if the market equilibrium stays the same (i.e., no change
in the matching), this intervention directly increases the startups' value by an amount equi-
39In my dataset, the median size of venture funding within one year after graduation is $0.78m. Pitch-
book Source: https://qz.com/1051121/the-median-value-of-seed-stage-startups-hits-their-highest-valuation-
on-record-6-2-million/
40See the appendix for a comparable dataset on average age of rms at their rst venture nancing.
41Tier 1 parameter of 0.23 divides the total value of 1.73, which gives 13.34%.
42See a list of equity-free accelerators at https://lootstrap.com/equity-free-startup-accelerators.
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valent to the support. If only one accelerator receives such support, the value increase of the
accelerator's graduate can be higher because the accelerator also attracts better candidates
by oering higher value. On the other hand, if such grants award multiple accelerators, a
cannibalization eect arises. Because of the market competition, the support can generate
a new market equilibrium, and indirectly forces some startups to match with their inferior
partners (or stay alone). If the increase from the direct eect cannot oset the decrease from
the indirect eect, the net benet of the policy intervention can be negative for the targeted
communities.
The examples in Table 1.7 illustrate the impacts of countervailing forces. In both cases,
I assume the utility share between accelerators and rms are xed and remain the same for
all participants so that the total match utility determines the matching pattern. In the rst
case, the subsidies to both accelerators decrease the overall welfare of the market by making
one accelerator worse o; in the second case, a subsidy to only one accelerator makes all
market participants better o.
In this section, I evaluate the eectiveness of two policy interventions to help constrained
entrepreneurs. The rst one studies the eect of subsidies to replace equity funding with
a grant and the second one examines the impact of additional capital injection to startups
(similar to the case of Start Fund for Y Combinator in 2011). For each of the analysis, I
impose three types of subsidies. Because female entrepreneurs have lower chance to join Tier
1 accelerators, the rst type called Gender Subsidy supports female applicants for Tier 1.
The second type called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity
to enter Tier 3. The last type called T3 Subsidy aims to help Tier 3 accelerators located
outside of startup hubs to boost local economy.
The proposed estimator does not capture the value of agents' outside choices and iden-
ties the model primitives based on necessary (i.e., the pairwise stability) but not sucient
conditions. Although this approach imposes weaker requirements on data during estimation,
29
it causes several challenges to conducting a counterfactual analysis.
First I have limited information on the distribution of unobservable quality of each poten-
tial match. For robustness, I simulate the error terms 200 times with a normal distribution
with mean zero and standard deviations of 1, 2, 3 and 5, respectively. The general pat-
terns are similar, and therefore I only report the results with the standard deviation of one.
Second, I do not have information on which equilibrium is realized in the data. In response,
I use the Gale and Shapley [72] algorithm to form matches with startups proposing43, which
is likely to be close to the reality given the low acceptance rate of accelerators.44 Because
it generates the startup-optimal matching (Roth and Sotomayor [135]), this approach is in
line with the purpose of the policy interventions to improve the startup growth. Third, I
do not have information on the population of all potential applicants of accelerators. Prior
literature (e.g. Agarwal [3], Akkus et al. [6]) conducts counterfactual analysis using the ori-
ginal dataset assuming all market participants are observed. However, prohibiting agent's
entry and exit, this approach is not very informative in this study given a large number
of unobserved accelerator applicants.45 In response, I evaluate the policy impacts using
simulated startups. I simulate 750 rms each year across four years and generate the rm
characteristics based on the moments of observed data.46 Although the simulated dataset
is not representative to the population of all accelerator applicants, it can capture the fea-
tures of those high-quality startups which have higher chance to be admitted.47 I form the
43Startup proposing means that the startups take the initiative to apply for accelerators and accelerators
decide which startups to admit. Please refer to Gale and Shapley [72] for the details.
44However, there is evidence that accelerators, even Y Combinator, will send invitations to startups (Stross
[141]). I also conduct a version of simulation with accelerators proposing. Although startups see lower match
values on average, the general pattern of the results hold.
45Using observed data also causes diculty to simulate the error term. Because of sorting, the unobserved
quality associated with admitted startups are drawn from the right of an unknown threshold of the underlying
distribution.
46Another way to simulate the data is to use the accelerator participants' characteristic changes over
the years. This approach works well if we can assume the type and number of applicants remain similar
over time. However, this assumption is not accurate. Over the years, more high-quality startups begin to
participate in this market thanks to the early success of accelerators.
47Note that this simulation may cause a biased result if the policy intervention has a large enough impact.
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benchmark, as shown in Table 1.8, with simulated dataset and model estimates for all policy
evaluations. The caveat notwithstanding, evaluating outcomes with the same equilibrium
forming mechanism with simulated dataset serves to illustrate the countervailing forces that
shape interactions between market structure and policy interventions.
1.6.1 Equity-free Accelerator
Many institution-backed accelerators oer free seed (no equity) as a grant for their parti-
cipants. Like a scholarship to the startups, this policy hopes to attract more entrepreneurs
from the subsidized community by lowering their cost to participate in accelerators. In this
counterfactual, I impose policies under which accelerators do not take any equity from the
subsidized startups. The subsidy compensates accelerators' loss, which is the original equity
share times the expected startup value at graduation. As a result, this subsidy changes the
preference of startups but not that of accelerators.
Table 1.9 reports the impacts on participants of subsidized accelerators. I nd neither of
the three types of subsidies signicantly change the admission rates of female entrepreneurs,
rst-time founders, and startups founded outside of startup hubs in accelerators. The intu-
ition is that increasing the willingness of startups which face challenges to join accelerators
does not increase the competitiveness of these startups from the accelerator perspective.
Therefore the accelerators will not admit more entrepreneurs who have disadvantages in
accelerators although they may see more applications from those entrepreneurs.
To illustrate the policy's impact on startup value, Table 1.9 also reports the calculated
value changes based on the deterministic part. Note that although the calculated startup
For example, if a subsidy gives every female founder a $10m capital injection, the accelerators will be full of
rms founded by women. The accelerators will also attract very high-quality startups, which would not want
to join accelerators otherwise. If there are not enough high-quality female-led startups, accelerators will also
admit low-quality female-led startups, which would not be admitted without the subsidy. The simulated
data does not capture either the high or low-quality startups. In this paper, I only test the policies which
cause marginal changes.
31
values are lower than the real expected values by abstracting away from the unobserved
quality, the value changes due to the policy are not necessarily biased.
Based on the deterministic startup values and the equity share, the average cost due to
the subsidies is at around $100k for each subsidized startup for all three types of policies.
While Gender Subsidy has almost no impact on the startup value, Exp Subsidy and T3
subsidy increase the value of subsidized startups, but the level of improvement is no higher
than the amount of subsidy size.
1.6.2 Capital Injection
Because reducing the participation cost is not an eective means to assist entrepreneurs with
disadvantages in accelerators, I examine another potential subsidy which oers additional
capital for startups after graduation. Such direct capital injections to startups, similar
to the Start Fund for Y Combinator in 2011, have become popular in top accelerators
(e.g., TechStars followed Y Combinator in 2012) but are rare in other programs. In this
counterfactual, I examine the impacts of providing a grant of $150k to entrepreneurs with
disadvantages. Compared with the previous approach, this subsidy cost is about 50% higher.
48 Based on the equity share, the startup value increase due to the capital injection changes
the preferences of both accelerators and startups.
As shown in Table 1.10, Gender Subsidy creates little change in the participants' prole
and startup values. One reason is that the disadvantage of women in Tier 1 is substantial
compared with the subsidy size. With a relatively milder weakness in Tier 3, rst-time
founders see a signicant increase, by about 3.5%, in admission rates in Tier 3 under the
Exp Subsidy. Because women tend to be inexperienced, the Exp Subsidy also increases
the admission rates of female-led startups by 7.1% in Tier 3. By subsidizing all startups
48The real cost increase is likely to be lower than 50% because the calculation in previous approach ignores
the unobserved quality.
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from Tier 3 accelerators outside of startup hubs, T3 Subsidy does not increase admission
rates of female or rst-time entrepreneurs. Because the subsidy size is small compared with
the relocation cost, this support does not raise the participation rates of startups founded
in startup hubs either.
With higher costs, the capital injection approach generates higher increases in startup
values. However, the improvements are not substantial, and no increase is larger than the
subsidy size.
1.7 Startup Performance After Accelerators
A fundamental assumption of my empirical approach is that the revealed preference reects
the accelerator's ability to level the dierence between startups. This section provides a
validity check on this assumption by studying the performance variation across startups
after experience with accelerators. I examine how two outcome measures - nancing and
acquisition - depend on the accelerator and startup factors.
The popular di-in-di approach to study startup performance after accelerators in prior
literature (e.g., Hochberg [90], Yu [151]) is improper to examine the variation among ac-
celerators because of the presence of sorting. With the matching estimates, I propose a
method, which is similar to the approach in Akkus et al. [5], to control for the unobserved
heterogeneity in regressions.
1.7.1 Model Setup
The concern over using traditional methods like OLS to study the accelerator impact relates
to the endogeneity in the unobserved term. Take the OLS for example.49 For a given startup
performance measure, PF (e.g., funding probability), and the match between a and s, the
49It is also applicable to other similar methods such as Logit and Probit.
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OLS estimates PFas = Z
asδ + tas, where Zas is a vector of observed covariates and tas is
the unobserved term. To generate consistent estimates, the OLS requires that tas to be
independent of Zas, which is satised if the accelerators and startups are matched purely
based on Zas (i.e., the researcher can fully capture the agent's decision through observables).
However, this is not accurate in the accelerator market, and we have PFas correlates with the
matching value Uas through the unobserved terms. In other words, the correlation between
εas and tas is not zero.
Note that we can write PFas = Z
asδ+ tas = Zasδ+ γεas + eas, where γ is the correlation
between εas and tas, and eas is i.i.d.. Given εas = Uas −Xasβ as in the matching model, we
have PFas = Z
asδ+γ(Uas−Xasβ)+eas, which can be consistently estimated if one observes
Uas. Following Akkus et al. [5], I use a proxy Pas for Uas as Uas = Pas + vas, where vas is
independent of Pas, Z
as, and Xas. In this way, PFas = Z
asδ + γ(Pas − Xasβ) + ξas with
ξas = (e
as + γvas) and ξas is independent of Pas, Z
as, and Xas. In this paper, I let P be the
dummy of startup survival (either has been acquired or in operation) status ve years after
graduation. Other alternatives and robustness check will be discussed in the appendix.
In summary, the second stage estimation is:
PFas = Z
asδ + γ [Pas − (Xasβ)] + ξas
1.7.2 Model Results
I examine the accelerator's impact on startup performance through two measures. The rst
measure is the external nancing captured through an indicator variable on whether the rm
obtains venture nancing after graduation. I collect this information from CrunchBase and
cross check it with CBinsights and Capital IQ for accuracy. When no funding information is
found, I assume the company has not raised any money. Alternatively, I can use the funding
size as a measure. However, since the equity information is mostly missing, this measure is
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subject to considerable noise.
Given that acquisition statistics are often cited when accelerators speak to the perform-
ance of their portfolio companies, it is an important metric of success(Yu [151]).50 Acquired
is a binary variable, with 1 indicating that a company has been acquired and 0 indicat-
ing that a company has not been acquired.51 I collect the acquisition information mainly
from the Crunchbase and CapitalIQ. I cross check them from the company websites and the
founders' Linkedin pages.
For independent variables, I include the same set of factors as in the matching model.
To avoid the interpretation challenge caused by the Start Fund factor, I exclude the cohort
that received the Start Fund investment in this stage.52
I examine four types of models in this stage. Table 1.11 shows results for the rst three
models. The rst model studies the accelerator impact on rm nancing probability within
one-year after graduation. The second model examines startups' long-term (i.e., 2nd to 5th
year after graduation) nancing rates given they were founded within one year after gradu-
ation. The third model is the same as the second except it is for rms that did not get funded
within one year after graduation. Table 1.12 reports estimates for the last model, which stud-
ies the acquisition rates. Across all models, the coecients of (Proxy −MatchingV alue),
which proxies for the εas in the matching model, indicate signicant positive sorting in the
market.
In regards to fundraising, female entrepreneurs and rst-time founders have no disad-
50One caveat of this measure is that acquisitions do not always happen because the target rm is of high
quality. Sometimes a startup is acquired for its technology or human capital despite its poor performance.
The failure rates are also an appealing statistic to test. However, it is unclear whether a fast failure in the
accelerator market is necessarily bad. Yu [151] argues the accelerator creates value by allowing low-quality
businesses to fail faster.
51I do not use Initial Public Oering (IPO) because there is only one such case.
52With the presence of Start Fund, the dependent variable captures the additional eects since the
graduates have already been funded by Start Fund. Although not reported, I tested the case with Start
Fund and all the following results hold with slightly dierent magnitudes. The coecient of Start Fund
is negative but insignicant.
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vantages in the short-term. Female entrepreneurs even tend to perform better in a larger
cohort. Over the long-term, while female founders still see no disadvantage, younger entre-
preneurs tend to outperform. Startups founded outside startup hubs have less of a chance to
obtain venture nancing. Older startups have a higher chance to be more successful in the
short-term, but their advantages disappear in the long-term. These results are consistent
with the ndings in the matching model.
The coecients of accelerator tier dummies indicate that Tier 1 and 2 have signicantly
higher impacts on the venture nancing in the short-term. In the long-term, I nd the Tier
1 and 2 accelerators' impact persists over time for startups that obtained fundraising in the
short-term. In addition, the accelerator's impact is not due to the improved nancing in the
short-term. On the other hand, I do not nd Tier 1 and 2 have advantages for startups who
do not obtain nancing in the short-term. While Tier 1 and 2 graduates still have a higher
chance of survival (Tier 1 56%, Tier 2 42%, Tier 3 41%) and raising funds, this dierence is
small and seems to be caused by the sorting eect as suggested by the last model in Table
1.11.
The ndings in Table 1.12 for acquisition rates are similar to the long-term nancing
except that I do not nd a signicant dierence among accelerators. One potential reason is
that the most successful graduates, especially those from top accelerators, operate on their
own. While the acquisition rates may still be a useful metric to evaluate some accelerators,
they are not accurate when comparing the dierence between dierent tiers.
For comparison, I report results for naive methods without controlling for sorting in
unobserved heterogeneity in Table 1.12. Similar results for Table 1.11 models can be found
in Table 1.4. Across these models, the estimates for the physical distance, as captured by
Out-of-State Participant, are the most obvious dierences. Further, the advantage of Tier
1 and 2 programs remain the same or even decreases after control for sorting, especially in
the long-term. Considering the non-trivial positive sorting as suggested by the parameter
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of (Proxy −MatchingV alue), this nding suggests that the top accelerators tend to pick
those startups with lower expected quality captured by the unobservable factors, which may
seem bizarre at rst glance. One explanation is that these are rms with high risk but also
high potential return if successful. Since Tier 1 and 2 programs may have the best pick in
the market and are more condent in their ability, they can aord to take these candidates.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper studies the ability of accelerators to level the playing eld for startups by reducing
the correlation between a startup's growth opportunity and its founder's demographic char-
acteristics. I develop a novel framework to estimate the preference of for-prot accelerators
in the admission process. My results suggest that female founders have no disadvantage in
accelerators, except in the top programs. High-quality accelerators can alleviate the human
capital dierence between experienced and inexperienced entrepreneurs. And, the acceler-
ator alone cannot entirely replace the support from a better environment in startup hubs like
Silicon Valley. Though counterfactuals, I nd that equity-free accelerators does not increase
admission rates of female entrepreneurs, rst-time founders, or founders not present in star-
tup hubs. Direct capital injection to inexperienced entrepreneurs can raise the admission
rates of rst-time founders as well as female founders.
The proposed NTU matching estimator extends the empirical NTU matching literature
by generating consistent estimates with only endogenously selected observations. With the
identication relying on variations in the xed utility sharing rule, this method is applicable
to similar settings such as the school-student market. For example, while prior literature
studying the impacts of scholarship on college participation focuses the extensive margin
(e.g., Dynarski (2003); Dynarski (2002)), the framework of this paper allows researchers to
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examine the internal dynamics of the market participants (i.e., do more minorities join better
colleges due to the impact of scholarships?).
Table 1.1: Accelerator Proles Across Tiers
Note: The accelerator participants are early-stage startups - mostly rms before any venture capital nancing. The majority of
these early accelerators focuses on high-tech startups, especially in information technology related elds. Better accelerators, as
indicated by the tiers, tend to take lower equity and have bigger classes. Furthermore, the best accelerators take low equities from
rms but do not give the highest seed investment. The second tier programs are the most generous in terms of rm valuation,
taking low equity and giving high seeds. On average, the entrepreneurs who participate in accelerators are signicantly younger
than the non-participants (close to 40). Further, while some argue accelerators are for rst-time entrepreneurs, one-third of
participants have founded some company before.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
# of Accelerators 2 8 17
# of Programs 19 25 30
# of States Represented 5 6 15
# of Programs in Startup Hubs (CA, NY, MA) 13 8 6
Equity Range 5%~6% 5%~8% 5%~10%
Seed Investment Range 10k~20k 10k~50k 6k~25k
Average Valuation (Seed/Equity) 307.9k 364.2k 274.9k
Average Cohort Size 26.72 13.12 8.01
# of Startups 335 239 202
Startup Average Age 1.83 1.73 1.77
Average Founder Age 27.81 29.37 29.68
Inexperienced Team 61.49% 63.18% 61.39%
Female Founder in Team 4.78% 13.81% 9.90%
Graduate Degree Founder in Team 30.45% 39.75% 36.63%
Industry: IT/Software 46.27% 44.77% 52.48%
Industry: Social Media/Social Platform 16.71% 18.83% 19.31%
Industry: Healthcare/Education 4.78% 9.21% 7.43%
Industry: Others 32.24% 27.19% 20.78%
38
Table 1.2: Accelerator Performance Across Tiers
Note: In Operation Rates represents the percentage of rms still in operation and not acquired ve years after graduation.
Acquisition Rates represents the percentage of rms that have been acquired within ve years after graduation. One-Year
and Five-Year show the startup performance within one year and ve years after graduation respectively.









In Operation Rates 49.25% 2.73% 58.16% 3.19% 47.52% 3.51%
Acquisition Rates 28.36% 2.46% 20.50% 2.61% 13.36% 2.39%
Startup Funding Rates
One-Year 52.24% 2.73% 47.28% 3.23% 25.74% 3.08%
Five-Year 58.21% 2.69% 53.97% 3.22% 32.67% 3.30%
Startup Funding Sizes Given Funded (k$)
One-Year 1,696 2,216 956 1,432 986 1,272
Five-Year 16,135 59,890 5,549 13,147 6,802 18,104
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Table 1.3: Reduced-Form Evidence: Probit of Chosen By Accelerators
Note: The stars indicate signicance level (* for 90%, ** for 95%, and *** for 99%). Assuming accelerators are the only
decision-makers in the admission market, one can use a Probit model to study the revealed preference of accelerators with
results shown in this table. Specically, I form all potential matches between accelerators and startups and construct the
dependent variable as the indicator of whether the match is observed in data. Although this estimation is biased due to the
correlation among unobserved terms, we still nd some assortative patterns such that relocation is costly and Tier 1 creates
higher value for inexperienced entrepreneurs. R2 = 0.27.
Variables Coef Std. Err.
Panel A: Startup Factors
Female Founder(s) -0.11 0.28
Inexperienced Founder(s) -0.28** 0.11
Founded Outside Startup Hubs 0.50*** 0.05
0.01*Average Founder Age -0.01*** 0.00
Startup Age 0.00 0.02
Panel B: Complementarities
log(Cohort Size)*Female Founder 0.03 0.13
Tier 1*Female Founder -0.22 0.23
Tier 2*Female Founder 0.16 0.18
log(Cohort Size)*Inexperienced Founder 0.07 0.05
Tier 1*Inexperienced Founder 0.45*** 0.08
Tier 2*Inexperienced Founder -0.02 0.07




Table 1.4: Reduced-Form Evidence: Short-Term Financing, Long-Term Financing, and Sur-
vival
Note: The stars indicate signicance level (* for 90%, ** for 95%, and *** for 99%). Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals
to one if the accelerator program happens before July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of
NBER denition. This table shows the regression results of four models. The rst model ST nancing has the independent
variable of indicators on whether the startup obtained venture nancing within one year after graduation. The LT Financing
1 has independent variables of indicators on whether the rm, which was funded within one year after graduation, obtained
venture nancing between 2nd-5th year after graduation. The LT Financing 2 has the independent variable of an indicator on
whether the rm, which was NOT funded within one year after graduation, obtained venture nancing between 2nd-5th year
after graduation. The last model has the independent variable of an indicator as to whether the rm survived within 5-year
after graduation. I exclude the cohort which received Start Fund investment to avoid biased estimation.









Panel A: Startup Factors
Female 0.01 0.12 0.34 0.27 -0.05 0.13 -0.11 0.12
Inexperienced -0.01 0.07 0.30** 0.15 -0.10 0.08 -0.02 0.07
Founded Outside
Startup Hubs
-0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04
0.01*Avg
Founder Age
0.15 0.34 0.01 0.61 -0.21 0.39 0.90*** 0.34
Startup Age 0.07*** 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04* 0.02
Panel B: Accelerator Factors
log(Cohort) -0.01 0.07 -0.07 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.08 0.07
Tier 1 0.32*** 0.09 0.41*** 0.15 -0.05 0.13 0.15 0.09
Tier 2 0.22*** 0.08 0.29** 0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.09 0.08
Panel C: Complementarities
log(Cohort)*Female 0.24* 0.12 0.35 0.23 -0.05 0.16 0.13 0.12
Tier 1*Female -0.02 0.19 -0.22 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.22 0.19
Tier 2*Female -0.07 0.16 -0.63* 0.35 -0.11 0.17 -0.02 0.16
log(Cohort)*Inexp 0.03 0.08 -0.03 0.14 -0.07 0.11 0.05 0.08
Tier 1*Inexp -0.04 0.12 -0.35* 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.04 0.12
Tier 2*Inexp -0.04 0.10 -0.34* 0.19 0.20* 0.12 -0.05 0.10
Out-of-State
Participant
0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.10* 0.05 -0.03 0.04
Panel D: Other Match Specics
Crisis & One Yr
Aft Crisis
-0.22*** 0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.05 -0.07 0.04
Constant 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.39*** 0.14 0.24* 0.13
Observations 648 274 368 648
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Table 1.5: Matching Model Results
Note: ** indicates within 95% CI. Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals to one if the accelerator program happens before
July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of NBER denition. Model 1 includes no interactions
between observed factors of the two sides of the market. Model 2 extends Model 1 to study the heterogeneity with interactions.
Normalizing the startup age to have parameter of ±1, I estimate the matching models (rst and third stages) by running the
dierential evolution optimization routine from 40 dierent starting points (20 each for the positive and negative normalization
respectively) and selecting the coecient vector that yields the highest value for the objective function. For valid inference, I
generate the condence intervals using the subsampling procedure described by Politis and Romano [129] and Delgado et al. [51]
to approximate the sampling distribution. I randomly conduct 100 of these subsamples with size at about one third of the total
data set. For each of the subsamples, I estimate the parameter vector as for the whole dataset. Call the estimate from the sth
subsample β̂s and the estimate from the original full sample β. The approximate sampling distribution for the parameter vector
can be computed by calculating β̃s = (n/N)
1/3(β̂s − β) + β for each subsample, where N and ns are the total sample size and
given subsample size respectively. I take the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile of this empirical sampling distribution
to compute 95% condence intervals for all of the estimates. For a convenient interpretation, I re-normalize the coecient in
the right most column to the dollar value based on the Start Fund parameter, which represents a USD 150k increase.
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Coef C.I. (95%) Coef C.I. (95%) Coef
$m
Panel A: Startup Factors
Female -3.09** -5.58 -1.88 -5.29** -22.28 -0.06 -0.12
Inexperienced -0.02 -0.19 0.07 -13.32** -16.38 -0.38 -0.30
Founded Outside
Startup Hubs
2.46** 1.01 11.13 -4.95** -10.03 -0.21 -0.11
0.01*Avg
Founder Age
2.30 -2.73 3.28 0.58 -3.41 2.26 0.01
Startup Age 1 super consistent 1 super consistent 0.02
Panel B: Accelerator Factors
log(Cohort) -7.49** -11.34 -7.42 -4.12** -9.62 -3.86 -0.09
Tier 1 11.65** 11.45 17.75 10.21** 10.11 29.83 0.23
Tier 2 2.93** 1.85 4.49 5.40 -0.79 22.17 0.12
Start Fund 5.26** 4.00 8.08 6.64** 4.22 16.78 0.15




4.12** 3.14 9.65 0.09
Tier 1*Female -20.63** -39.75 -9.20 -0.47
Tier 2*Female -5.87 -12.68 11.33 -0.13
log(Cohort)*Inexp -0.13 -2.99 0.55 0.00
Tier 1*Inexp 13.50** 1.51 15.65 0.30
Tier 2*Inexp 13.61** 0.71 15.36 0.31
Out-of-State
Participant
-16.20** -24.57 -16.03 -29.51** -42.87 -26.63 -0.67
Panel D: Other Match Specics
Crisis & One Yr
Aft Crisis
2.41** 1.13 9.52 12.86** 3.85 23.02 0.29
Constant 46.24** 45.59 64.10 79.93** 77.50 83.45 1.81
Matching Score 81.11% 81.18%
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Table 1.6: Summary of Match Values
Note: This table reports the total match surplus of observed matches between startups and accelerators. All these values are
calculated with the estimates in Table 5 Model 2. It is renormalized to million USD based on the importance of USD 150k
capital through the Start Fund. The mean dierences among all three tiers are signicant at 99%. For comparison, the last
column reports the average startup valuation in million USD calculated based on the accelerator's seed and equity-share. Note
that the calculated value ignores the unobserved quality and therefore likely to be downward biased due to selection. Further,
because of sorting, this bias tends to be larger in better accelerators.
Obs Mean (m$) Std. Dev Seed/Equity
Tier 1 Accelerators 319 1.73 0.31 0.31
Tier 2 Accelerators 226 1.50 0.37 0.36
Tier 3 Accelerators 191 1.24 0.34 0.27
All Accelerators 736 1.53 0.39 0.32
Table 1.7: Examples of Policy Intervention Eects
Note: This table shows two examples to illustrate the complexity of the equilibrium conditions of NTU two-sided matching,
which makes the eect of policy intervention on the accelerator market hard to predict. In both cases, I assume the utility
share between accelerators and rms are xed and the same for all participants so that the total match utility determines the
matching pattern. The rst column reports the match values for all potential matches in the baseline case. The third column
reports the match values in the scenario with a subsidy. The second and fourth columns report the realized matches for the
baseline and subsidy scenario respectively. In example 1, the subsidies to both accelerators decreased the total welfare of the
market by making one of the accelerators worse o; In the second example, a subsidy to only one of the accelerators makes all







Accelerator A - Firm 1 9 X 10
Accelerator A - Firm 2 8 11 X
Accelerator B - Firm 1 0 2 X
Accelerator B - Firm 2 8 X 10
Example 2:
Accelerator A - Firm 1 6 X 6
Accelerator A - Firm 2 9 9 X
Accelerator B - Firm 1 8 12 X
Accelerator B - Firm 2 10 X 11
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Table 1.8: Startup Characteristic Moments of Simulated Dataset
Note: The rm value represents the average startup share of the graduation value. I use the Gale and Shapley [72] algorithm
to form matches with startups proposing, which is likely to be close to the reality given the low acceptance rate of accelerators.
Because it generates the startup-optimal matching (Roth and Sotomayor [135]), this approach is in line with the purpose of the
policy interventions to improve the startup growth. I simulate 750 rms each year across four years, and the rm characteristics
are generated based on the estimated joint distribution of data. Although the simulated dataset is not representative to the
population of all accelerator applicants, it is likely to capture the features of those high-quality startups which are more likely
to be admitted. I simulate the error terms 200 times with a normal distribution with mean zero and the standard deviation of
one.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Firm Value in m$ 1.74 0.01 1.60 0.01 1.40 0.01
Female Founder 6.74% 1.10% 8.53% 1.40% 9.51% 1.47%
Experienced
Founder
36.31% 1.94% 39.51% 2.30% 43.81% 2.75%
Startup Founded in
Startup Hubs
59.70% 1.81% 48.38% 2.35% 39.90% 2.31%
Average Founder
Age
28.52 0.21 29.39 0.26 29.24 0.32
Startup Age 1.78 0.03 1.83 0.04 1.71 0.05
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Table 1.9: CF1: Replace Equity Funding With Grants
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents in startup hubs. N-SH indicates for accelerators not in startup hubs. Base
is the baseline scenario and CF indicates the counterfactual analysis results. This table shows the changes concerning rm
values and startup factors for each policy intervention based on the simulated benchmark. In this counterfactual, I impose
policies to oer equity-free accelerators to entrepreneurs with disadvantages in accelerators. Under these policy interventions,
accelerators do not take any equity from the subsidized startups and compensate for the loss, which is the original equity share
times the expected startup value at graduation, from the subsidy. As a result, this subsidy changes the preference of startups
but not that of accelerators. The rst policy called Gender Subsidy supports female applicants to Tier 1. The second policy
called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity to enter Tier 3. The last policy called T3 Subsidy
aims to help Tier 3 accelerators located outside of startup hubs.
Accelerator
Participants














1.68 1.69 +0.01 1.40 1.42 +0.02* 1.36 1.46 +0.10*
Female 23.74 23.69 -0.05 19.71 19.72 +0.01 19.72 19.73 +0.01
Inexp 224.19 224.13 -0.06 116.39 116.36 -0.02 116.36 116.49 +0.12
#Founded
NSH
141.87 141.97 +0.10 124.37 124.34 -0.02 124.34 124.45 +0.11
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Table 1.10: CF2: Capital Injection
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents within startup hubs. Base is the baseline scenario and CF indicates
the counterfactual analysis results. This table shows the changes concerning rm values and startup factors for each policy
interventions based on the simulated benchmark. In the second counterfactual, I evaluate the policy interventions to provide
a grant of $150k to startups but do not change the equity funding structure. Compared with the previous approach, these
types of policy often involve bigger subsidies because part of the support indirectly goes to accelerators due to the equity share.
These grants change the preference of both accelerators and startups. The rst policy called Gender Subsidy supports female
applicants to Tier 1. The second policy called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity to enter
Tier 3. The last policy called T3 Subsidy aims to help Tier 3 accelerators located outside of startup hubs.
Accelerator
Participants














1.68 1.69 +0.01 1.40 1.43 +0.03* 1.36 1.50 +0.14*
Female 23.74 23.79 +0.06 19.67 21.09 +1.42* 19.70 19.78 +0.09
Inexp 224.19 224.01 -0.18 116.46 120.41 +3.95* 116.32 116.55 +0.23
#Founded
NSH
141.87 142.09 +0.22 124.32 124.91 +0.59 124.40 124.45 +0.05
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Table 1.11: Startup Performance: Financing
Note: The stars indicate signicance level (* for 90%, ** for 95%, and *** for 99%). Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals
to one if the accelerator program happens before July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of
NBER denition. This table shows the regression results of three models. The rst model ST nancing has the independent
variable of indicators on whether the startup obtained venture nancing within one year after graduation. The LT Financing
1 has independent variables of indicators on whether the rm, which was funded within one year after graduation, obtained
venture nancing between 2nd-5th year after graduation. The additional control of log(fund size within 1yr aft graduation)
controls for the impact of funding size in the short-term. The LT Financing 2 has the independent variable of an indicator on
whether the rm, which was NOT funded within one year after graduation, obtained venture nancing between 2nd-5th year
after graduation. I exclude the cohort which received Start Fund investment to avoid biased estimation. The positive parameter
for (Proxy-Match Value) suggests a positive sorting pattern.









0.35*** 0.04 0.41*** 0.08 0.45*** 0.04
log(Fund Size Within 1yr Aft
Graduation)
0.06** 0.03
Panel A: Startup Factors
Female 0.06 0.11 0.40 0.25 0.02 0.11
Inexperienced -0.04 0.07 0.20 0.14 -0.12* 0.07
Founded Outside Startup Hubs -0.08** 0.04 -0.05 0.07 -0.14*** 0.05
0.01*Average Founder Age -0.15 0.32 -0.26 0.57 -0.70** 0.33
Startup Age 0.06*** 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02
Panel B: Accelerator Factors
log(Cohort) -0.04 0.06 -0.13 0.10 0.00 0.08
Tier 1 0.31*** 0.09 0.35** 0.14 0.02 0.11
Tier 2 0.22*** 0.08 0.28* 0.14 -0.05 0.08
Panel C: Complementarities
log(Cohort)*Female 0.21* 0.11 0.38* 0.22 -0.06 0.14
Tier 1*Female -0.17 0.18 -0.37 0.31 0.03 0.23
Tier 2*Female -0.08 0.15 -0.70* 0.33 -0.14 0.14
log(Cohort)*Inexp 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.09
Tier 1*Inexp -0.01 0.11 -0.25 0.18 0.15 0.13
Tier 2*Inexp 0.03 0.10 -0.22 0.18 0.25** 0.10
Out-of-State Participant -0.07* 0.04 -0.12* 0.07 -0.05 0.05
Panel D: Other Match Specics
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis -0.16*** 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.04
Constant 0.36*** 0.12 -0.07 0.28 0.63*** 0.12
Observations 648 274 368
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Table 1.12: Startup Performance: Five-Year Exit Rate
Note: The stars indicate signicance level (* for 90%, ** for 95%, and *** for 99%). Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals to
one if the accelerator program happens before July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of NBER
denition. This table shows the regression results of four models. The rst model has the independent variable of an indicator
on whether the rm is acquired within 5-year after graduation. The second model shows comparable results without control for
sorting. The third model has the independent variable of an indicator on whether the rm, which was NOT funded within one
year after graduation, is acquired during 5-year after graduation. The last model studies a similar setting as in the third model
but for rms obtained nancing within one year after graduation. I exclude the cohort which received Start Fund investment
to avoid biased estimation. The positive parameter for (Proxy-Match Value) suggests a positive sorting pattern.













0.35*** 0.03 0.30*** 0.03 0.38*** 0.08
Panel A: Startup Factors
Female 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.24
Inexperienced -0.11* 0.06 -0.08 0.07 -0.11* 0.06 -0.16 0.14
Founded Outside
Startup Hubs
-0.08** 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.10** 0.04 -0.01 0.07
0.01*Average
Founder Age
-0.71*** 0.28 -0.42 0.30 -0.55* 0.29 -0.76 0.55
Startup Age 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03
Panel B: Accelerator Factors
log(Cohort) 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.10
Tier 1 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.14
Tier 2 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.14 0.14
Panel C: Complementarities
log(Cohort)*Female -0.01 0.10 0.02 0.11 -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.21
Tier 1*Female -0.10 0.15 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.20 -0.20 0.30
Tier 2*Female -0.10 0.13 -0.09 0.14 -0.11 0.12 -0.09 0.32
log(Cohort)*Inexp -0.07 0.07 -0.05 0.07 -0.11 0.08 0.04 0.12
Tier 1*Inexp 0.15* 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.18
Tier 2*Inexp 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.22*** 0.09 0.03 0.17
Out-of-State
Participant
-0.08** 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.17*** 0.06
Panel D: Other Match Specics
Crisis & One Yr
Aft Crisis
0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.14* 0.07
Constant 0.49*** 0.10 0.35*** 0.11 0.43*** 0.11 0.53** 0.22
Observations 648 648 368 274
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Figure 1.1: Accelerator Process
This gure shows the owchart of the accelerator process. The whole procedure of accelerators starts with a public
announcement of the details and terms of the program, such as application requirements, resources provided, seed investment,
equity share, class size, location, and schedule. Once announced, these terms stay the same for all participants. Entrepreneurs
submit their applications as individual rms. Admitted entrepreneurs start the program together at the same time and in the
same location. The program lasts for a xed period, often three months, during which accelerators oer mentorship, network
opportunities, and other forms of business support. At the end of the program, accelerators hold a Demo Day in which each
startup pitches to a group of potential investors. Firms are ocially o the hook in terms of participating in accelerator after
graduation, but they can, and often do, become involved in the alumni community.
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Figure 1.2: PitchBook Data on Venture Financing Deals
This diagram (source: pitchbook.com) shows venture nancing trends over the past decade in the U.S. While venture
investment deals reverted to the upward trend in 2009, the recovery only began to speed up since the third quarter of 2010.
This is especially true of the market for early startups, which is indicated by Angel/Seed and Early VC.
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Chapter 2
How Business Accelerators Accelerate
Startups: Screening vs. Training
With screening and business training, business accelerators have become an essential player
in the entrepreneurship world in the past decade. I study the relative importance of screen-
ing in accelerator value creation from the market participant's perspective. In a competitive
market, any value creation for startups through screening should be reected in the increase
of venture nancing in the short term after accelerator graduation. I develop a three-stage
approach to identify the upper bound of screening's value creation by examining the import-
ance of the accelerator's ability to assist startup fundraising in the short run. With a novel
dataset, covering the universe of U.S. business accelerators from 2008 to 2011, I nd the
screening contributes to less than 1/6 of the total value added by accelerators on average,
and the ratio is meager, at 1/10, for the top accelerators.
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2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade, business accelerators have become essential players in the entrepren-
eurship market. This new mechanism attracts not only investors, aiming for higher returns,
but also institutions and local governments, who hope to boost their communities' economies.
Business accelerators provide startups with assistance on venture nancing and managerial
capital.1 2 They create value through two mechanisms - screening, which creates a startup
quality certicate to reduce market information asymmetry, and training, which improves
entrepreneurs' ability to run businesses. These two channels have dierent implications for
society. Screening improves resource reallocation eciency but with negative spillover eect,
and training directly increases social productivity but may take a longer time to realize.3
This paper studies the relative importance of screening in the value added by business ac-
celerators.
Business accelerators (accelerator hereafter) are structured programs oering xed-
term and cohort-based training, which includes mentorship, educational components, and
shared-oce space to participants in exchange for a small share of equity, typically 5%.
Unlike traditional venture capitals, accelerators contribute little through a direct capital
injection.4 Rather, accelerators serve as intermediaries connecting startups and venture
investors. This mechanism helps its graduates to obtain venture investment much earlier
than otherwise by reducing information asymmetry in the market. On the other hand,
with economies of scale, the accelerator lowers the cost to facilitate the knowledge ow
from mentors to entrepreneurs, substituting the managerial capital which otherwise may
1See Da Rin et al. [45] for a survey of rm nancing. See Bloom and van Reenen [25] as an example of
managerial capital.
2I dene nancing capital as money injection as equity investment or loan. Managerial capital captures
more soft rm assets such as management skills and business network. Details will be provided in Section
3.
3See Fang [60] for a discussion.
4Market participants normally consider the seed as stipend during the programs (Hallen et al. [87]).
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take years of operation to accumulate. Such assistance creates a boost for startup business
quality, the benet of which lasts in the long term. Prior literature (Yu [151], Hochberg [90])
has demonstrated the positive treatment eect of accelerators. However, understanding the
relative importance of accelerator value creation channels is essential to nding out whether
and how we can achieve its early success in the future. This paper estimates an upper bound
of screening value creation.
My empirical strategy builds on the assumption that the screening eect is reected in
the improvement of venture nancing in a competitive market in the short run and vanishes
in the long term. In the short term, given the popularity of accelerators, information on
their participants is publically available, and any improvement caused by screening should
reect in the increase of venture nancing in a competitive venture investment market.5
The accuracy and importance of the signal generated by accelerators decay over time as
information on business quality is revealed through operation records; therefore the screening
eect is ignorable in the long term. I obtain an upper bound for the importance of screening
by studying the value added in the venture nancing improvement within one year after
graduation.
My approach takes three steps: First, I obtain the accelerator production function, whose
output is the expected startup value at graduation. The revealed preference during the
admission process of for-prot accelerators. Because the admission process is a two-sided
matching game similar to the school-student market (Roth and Sotomayor [135]), traditional
methods like Logit and Probit generate biased estimates. I use a new two-sided matching
maximum score estimator (Fox [66], Manski [111, 112]) to account for the sorting and in-
terdependence of agents' choice sets. Based on the pairwise comparison mechanism (Fox
[64, 66], Chen [31]), this estimator imposes weak assumption on the unobservable, generates
5The venture investment market, especially the one for accelerator graduates, develops fast during the
past decade (See pitchbook data in appendix) and involves thousands of active investors.
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consistent estimates for an endogenous sample, and allows for the existence of multiple equi-
libria. Second, I form a measure for nancing from the venture funding probability within
one year after graduation based on ex-post realized investment information. I control for
sorting by constructing a measure for unobserved matching quality with estimated determ-
inistic value and a proxy for total matching value, similar to the method proposed by Akkus
et al. [5]. Finally, I identify the upper bound of the screening importance in the production
function based on how the nancing measure aects the admission result.
With a hand-collected novel dataset covering the universe of U.S. accelerators and their
graduates from 2008 to 2011, I nd that screening plays a much less important role than
improvement in the managerial capital in the value added by accelerators. My calculation
shows that the upper bound of the Screening to Managerial Capital Ratio is around 20%
on average. Further, the marginal importance of screening drops as the expected funding
probability increases. As a result, it is not surprising to see that participants of the super-
stars - Y Combinator (YC) and Techstars - care even less, about half of the average gure,
on the improved nancing through screening. This importance ratio is higher for programs
held outside of startup hubs (i.e., not in California, Massachusetts, or New York) and for
those startups that relocated.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature studying the accelerator phenomenon.
Early studies, which are primarily conceptual (Cohen and Hochberg [39], Cohen [38]), Kim
[101] model accelerators as a form of certication for startup quality. More recent studies
evaluate accelerators by comparing the startup companies that completed accelerator pro-
grams to those that did not. Hallen et al. [87] nd that accelerators add value through
mentorship while sorting and signaling eects are also present. Gonzales-Uribe and Leather-
bee [81] nd business training provided by a Chilean government funded accelerator has a
positive impact on subsequent startup performance, but such eect does not exist for basic
supports like seed injection and shared oce space. Yu [151] argues that accelerators help
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resolve uncertainty around company quality sooner, allowing founders to make funding and
exit decisions accordingly. This paper most closely relates to the recent working paper of
Chen [31], which examines the heterogeneity of accelerator value creations. Expanding his
two-sided matching model into a three-stage approach, this is the rst study that directly
examines the accelerator's value creation channels.
This paper also connects to the literature concerning the screening eect in education
which has proven dicult (Fang [60]). Although for dierent markets, my result is close to
the ndings in Lange [103], which shows that screening creates less than 20% of the total
value creation of education.
2.2 Institutional Details
2.2.1 What is an Accelerator
There is no ocial denition for the business accelerator, which is also called seed accelerator
or startup accelerator, yet. Cohen and Hochberg [39] are among the rst in academia to give
a clear formal denition for accelerators. Dierent from traditional early stage nanciers,
education programs or incubators, they dene an accelerators as a xed-term, cohort-based
program, including mentorship and educational components, that culminates in a public
pitch event or demo-day. Another denition is from seed-db.com, which is one of the biggest
public resources tracking accelerators, especially in the U.S. Seed-DB denes accelerator as a
program that satises the following criteria: 1) has an open application process; anyone with
an idea can apply; 2) invests in companies, typically in exchange for equity, at pre-seed or
seed stage; 3) holds cohorts or classes of startups, not an on-demand resource; 4) provides
a program of support for the cohorts, including events and company mentoring; 5) focuses
on teams, and not individual mentoring. With some minor dierences, the two denitions
cover very similar programs. I identify individual accelerator programs from seed-db.com.
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Accelerators target early stage startups but not nascent ones. Therefore, accelerators are
not for businesses worth more than tens of millions of dollars nor nascent entrepreneurs who
do not have any solid product or idea yet. Following the early programs, many accelerators
invest a small amount of seed money to each startup they admit in exchange for equity. But
unlike many traditional venture capitals, who condentially negotiate with entrepreneurs,
accelerators set transparent but roughly xed terms. Thanks to modern information tech-
nologies, entrepreneurs can nd information about accelerators all over the country, or even
the world, easily. Figure 2.1 summaries the progress of accelerators.
The whole procedure of accelerators starts with a public announcement of the details
and terms about the program, including information on application requirements, resources
provided, seed investment, equity share, class size, location, and schedule. Once announced,
these terms are not subject to negotiation. Startups submit their applications to accelerators.
The admission process is competitive. Applicants to popular programs see the acceptance
rate of 1% to 2%. The average number is around 4% for the U.S. market.6 Admitted entre-
preneurs start the program together at the same time and in the same location. The program
lasts for a xed period, often three months, during which accelerators oer mentorship, net-
work opportunities, and other business supports. At the end of the program, accelerators
hold a Demo Day in which each startup pitches to a group of potential investors. Firms
are under no obligation to accelerator after graduation but they are often involved in the
alumni community.
2.2.2 Brief History and Current Status
Y Combinator launched the world's rst accelerator in 2005, followed by TechStars in 2006.




also in Mountain View, CA. In 2009, it consolidated to a single program in Silicon Valley
with a bigger cohort size. TechStars used a dierent approach. It has grown to 40 dierent
programs worldwide as of April 2018, since its rst launching in Boulder, Colorado in 2006.
Both remain as top accelerators. As summarized by Hathaway, the growth in U.S.-based
accelerators took o after 2008.7 The number reached 170 programs in 2014 and held mostly
steady afterwards. Accelerators attract much attention thanks to their outstanding perform-
ances in general. Pitchbook.com reported that about one-third of Series A venture funding
went to accelerator-backed startups in 2015.8 Consistent with my back-of-envelope calcu-
lation, participation in an accelerator becomes a check-box on the to-do list for startups.9
10
Physically, accelerators are concentrated in the well-known technology startup hubs and
major cities of San Francisco-Silicon Valley, Boston-Cambridge, and New York, which ac-
count for about 40 percent of all accelerators in the United States between 2005 and 2015.
The other 60 percent spread across 35 states and the District of Columbia.
Most early accelerators focused on high-tech startups, aiming to generate a higher return
and social impact. While it is still a focus for many programs, new accelerators are begin-
ning to diverge into more industries and communities in recent years. Interestingly, despite
signicant heterogeneity in terms of concentrations and purposes, the majority, if not all,
of accelerators follow the model of Y Combinator and TechStars closely in terms of seed




9Each year there are about 400,000 new rms registered in the U.S.. Around 10% of them, or 40,000, are
medium to high tech startups (based on Kauman Firm Survey). According to F6S.com (one of the biggest
accelerator program network), the average acceptance rate of accelerators is about 4% in the U.S.. While
successful applicants applied 3.3 times before being admitted, unsuccessful startups applied 1.8 times. To
be conservative, assume each accelerator takes 20 startups per year (GUST 2015 reported 2,968 startups
graduated from 111 accelerators in the U.S.), 170 accelerators across the country would receive applications
from 30,000 unique startups per year.
10Source: https://alexiskold.net/2014/08/19/top-10-reasons-to-join-and-not-to-join-an-accelerator/
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whether such features are the best t. And unsurprisingly, there are signicant variations in
performances. As of 2016, YC had invested in about 940 companies, including some well-
known unicorns such as Dropbox and Airbnb.11 YC has a combined market capitalization
of over 65 billion. About 170 YC graduate startups have been acquired with the estimated
total value of over 3 billion. On the other hand, not all accelerators have matched YC's
success. For example, neither South Carolina's NextStart nor Minnesota's Project Skyway
lasted for more than two years. While NextStart closed quietly, Project Skyway reformed
as Skyway Fund and started traditional angel investing after its second cohorts nished in
2012.
2.2.3 Accelerator Value Creations
Accelerators Create Value
Venture nancing is an important source for startups to accumulate physical assets (see
Da Rin et al. [45] for a survey). Human capital, dened more generally as managerial
capital to represent soft capital such as management skills and business networks, is
also critical for rm performance (e.g.,Bloom and van Reenen [25]). Industry insiders and
researchers widely acknowledge that accelerators are helpful in both ways.
According to the surveys by Christiansen and Tech.eu, startups consider the managerial
capital improvement from mentorship and networking among the most valuable assistance
from accelerators.12 13 While the amount of seed investment receives the lowest importance
rank in the surveys, the results are inconclusive for the importance of activities focusing on
fundraising, which are critical for some startups but a distraction for others. Even acceler-
ators themselves appear to disagree on how they create value. Many well-known programs,




like Y Combinator and TechStars, emphasize their brand names, outstanding mentors, and
well-developed alumni network. They claim to focus on their graduates' long-term growth.
Meanwhile, some programs try their best to improve on their graduates' chance to secure
venture investment at or shortly after the Demo Day.
Early research (see Tasic et al. [144] for a survey) provided qualitative evidence that
accelerators' assistance in managerial capital is valuable for entrepreneurs. More recently,
Gonzales-Uribe and Leatherbee [81] empirically demonstrate that managerial skill training
improves startup performance. Hallen et al. [87] show evidence on the startup learning
eect during accelerator programs. For nancing, Kim [101] models accelerators as a form
of certication for startup quality. Fehder and Hochberg [62] show that regions with some
accelerators see an increase in seed and early-stage nancing. Yu [151] nds that accelerator
graduates obtain venture nancing earlier than comparable non-accelerator-participants.
Economic Mechanisms of Accelerator Value Creations
For managerial capital improvement, the accelerator mechanism oers a platform to facilit-
ate knowledge and resource sharing from experienced mentors/investors to startups. With
economies of scale, this mechanism lowers the cost to gather experienced mentors, oer net-
working events, and provide valuable business support. Further, creating a community of
people who share similar interests in the entrepreneurship world, the accelerator can generate
long-lasting impact. The knowledge and experiences obtained in accelerators may substitute
years of actual operation experiences and therefore accelerate the rm growth.
For nancing, while the accelerator often provides some seed money, the amount is small
and not considered signicant nancing for startups.14 Instead, the accelerator's xed-term
cohort-based structure allows it to serve as an intermediary connecting startups and in-
vestors. It can reduce information asymmetry in the venture market with two advantages.
14Many market participants consider the seed as a stipend during the programs (Hallen et al. [87]).
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First, dealing with a group of startups at the same time can improve screening with lower
cost, as pointed out by Ramakrishnan and Thakor [131]; and second, by taking a small
equity with some seed investment, accelerators send a credible signal to outside investors,
following the argument in Breadley et al. [28]. The screening by accelerators is especially
helpful for early-stage startups as they lack credible business quality signals to attract ven-
ture investors. Besides, working with startups for several months, many accelerators oer
education to improve entrepreneurs' pitching skills and help them to network with potential
investors, which are helpful to reveal information about the candidate's quality.
To evaluate the value creation channels, I focus on accelerators' direct impacts by study-
ing the eects that are not caused by any other improvement. For example, the following
three eects are indirect: the improved managerial capital by spending money on network-
ing because the accelerator graduate obtained more venture investment; the better venture
nancing because the startup improved its operation from knowledge learned from an accel-
erator; and, the nancing improvement in the long run caused by the nancing improvement
in the short run. A key argument of this project is that the improvement of startup nancing
around and shortly after graduation provides an upper bound for the accelerator's screening
eect.15
For nancing, the screening signal becomes irrelevant in the long run since there will be
more reliable information on the startup quality, such as the production and sales record,
revealed over time. For managerial capital, one possible way the screening can add value is
through its impact on the rm's sales. This eect is ignorable because customers pay more
attention to the product than the startup background. Another way is through attracting
business partners, which should not be important in the long run either with a similar
intuition as discussed before for the nancing case. In the short run, while screening may
15This argument is similar to the one in Farber and Gibbons [61], which shows that schooling eect can
be independent of human capital gain through experience but with decreasing impact on wages.
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help startups nd good business partners, it is also likely to be reected in the short-term
nancing quality because the investors can notice such improvement. While the public
expectation of the managerial capital improvement from screening can be dierent than the
real value for the startup, the rational public expectation should be consistent with the
average of the startup's actual values.16
The following (Figure 2.2) diagram illustrates the two value adding channels in a diagram
of rm growth. The x-axis represents the rm value (e.g. net present value (NPV)) and the
y-axis is time. Before a startup is ready for venture nancing, it may take several years
of slow growth to set up its team and product. Once it is ready for venture nancing, the
startup grows faster with help from venture capitalists. Such growth slows down again when
the rm becomes more established. Most accelerator participants are rms at the edge of
receiving their rst venture nancing.
The nancing improvement through screening is a one-time inward shift of the rm
development curve because the accelerator can help startups to enter the fast development
zone earlier. The managerial capital improvement is represented as the increased slope of
the value curve. This is because a startup with higher managerial capital can grow faster
with the same amount of initial physical assets. While the nancing improvement is eective
immediately, the managerial capital improvement takes time to realize and sees its impact
increase over time.
Dierent Implications of the Value Creation Channels
If the screening eect is critical for accelerator participants, too many such programs are
a concern because screening (e.g., Stiglitz [140]) can generate a negative spillover eect as
resources will be reallocated from those in worse condition to those in better condition.
16The screening may be able to aect factors of a startup's operation other than those mentioned here.
However, the arguments for such impacts are similar.
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Further, Riley [133] points out that too much screening increases social cost for signaling.
In an extreme case, when most startups participate in some accelerators, we come back to
the world without signaling but with the cost of running accelerators. Finally, we need to be
careful about the kind of signal that is sent out from the selection mechanism. For example,
holding a program which only serves a specic community may fall short of expectation
because investors know that admittance by an such accelerator does not necessarily mean
the startup has good business quality.
On the other hand, if the accelerator creates most value in the managerial capital, it is
unclear that the format of those early accelerators ts every scenario. For example, the seed
for equity model, which is helpful to send a credible signal as discussed before, may not be
necessary for every program.17 Further, too much focus on fundraising during Demo Day
and training on pitching skills can be a distraction, generating more cost than benet.
2.3 Two-Sided Matching Model and Three-Stage Estim-
ation
I develop a three-stage approach to identify the relative importance of short-term nancing
in the total value creation of accelerators as an upper bound for the impact of screening.
With rational expectation, the rst two stages generate a consistent measure for expec-
ted short-term nancing quality using ex-post funding information within one year after
graduation. Specically, the rst stage recovers the accelerator production function given
observed covariates through the matching pattern. The second stage consistently estimates
the accelerator's impact on rm nancing with the rst stage result. The measure is then
calculated using the second stage estimates.
17Some programs, although few, start to charge their participants. e.g.,
https://pando.com/2013/04/25/this-accelerator-charges-its-companies-25000-thats-just-wrong-right/
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In the third step, I examine the importance of short-term nancing by studying how the
variation in the proposed measure aects the accelerator admission process.
The two-sided matching model uses the same approach as in Chen [31]. I briey introduce
the model setup and estimation here and refer to his paper for detailed discussions.
2.3.1 Why a Matching Model
The accelerator admission is a match between the accelerator and startup. It is instructive to
observe that each startup deliberates among many viable alternative accelerators, and each
accelerator considers viable startups from their pool of applicants. Through the equilibrium
channel, the values of possible alternative matchesboth implicit and explicit applications
provide a bound for the value of each realized match. Formalizing this intuition, this paper
analyzes the market participants' utility function with a revealed preference approach. I use
the characteristics of each startup's and accelerator's alternative matches to estimate the
value of the matches that do occur.
Competition exists on both sides of the accelerator market. Because accelerators have
limited capacity, they only admit the best startups. At the same time, accelerators compete
to attract good (desirable) candidates because each startup can only join one accelerator.
By assuming that each agent's decision is independent and has no externalities, standard
discrete choice models, such as Logit and Probit, cannot accommodate markets with two-
sided selection and competition in the choice set (See Mindruta et al. [116] for a detailed
discussion). To address this challenge, economists have developed two-sided matching models
to capture this market structure explicitly.
I model the accelerator admission as a two-sided matching game (Roth and Sotomayor
[135]). Each accelerator-startup match creates a joint match value, and the match value
is split according to the pre-announced equity-share and seed investment, which are con-
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sidered exogenous in this paper.18 Agents from both sides of the market maximize payos
by choosing matches with agents on the other side.19 In equilibrium, agents have no feasible
deviations to match with other partners and weakly increase the payos for all participants.
In the estimation, I construct counterfactual matches to each pair of observed matches within
the same market by switching their partners. Comparing pairs of observed matches with
their counterfactual matches yields sets of inequalities required by the equilibrium condition.
Given these inequalities and a parametric form for the match value function, I choose the
parameter vector that maximizes the fraction of inequality sets that hold. This is the max-
imum score estimator I propose in this paper. Compared with similar estimators as in Fox
[66] and Akkus et al. [6], this estimator studies non-transferable utility matching games, in
which neither the uniqueness or the competitiveness of equilibrium is guaranteed.
2.3.2 First Stage: The Accelerator Production Function
During the accelerator admission process, I assume each startup has information on all
accelerators on the market.20 Also, accelerators and startups share a total matching surplus
Uas for a given match between the accelerator a and the entrepreneur s.
21 Their expected
utilities can be written in the following forms:
U sas = (1− Ea) ∗ Uas + ta − csas
Uaas = Ea ∗ Uas − ta − caas
18This is based on the fact such terms that are xed once the accelerators announce them.
19To guarantee the existence of equilibrium, this paper abstracts away from potential gain from com-
plementarity in the accelerator portfolio. It is dicult for the accelerator to make decisions based on the
portfolio given a large number of applications. In reality, it is not rare to see two direct competitors in the
same cohort (Stross [141]).
20Thanks to the popularity and public prole of accelerators, it is easy to nd their programs online.
21The shared total surplus can be interpreted as the rm value at accelerator graduation. It does not
necessary to exclude non-rm related utilities such as access to the accelerator network or having a high-
quality entrepreneur as a mentor in the future. The key assumption here is that the utility is divided
according to the equity share.
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where Ea is the equity share of the accelerator a and ta is the seed investment from the
accelerator a, which are both exogenously given; csas and c
a
as are individual costs, which are
not captured by Uas nor the equity/seed, for a and s respectively in the given match. As
mentioned before in Section 3.3, I consider the seed investment as a stipend for entrepreneurs
that does not increase the rm value. This assumption is not important for the model
identication and can be changed. One can ignore csas if the startup faces the same individual
costs for all possible accelerators.22 A similar argument also applies to caas.
A startup's individual cost includes the founders' time and living expenses during the
accelerator program. It may also include migration spending if the startup needs to relocate.
Since the majority of accelerator programs last for three months, the cost variation on time
spending is small. Due to data limitation, I assume that costs of living are very similar
across accelerators. The migration cost includes the rm's moving expenses and potential
business loss. This cost can directly reduce the rm valuation and is therefore controlled
by a relocation dummy in Uas. I assume accelerators face the same cost across all possible
startup candidates.
Let the observed covariates of entrepreneurs be Xs, accelerator covariates be Xa, and
their interactions be Xas. Let X




where εas is assumed to follow distributions consistent with the median independence feature
such that Median(εas|Xas) = 0.
Some additional model assumptions: 1) It is a static model in which all observables are
exogenous; 2) Each year is a separate market.23 Agents on one side of the market can only
be matched with agents from the other side in the same market; 3) Some accelerators run
22Note that this does not require all startups to have the same cost.
23This assumption is made for convenience and does not aect the model result's consistency.
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multiple programs in various locations across years. I model the matching between programs
and startups; and 4) each program can admit multiple startups, but each startup can only
join one program.
2.3.3 Second Stage: Accelerator's Impact on Startup Performance
The second stage studies the accelerator's impact on startup performance, especially on
short-term nancing. To address concerns with unobserved heterogeneity, I utilize the rst
stage results and a proxy of realized matching value.
Take the OLS, for example.24 For a given startup performance measure, PF (e.g. funding
probability), and the match between a and s, PFas = Z
asδ+εasfund = Z
asδ+γεas+eas, where
Zas is a vector of observed covariates, γ is the correlation between εas and εasfund, and e
as is
i.i.d. Given εas = Uas−Xasβ as in the rst stage, we have PFas = Zasδ+γ(Uas−Xasβ)+eas,
which can be consistently estimated if one observes Uas. Inspired by Akkus et al. [5], I use
a proxy Pas for Uas as Uas = Pas + vas, where vas is independent of Pas, Z
as, and Xas. In
this way, PFas = Z
asδ + γ(Pas −Xasβ) + ξas with ξas = (eas + γvas) and ξas is independent
of Pas, Z
as, and Xas. In this project, I let P be the dummy of startup survival (either has
been acquired or is in operation) status ve years after graduation. Other alternatives and
robustness checks will be discussed in the appendix.
In summary, the second stage estimation is:
PFas = Z
asδ + γ [Pas − (Xasβ)] + ξas
2.3.4 Third Stage: Relative Importance
This stage estimates the matching model as in the rst stage but with the nancing measure
calculated from the second stage result. Additional assumptions are imposed to obtain
24It is also applicable to other similar methods such as Logit and Probit.
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consistent results. First, I assume the equity share Ea to be the same for all accelerators in the
same market. Second, I assume εas is independent, identical, and symmetrically distributed.
Third, I assume the accelerator graduation value is a linear combination of the startup
original value (before accelerator) V s and the value added by accelerator V as. Further, V as
can be linearly decomposed to the value added in nancing V asF and in managerial capital
V asH .
For a given match (a, s), denote the measure for nancing as fas and measure for mana-
gerial capital as has. We have:
Uas = V
s + V asF + V
as
H
= V s + wffas + whhas
where wf and wh can be interpreted as relative weights of the two value creation chan-
nels.25 To identify wf without data on non-matched startups (non-accelerator participants),
I decompose V s = V̂ s + wffs, where fs is the startup's original nancing quality, so that
Fas = fs+fas is the total nancing value at graduation. In this way, Uas = V̂ s+wfFas+whhas
and the weight of nancing can be identied with a measure of Fas.
I use the agent's belief on the probability of obtaining venture nancing within one year
after graduation as a measure for Fas, denoted as FPas.
26 In equilibrium, ex-ante beliefs
about funding probability should be consistent with ex-post realized funding probability.
I use observed funding information for each startup to form such beliefs based on second
stage results. I dene the short-term as one year after graduation, because it allows time
25Here I assume everyone has the same wf and wh. The model can be expanded to relax this assumption.
However, in order to make sure both the rst and third stage are correctly specied, one needs to include
multiple interactions in the rst stage model. This may signicantly increase the data requirement and
computation time.
26Here I assume higher probability is strictly preferred by everyone. This does not exclude those claiming
that they do not need immediate funding because it is plausible to argue that everyone likes funding at a
reasonable cost. The model allows such cost to be dierent across rms
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for the negotiation on nancing terms and the gap between funding decisions and actual
investments. Note that such measure is a proxy for general funding quality. Alternatively, I
can use the funding size as a measure, but it may introduce more noises as the information
on equity share is mostly missing.
Ideally, I could calculate FPas = Z
asδ + γ [Pas − (Xasβ)] for each potential match.
However, this is not possible, as I do not observe Pas for counterfactual matches. In-
stead, I create a consistent proxy, denoted as MFas, for FPas. Let MFas = Z
asδ, so that
FPas = MFas + γε
as. I assume that any additional variables in Zas, but not in Xas, to be
independent with εas.
The relative importance of nancing is likely to be non-linear. For example, a startup
located in the midwest may care more about the marginal improvement to secure venture
nancing than a similar startup in Silicon Valley. To capture such curvature, I include the














With the same equity share across accelerators, we can write U sas = (1 − E) ∗ [wasf1MF as +
wasf2(MF





asMF as))]− ta. Denote τas =
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asMF as). We have:
Pr(U sas > U
s
a′s)⇔ Pr((1− E)(Das −Da′s) > (1− E)(ϕa′s − ϕas + τa′s − τas))
⇔Pr(Das −Da′s > ϕa′s − ϕas + τa′s − τas)
It is straightforward to see that MED(ϕa′s − ϕas + τa′s − τas) = 0 and therefore Pr(U sas >
U sa′s) > 50% if and only if Das > Da′s.
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v to be independent,
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identical, and symmetrically distributed with mean zero. I estimate the following function:
Uas = V̂ s + wfF
as + whh
as
= (Xasβv + ε
as




= (Xasβv + ε
as












as)2 +Xas(βv + βh) + (ϕas + τas)
Including the square term of the nancing measure makes the model very costly to
estimate because the number of controls increases exponentially. With limited data and
computation power, I restrict the total number of controls in this model.
The identication of wasf requires an exclusive restriction variable which only contributes
to the short-term nancing in the accelerator production function. Assuming the macroe-
conomy condition impacts the matching value only through Fas, I use a dummy indicating
whether it is before one year after the nancial crisis.27 I place the threshold at July 2010
instead of the ocial end of the great recession based on the NBER denition, because 1)
According to PitchBook (Figure 2.3), while venture investment deals came back to the up-
ward trend in 2009, the recovery only speeded up after the third quarter of 2010. This is
especially true for the market of early startups, which is targeted by Angel/Seed and Early
VC. 2) The accelerator applications and admissions were decided at least several months
ahead of the actual program. Graduates from 2009 programs are unlikely to be aware when
the nancing condition was going to get better during their applications.




. This is not a concern because it only makes the project result more
27The biggest concern may be that there are more resources available for accelerators to improve their
education quality after the crisis. Since accelerators attract applicants through public media channels, such
improvement is unlikely to be condential or only internally announced. However, I do not nd any signicant
resource added to accelerators concentrated around the end of the nancial crisis.
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conservative. Let A denote the set for all possible a that can be matched with a given s.
We know that V s is upper bounded (the minimum value of whHas is bounded by zero) by
the smallest V s = (Ua′s −wfFa′s) +wffs among all possible a′ ⊆ A . Therefore V asH is lower
bounded by V asH = Uas − V asF − V s = (Uas − wfFas) + wffs − V s. Let Ûas = Uas − wfFas,
then V asH = Ûas − Ûamins, where amin = argmin
a⊆A
{(Uas − wfFas) + wffs}.28 In practice, it is
enough to calculate V asH = max
a′⊆A
(Ûas− Ûa′s). Further, V asF is upper bounded by V asF = wfFas
when fs = 0. We obtain V
as
F /V asH as the upper bound for the ratio
V asF
V asH
for any a 6= amin.
2.3.5 Subsampling and Condence Intervals
I follow Akkus et al. [6] to obtain subsampling and condence intervals for the maximum
score estimator. Normalizing the startup age to have parameter of +1 and −1 respectively, I
estimate the matching models by running the dierential evolution optimization routine from
40 dierent starting points (20 each for the positive and negative normalization, respectively)
and selecting the coecient vector that yields the highest value for the objective function.
For valid inference, I generate the condence intervals using the subsampling procedure
described by Politis and Romano [129] and Delgado et al. [51] to approximate the sampling
distribution. I randomly conduct 100 of these subsamples with sizes at about one third of
the total data set.
For each of the subsamples, I estimate the parameter vector as for the whole dataset.
Call the estimate from the sth subsample β̂s and the estimate from the original full sample
β̄. The approximate sampling distribution for the parameter vector can be computed by
calculating β̃s = (ns/N)
1/3(β̂s − β̄) + β̄ for each subsample, where N and ns are the total
sample size and given subsample size, respectively. I take the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th
percentile of this empirical sampling distribution to compute 95% condence intervals for all
of the estimates.




I construct a novel dataset covering U.S. accelerators that existed from 2008 to 2011.29 I
study this time frame because the majority of currently well-known accelerators emerged
during this period, and it allows me to collect ex-post startup performance up to ve years.
To have all accelerators maximize nancial return, I exclude accelerators with dierent utility
functions, such as those with restrictions on the community they serve and those that do
not take any equity. These exclusions are unlikely to cause a signicant impact as they only
represent about 2% of the data. I also dropped startups with missing information on founder
characteristics. Hereafter, I dene a program as a cohort of accelerators. Some accelerators
run multiple programs in various locations across years. In total, I identied 74 programs
representing 27 accelerators and 776 startup graduates.
I use CrunchBase, AngelList, CapitalIQ, CBinsights, VentureXpert, and Linkedin to get
the details of each program and its participants. Data on private rms often lack crucial
information and may suer a self-reporting bias since successful startups are more likely
to release information to the public. To mitigate such concern, I cross check each rm
by searching for related news and press releases. The bias of self-reporting is mild in this
paper because I have found information even for failed startups, thanks to the publicity and
popularity of accelerators.
Data on non-participants of accelerators is helpful to understand the value added by
accelerators relative to other options. However, it is not necessary for this paper to generate
consistent estimates (details in the model section). Since my focus is on whether founders'
demographic characteristics aect their admission in accelerators, the non-participants data
29I collected data from 2005, the founding year of the rst accelerator. I restricted attention to observations
after 2008 as there were only two programs (Y Combinator and TechStars Boulder) before 2008.
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does not contribute to my research question either.
To characterize accelerators, I collect information on their location, size, and terms oered
(amount of seed investment and equity share). For each startup, I obtain its business age,
location, founders' background (gender, education, and entrepreneurship experience), and
operation (acquired, dead, or operating) and nancing status.
To further capture some unobserved dierences among accelerators, I categorize accel-
erators into three tiers and control the xed eects of each. The rst tier includes the two
widely acknowledged superstars in this market - Y Combinator and TechStars. The second
tier consists of all the accelerators who received ranks from the Seed Accelerator Ranking
Project (SARP) except for the two in the rst tier.30 All the rest of the accelerators are
in the third tier. While all Tier 1 and Tier 2 accelerators are still running, six of the Tier
3 accelerators stopped or joined other accelerators as a chapter. Note that I do not impose
any restriction on the quality ranking across tiers, and the model estimates do not depend
on the endogenously generated categorizing rule of tiers.
2.4.2 Summary Statistics
Table 2.1 shows a summary of programs and startups across accelerator tiers.
The accelerator participants are early-stage startups - mostly rms before any venture
capital nancing. Better accelerators, as indicated by the tiers, tend to take lower equity and
30SARP is led by Yael Hochberg and probably the only ranking conducted by economics researchers.
Although the exact ranking criteria are unknown to the public, according to the website, The goal of
our project is to provide greater transparency regarding the relative performance of programs along multiple
dimensions that may be of importance to entrepreneurs. Many of the metrics in question, such as fundraising
and valuations, are metrics accelerators and startups are reluctant to publicize out of concern for negative
competitive eects should they become widely known to investors and competitors. As an independent, non-
partisan research entity run by academics, we collect this sensitive data in condence, distill it down, and
provide information on the relative success of the programs and of the phenomenon as a whole  without
revealing individual deal details. Our rankings are meant to provide guidance for entrepreneurs who are
considering going through an accelerator, and who are wondering how they dier on performance across
various categories. SARP has been running since 2013, and the rankings are available since 2015. See:
seedranking.comcom
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have bigger classes. A potential reason is that better programs have a lower cost of pulling
resources to sponsor larger programs and create a higher total return. Additionally, Tier 1
accelerators take lower equities from startups but do not give the highest seed investment.
The second tier programs are the most generous regarding startup valuation (calculated as
seed/equity).
In my dataset, about 37% of the accelerator programs are found in startup hubs (CA,
MA, NY). This pattern is similar to the geographic distribution of accelerators in 2015, in
which about 40% of all accelerators in the U.S. were located in the well-known technology
startup hubs and major cities of San Francisco-Silicon Valley, Boston-Cambridge, and New
York.
The accelerator participants are signicantly younger than non-participants. Azoulay
et al. [12] reported that the average age of startup founders in the U.S. is 41.9. High-tech
founders are a bit younger but still around 39 to 40, and this age range is not very dierent
in startup hubs. If we interpret age as a proxy of general work experience, this indicates
that accelerators' assistance may be a substitute for human capital accumulation over time.
Further, while some consider accelerators to be designed for rst-time entrepreneurs31, I nd
one-third of accelerator participants have founded some company before. While not reported
in the table, over 99% of entrepreneurs in my data have college degrees. About 35% of them
also have graduate degrees, close to the gure of comparable non-participants during the
same period (see appendix). The female participation rate, which is at 10% on average and
below 5% in Tier 1, is low because 8%~16% of startups which received rst venture funding
during the same period are founded by women.32
Most early accelerators focus on high-tech startups, especially in the IT related elds,





celerators have recently diverged to work with dierent industries and communities. Despite
heterogeneity in concentration and purpose, the majority of accelerators follow the frame-
work of Y Combinator and TechStars. As of 2016, Y Combinator had invested in about 940
companies, including some well-known unicorns such as Dropbox and Airbnb.33 Y Combin-
ator has a combined market capitalization of over $65b. About 170 Y Combinator graduate
startups have been acquired with the estimated total value of over $3b. However, not all
accelerators have matched Y Combinator's success. For example, neither South Carolina's
NextStart nor Minnesota's Project Skyway lasted for more than two years. While NextStart
closed quietly, Project Skyway turned into the Skyway Fund and started traditional angel
investing after its second cohort nished in 2012.
The rst two rows of Table 2.2 show the ve-year in operation rates, which is the per-
centage of graduates that are still in operation and have not yet been acquired, and the
ve-year exit rates, which is the percentage of graduates that have been acquired. Financing
performance, including portions of startups which obtained venture nancing within one
year, ve years, and 2-5 years after graduation, are reported in the last three rows. Tier 1
accelerators dominate in all the performance measures reported. Compared to those from
Tier 3, graduates from Tier 2 accelerators enjoy better venture nancing.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Relative Importance of Screening
In this estimation, I excluded the 2011 summer cohort of Y Combinator since they received
additional funding from the Star Fund. This leaves me with 648 rms. Due to data limitation
and computation diculty, I selected ve variables in addition to the business age and the
macroeconomy dummy to capture value variations.
33Dropbox is the only public rm which graduated from an accelerator as of April 2018.
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The quality of young startups can heavily depend on the founding teams' quality. Ex-
perienced entrepreneurs have accumulated more managerial capital and nancial assets to
produce better businesses as discussed in the prior study (Gompers et al. [80], Hsu [93]) on
serial entrepreneurs. Therefore the accelerator value added to a startup founded by such
entrepreneurs may be systematically dierent from those founded by rookies. I include a
dummy indicating whether at least one member of the founding team had founded some
startup before. On the accelerator side, I include dummies of the accelerator tiers to capture
quality dierences. Additionally, I include the indicator of whether the accelerator and the
startup are from the same state to control for the relocation cost. All interactions and square
terms of the controls are also included in the matching value estimation of both the rst and
third steps.
The second step is a regression with a dependent variable as the indicator of whether the
startup obtained venture nancing within one year after graduation and the independent
variables include all the rst order terms of the rst stage controls. The variable (Proxy −
MatchingV alue) is the term Pas − (Xasβ) as in the model section.
Model Results
Table 2.3 reports the key results of the rst and third steps. The results are normalized to
+1 of startup age because it generates a higher matching score. The second stage results are
in Table 2.4.
First of all, the amount of seed investment only has a marginal impact during the accel-
erator admission. The signicant and positive coecient of (Proxy −MatchingV alue) in
the second stage indicates the sorting eect in the unobservable matching quality is import-
ant and better accelerators admit better startups. In Table 2.4, the year dummy pattern
supports the argument that the venture investment market recovers since July 2010.
Serial entrepreneurs do not see much dierence from rookies in terms of value creation
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in accelerators. This result is consistent with the opinion of Alex Iskold, Managing Director
of TechStars NYC, that accelerators are not only for rst-time entrepreneurs.34 Further,
serial entrepreneurs do not enjoy higher short-term nancing rates after graduation either.
Considering that experienced entrepreneurs tend to produce better startups and attract
more venture investors, this nding suggests that the accelerator mechanism can reduce the
dierences between the veteran and rookie. Older businesses still enjoy higher funding rates
but only in the short term, indicating that screening cannot replace the operation record as
a quality signal to attract investors.
The accelerator tier dummies in the third stage capture the dierence in the managerial
quality improvements. The second and third stage results suggest that better programs
both enjoy higher short-term funding probability and generate better mentorship quality for
long-term growth. It is worth noting that the dierence between Tier 1 and 2 programs
increases in the last stage result compared with the one in the rst stage. This nding is
consistent with the top programs' claim that they focus more on the startup's managerial
capital improvement for long-term growth. On the other hand, the dierence between Tier 2
and 3 programs decreases. In fact, the Tier 2 dummy is close to an insignicant level in the
third stage. This is not surprising as anecdotal evidence indicates that some Tier 2 programs
tend to create more value in short-term nancing improvement. The dierence between Tier
1 and 2 programs decreases during the nancial crisis as reported by the interactions of tiers
and macroeconomy condition in rst stage results. This pattern suggests the concavity of
short-term nancing importance.
Screening v.s. Managerial Capital
Following method provided in Section 2.3.4, I calculate the upper bound of the Financing to
Managerial Capital Ratio of each rm except those being matched with their worst choices.
34Source: https://alexiskold.net/2014/08/19/top-10-reasons-to-join-and-not-to-join-an-accelerator/.
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In total, I obtained 618 ratios.
Table 2.5 reports the summary statistics of ratios across dierent tiers of accelerators. The
improvement of short-term nancing is not very important in accelerator value creation since
all ratios are much smaller than one, with the lowest value being only 0.23%. The relative
importance of the screening eect is therefore even lower. This result is supported by the
recent trend that more startups, which have already secured millions of venture investment,
join accelerators. This is especially true for the top programs, who have much lower ratios
compared with the other tiers. The results for Tier 2 programs are divided. While some
of them, about 40%, follow the two top accelerators and have similar ratio levels, some
others, about 30%, emphasize on short-term nancing and have the highest ratio among all
programs at about 30%.
Figure 2.4 shows ratio averages across states. Startup hubs - California, Massachusetts
and New York - have lower ratios. This pattern still holds even when I removed Tier 1
accelerators in those states. A plausible explanation is that startups in these states have
better venture nancing opportunities without accelerators.
2.6 Conclusion
Separately identifying the screening eect from the human capital improvement attracts
much attention in labor economics, especially in education studies, because these two chan-
nels have dierent social welfare implications. In this project, I estimated an upper bound
of the screening eect in the accelerator market based on some specic industry features. I
nd that the accelerator mechanism helps startups mostly through its mentorship and busi-
ness support, despite the fact that the screening pattern is also apparent. Such nding is
especially true for the oldest, and arguably the best, two accelerators - Y Combinator and
TechStars. The importance of screening increases when startups are facing a high cost to
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raise funds in alternative channels.
Table 2.1: Accelerator Proles Across Tiers
Note: The accelerator participants are early-stage startups - mostly rms before any venture capital nancing. The majority of
these early accelerators focuses on high-tech startups, especially in information technology related elds. Better accelerators, as
indicated by the tiers, tend to take lower equity and have bigger classes. Furthermore, the best accelerators take low equities from
rms but do not give the highest seed investment. The second tier programs are the most generous in terms of rm valuation,
taking low equity and giving high seeds. On average, the entrepreneurs who participate in accelerators are signicantly younger
than the non-participants (close to 40). Further, while some argue accelerators are for rst-time entrepreneurs, one-third of
participants have founded some company before.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
# of Accelerators 2 8 17
# of Programs 19 25 30
# of States Represented 5 6 15
# of Programs in Startup Hubs (CA, NY, MA) 13 8 6
Equity Range 5%~6% 5%~8% 5%~10%
Seed Investment Range 10k~20k 10k~50k 6k~25k
Average Valuation (Seed/Equity) 307.9k 364.2k 274.9k
Average Cohort Size 26.72 13.12 8.01
# of Startups 335 239 202
Startup Average Age 1.83 1.73 1.77
Average Founder Age 27.81 29.37 29.68
Inexperienced Team 61.49% 63.18% 61.39%
Female Founder in Team 4.78% 13.81% 9.90%
Graduate Degree Founder in Team 30.45% 39.75% 36.63%
Industry: IT/Software 46.27% 44.77% 52.48%
Industry: Social Media/Social Platform 16.71% 18.83% 19.31%
Industry: Healthcare/Education 4.78% 9.21% 7.43%
Industry: Others 32.24% 27.19% 20.78%
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Table 2.2: Accelerator Performance Across Tiers
Note: In Operation Rates represents the percentage of rms still in operation and not acquired ve years after graduation.
Acquisition Rates represents the percentage of rms that have been acquired within ve years after graduation. One-Year
and Five-Year show the startup performance within one year and ve years after graduation, respectively.







Startup Operation Status (Five Year)
In Operation Rates 49.25% 2.73% 58.16% 3.19% 47.52% 3.51%
Acquisition Rates 28.36% 2.46% 20.50% 2.61% 13.36% 2.39%
Startup Funding
Rates
One-Year 52.24% 2.73% 47.28% 3.23% 25.74% 3.08%
Five-Year 58.21% 2.69% 53.97% 3.22% 32.67% 3.30%
Startup Funding Sizes Given Funded (k$)
One-Year 1,696 2,216 956 1,432 986 1,272
Five-Year 16,135 59,890 5,549 13,147 6,802 18,104
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Table 2.3: Main Model Results: 1st & 3rd Steps
Note: ** indicates within 95% CI. This table reports results for the rst and third stages of model estimation. Both of these two
stages use a two-side matching maximum score estimator. Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals to one if the accelerator program
happens before July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of NBER denition. ST Funding Prob
is the calculated measure for short-term nancing probability based on the method described in the model section (Step 2).
Normalizing the startup age to have parameter of ±1, I estimate the matching models (rst and third stages) by running the
dierential evolution optimization routine from 40 dierent starting points (20 each for the positive and negative normalization
respectively) and selecting the coecient vector that yields the highest value for the objective function. For valid inference, I
generate the condence intervals using the subsampling procedure described by Politis and Romano [129] and Delgado et al.
[51] to approximate the sampling distribution. I randomly conduct 100 of these subsamples with sizes at about one third of
the total data set. For each of the subsamples, I estimate the parameter vector as for the whole dataset. Call the estimate
from the sth subsample β̂s and the estimate from the original full sample β. The approximate sampling distribution for the
parameter vector can be computed by calculating β̃s = (n/N)
1/3(β̂s − β) + β for each subsample, where N and ns are the
total sample size and given subsample size respectively. I take the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile of this empirical
sampling distribution to compute 95% condence intervals for all of the estimates.
1st Step 3rd Step
Variables Coef C.I. (95%) Coef C.I. (95%)
Experienced -1.99 -6.78 1.36 -2.34** -5.05 -0.41
Tier 1 Accelerator 9.67** 7.73 26.09 16.21** 10.38 20.24
Tier 2 Accelerator 6.75** 3.06 18.75 2.90** 0.42 6.65
Out-of-State Participant -5.70 -7.05 2.67 -16.48** -18.99 -8.32
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis -6.58** -11.37 -0.16
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis*Exp 1.97** 1.42 5.507
Crisis & One Yr Aft
Crisis*Startup Age
2.42** 2.42 7.375
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis*Tier 1 17.91** 1.25 22.76
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis*Tier 2 20.38** 2.73 23.53
Crisis & One Yr Aft
Crisis*Out-of-State Participant
-1.11** -19.42 -1.11
Seed 0.80** 0.315 1.16 0.15** 0.15 30.48
Constant 49.57** 48.77 56.14 57.63** 55.28 68.57
ST Funding Prob 73.36** 59.92 74.15
(ST Funding Prob)2 -
110.41**
-110.55 -87.65
Startup Age 1 super consistent 1 super consistent
Squared Terms and Other
Interactions35
Y Y
Matching Score/Max Score 81.94% 82.55%
35For dummy variables, one cannot separately identify the parameters of rst and second
orders.
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Table 2.4: Main Model Results: 2nd Step
Note: The stars indicate signicance level (* for 90%, ** for 95%, and *** for 99%). Crisis & One Year Aft Crisis equals to
one if the accelerator program happens before July 2010, which is one year after the ocial end of the great recession of NBER
denition. This table shows the regression results of the second stage estimation described in the model section. All three
models reported here have the independent variable of indicators on whether the startup obtained venture nancing within one
year after graduation. Model 1 does not control for each individual year xed eects. Model 2 does not control for the nancial
crisis xed eects. Model 3 controls for both year and nancial crisis xed eects.







(Proxy-Matching Value) 0.34*** 0.03 0.35*** 0.04 0.34*** 0.04
Experienced Founder(s) 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04
Startup Age 0.06*** 0.02 0.05*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02
Tier 1 Accelerator 0.22*** 0.04 0.25*** 0.05 0.26*** 0.05
Tier 2 Accelerator 0.18*** 0.04 0.18*** 0.04 0.18*** 0.04
Out-of-State Participant -0.11*** 0.04 -0.11*** 0.04 -0.11*** 0.04
Crisis & One Yr Aft Crisis -0.13*** 0.04 -0.12* 0.07
Yr 2008 -0.19*** 0.06 -0.07 0.09
Yr 2009 -0.16*** 0.05 -0.04 0.09
Yr 2010 -0.11** 0.04 -0.07 0.05
Constant 0.22*** 0.05 0.27*** 0.06 0.26*** 0.06
Observations 648 648 648
Table 2.5: Upper Bound of F/H ratios across Accelerator Tiers
Note: This table reports some statistics of the calculated ratios of the relative importance of the short-term nancing to other
value created by accelerators.
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
Mean Ratio 10.55% 21.11% 21.96%
Min Ratio 0.23% 3.09% 8.54%
Max Ratio 16.92% 38.99% 36.86%
Standard Deviation 4.36% 10.88% 6.17%
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Figure 2.1: Accelerator Process
This gure shows the owchart of the accelerator process. The whole procedure of accelerators starts with a public announcement
of the details and terms of the program, such as application requirements, resources provided, seed investment, equity share,
class size, location, and schedule. Once announced, these terms stay the same for all participants. Entrepreneurs submit their
applications as individual rms. Admitted entrepreneurs start the program together at the same time and in the same location.
The program lasts for a xed period, often three months, during which accelerators oer mentorship, network opportunities,
and other forms of business support. At the end of the program, accelerators hold a Demo Day in which each startup pitches
to a group of potential investors. Firms are ocially o the hook in terms of participating in the accelerator after graduation,
but they can, and often do, become involved in the alumni community.
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Figure 2.2: Accelerator Value Creation
Figure 2.3: PitchBook Data on Venture Financing Deals
This diagram (source: pitchbook.com) shows venture nancing trends over the past decade in the U.S. While venture investment
deals reverted to the upward trend in 2009, the recovery only began to speed up after the third quarter of 2010. This is especially
true of the market for early startups, which is indicated by Angel/Seed and Early VC.
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Figure 2.4: Average Upper Bounds of F/H Ratio Across States
This diagram shows the average upper bounds of the nancing to managerial capital ratio across states.
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Chapter 3
Not only who but where : A structural
approach of incorporating location into
our understanding of the audit market
This paper investigates the eects of auditor oce location on client and auditor surplus.
Using a two-sided matching market model, we nd that, while both clients and auditors
bear the costs of geographic distance, auditors disproportionately bear costs. Although
distance exerts costs on clients, clients incur distance costs to gain auditor expertise. Next,
we examine how the stickiness of audit oce locations aects equilibrium audit market
matches. The immobility of audit oce locations results in a market-wide surplus loss of
1.6%, and leaves 8% of clients worse o. In addition, by aggregating individual client-
auditor surplus at the MSA and state level, We nd that in underserved regions, clients
are more likely to choose their second-best auditors, and auditors are more likely to extract
rents from clients. Finally, relocating audit oces in overserved regions, such as Detroit
and Cincinnati, to underserved regions, such as Austin and Houston, improves market-wide
surplus, and therefore, leaves clients and auditors in both regions better o. Overall, this
85
paper contributes to the literature by highlighting how an audit market friction (stickiness
in audit oce location) aects surplus and auditor matches. This paper is a joint work with
Seongjin Ahn
3.1 Introduction
An extensive literature in the industrial organization eld suggests that an analysis of the
eects of competition should incorporate both the number of rms in the same product
market and the locations of rms relative to their customers Gabszewicz and Thisse [71],
Porter [130], Tirole [145]. In the audit market, location aects audit quality as well as
audit costs and fees. For example, assessing internal controls and providing feedback on
information systems require auditors to observe these systems Oce [124]. Because audit
oces and expertise are dispersed and costly to move, distance constitutes a friction that
potentially limits client access to pertinent expertise. However, these negative eects may
be curbed by the fact that auditors have incentives to shift resources to valued clients. In
this paper, we investigate the eect of auditor locations on the value clients and auditors get
from receiving and providing an audit, to understand the distance-related friction.1
Two challenges exist in documenting the impact of the auditor's location on clients' and
auditors' welfare and, consequently, the audit market as a whole. First, the value clients
receive from an auditor and the costs incurred by the auditor are unobserved. Second, the
value, costs, and audit fees are jointly determined with other market forces (e.g., competi-
tion). We address these challenges by developing an empirical client-auditor matching market
model, based on the structure of multi-dimensional two-sided matching market models (e.g.,
1We dene the value that clients get from auditors as client surplus and the value that auditors get from
clients as auditor surplus. Client surplus is calculated as unobserved audit benets less audit fees, following
Gerakos and Syverson [75], Guo et al. [85]. Though our conceptual denition is identical to theirs, our
estimation approaches dier. Auditor surplus is calculated as audit fees less unobserved audit costs, a new
development in the literature. Total surplus is calculated as the sum of client surplus and auditor surplus.
See Section 4 for more detail.
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Fox [65]).
Two-sided matching market models have several advantages in an audit market setting.
First, such a model separates the client-side decision and the auditor-side decision which
jointly determines observed client-auditor pairs. This allows us to understand whether the
client or auditor drives more or fewer audits (Donovon et al. [52]).2 Second, the model 
through the equilibrium concepts embedded in it  accounts for the dynamics of client-auditor
selection contingent on other competitors in the market. In other words, equilibrium matches
are formed only when neither clients nor auditors deviate from their matched pairs. Third,
this model incorporates outside opportunities for which a particular client or auditor could
feasibly be matched but were not. Hence, the model estimates how much value the client
and auditor could have received under these alternative matches; this allows us to identify
whether observed client-auditor pairs are suboptimal and to quantify the unobserved loss of
surplus in the audit market, i.e., friction. Lastly, the counter-factual analysis enables us to
understand under what circumstances friction in specic local audit markets can be resolved.
We rst examine who (the client, auditor, or both) bears the costs of a greater distance
between the auditor and client and how much. Our results suggest that, on average, a shorter
distance between the client's headquarter and the auditor's oce generates benets for both
the client and auditor; these benets are higher for the latter. For instance, a 100-mile
reduction in the distance between the client and auditor results in a $43 million increase in
client surplus and a $64 million increase in auditor surplus, which is about 2.2% of total audit
fees in 2015. The sensitivity of client surplus to client-auditor distance varies based on client
characteristics. For example, bigger clients prefer auditors that are closer, but clients with
better corporate governance associated with auditing benet more from auditors that are
farther away. In contrast, the sensitivity of auditor surplus to the distance is less dependent
2Appendix A. explains the erroneous inferences we may obtain if we model client-auditor selection as
a one-sided market rather than a two-sided market. Appendix B. explains why reduced-form estimation
hinders the understanding of whether the client or the auditor is driving results.
87
on client characteristics.
Next, we examine the economic signicance of changes in distance to other characteristics.
This analysis sheds light on the relative importance of client-auditor proximity, identifying
the circumstances under which clients sacrice other desirable auditor characteristics for
higher proximity. We nd that a one-standard deviation increase in distance is associated
with a 3.04% decrease in client surplus relative to its mean. Distance has a larger eect
on surplus than either industry expertise or Big N; a one-standard deviation decrease in
these variables decreases client surplus by 0.2% or 2.07% relative to its mean, respectively.
However, distance is substantially less important than the length of the client-auditor rela-
tionship; a one-standard deviation shift in relationship tenure leads to a 23.4% change in
client surplus relative to its mean. We also examine the market-wide loss of total surplus
due to the immobility of audit oce locations. We do this by comparing the total surplus
of new predicted equilibrium client-auditor pairs to the total surplus of actual equilibrium
client-auditor pairs in a scenario where auditor location does not matter. This analysis is
equivalent to examining whether auditor pairs would change if potential alternative auditors
were located in the same location as a client's actual auditors. The results suggest that
the market-wide total surplus might improve by 1.6%, and that approximately 8% of clients
would be better o if the alternative auditors were located in the same locations as their
actual paired auditors.
Additionally, we aggregate client and auditor surplus at the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA) level and at the state level to examine the variation in market-wide total surplus
and equilibrium audit price across the U.S. In underserved audit markets, where clients have
relatively fewer auditor options in their geographical area, market-wide total surplus is lower
and auditors charge higher audit fees relative to audit costs. This indicates that auditors have
more bargaining power likely due to lower competition. Also, clients in underserved markets
are 2.5 times less likely to select their rst-best auditor compared to clients in overserved
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markets. Lastly, our results suggest that relocating or opening an audit oce can increase
market-wide total surplus in local audit markets with low market-wide total surplus. For
example, relocating audit oces from overserved MSA to underserved MSA increases total
surplus in both MSAs. At the state level, in California, where state-level total surplus is low,
new auditor oces can increase market-wide total surplus by as much as 2.6%, depending
on auditor characteristics.3
This study adds to the literature on the roles of distance in various settings. In non-audit
settings, prior studies document the benets of proximity obtained by facilitating monitoring
and access to information. Mutual fund managers are more likely to hold shares of local rms
and earn signicant abnormal returns (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz [43, 44]). Banks located
closer to their borrowers are more likely to lend to informationally dicult borrowers (e.g.,
Petersen and Rajan [127], Mian [115], Su [142]). Analysts who are geographically proximate
to rms they follow are more accurate than other analysts (e.g., Malloy [109], Bae et al. [15]).
Co-location of rms in the same industry reduces analysts' information acquisition costs
(Jennings et al. [94]). Headquarters' proximity to plants increases plant level-investment
and productivity (Giroud [77]). In audit-setting, prior studies document that more distant
auditor selections are associated with low quality audits (Choi et al. [36], Jensen et al. [95]).
My paper complements prior studies by documenting the costs associated with auditors'
geographic proximity to clients.
This study provides new insights for regulators by highlighting how an audit market
friction (stickiness in audit oce location) aects audit market participants' surplus and
auditor matches. The evidence that distance reduces surplus for both clients and auditors
gives insights into why auditors maintain multiple audit oces and locate these oces close
to their client pools. Additionally, our results suggest that clients in underserved markets
3Our model does not consider set-up costs associated oce relocation or openings. Therefore, considering
those initial set-up costs will reduce the amount of total surplus changes documented in this paper.
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are less able to hire their ideal auditor than clients in other local audit markets. Moreover,
auditors in those markets enjoy bargaining power and extract rents from clients by charging
relatively high prices. Overall, this study provides evidence of market imperfections and
suggests how they may be resolved.
Finally, this study overcomes some of the limitations of conventional approaches (i.e.,
OLS, probit model, logit model) that have been used to examine client/auditor selection
and audit pricing. First, the method used in this paper allows the client-side and auditor-
side decisions to be modeled separately. Prior studies typically model a single side of the
selection process, as if the matching process between the auditor and client were similar to
selecting and purchasing a soda at a convenience store. Omitting the market forces from one
side in a two-sided market could provide an inaccurate picture of how the selection process
occurs (e.g., Gale and Shapley [72], Becker [20], Roth and Sotomayor [135]). Second, the
estimation approach in this paper overcomes self-selection issues (e.g., Francis [68], Hay et al.
[88], Lennox et al. [105], DeFond and Zhang [49], Donovon et al. [52]). Third, unlike the
conventional approach, this study does not assume that a client chooses auditors indepen-
dently from and unconstrained by other clients (Hay et al. [88], DeFond and Zhang [49]).
Prior studies argue that such an assumption leads to biased estimation and generates mixed
results (e.g., Hay et al. [88]). We overcome these limitations by utilizing two-sided matching
models that explicitly deal with these issues both theoretically and empirically.
3.2 Prior Research and Hypothesis Development
3.2.1 Spatial Competition and Audit Market Structure
Prior studies on theoretical models in spatial competition introduce rm location as a source
of market power and an important dierentiating factor between goods produced in the mar-
ket (Biscaia and Mota [24]). Spatial economics focuses on economic agents' location choices,
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e.g., given the location of one rm, which location should another rm select to maximize
its prots (Hotelling [91])? The optimal location could be derived, for instance, by geo-
graphically mapping customer density and locating production to minimize transportation
costs (Keune et al. [100]). Therefore, the ultimate concern of spatial economics is the loca-
tion of economic activity and the allocation of scarce and indivisible resources over space
(Duranton [55]).
Because the economic activities in the audit market, i.e., purchasing and providing audit
services, involve space and location issues, prior studies of audit market concentration and
industry specialization adopt theoretical arguments from spatial economics. Mayhew and
Wilkins [113] document that industry specialist auditors, dened as industry experts with
signicantly higher market share than their competitors, earn higher audit fees. Numan and
Willekens [122] dene audit markets by industry segments per U.S. Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) and document a positive association between audit fees and industry specialist
auditors in the local audit market. While Numan and Willekens [122] focus on Big 4 auditors,
Bills and Stephens [23] and Keune et al. [100] include non-Big 4 auditors, and document the
eect of non-Big4 market leadership on audit fees on both groups of auditors.
While this paper also examines the structure of the audit market from the angle of spatial
competition, it diers from prior studies in two major ways. First, we focus on the eect of
physical location rather than product-space location. For example, Numan and Willekens
[122] dene spatial competition in the following way: an auditor's relative market position in
the audit market as the distance (in terms of industry market share) between the incumbent
auditor and its closest competitor. We consider the impact of physical client headquarter
location and oce-level auditor location in local audit markets. Second, we focus on the
economic wealth generated for client and auditor pairs as well as relative audit prices (based
on audit benets and audit costs), rather than studying absolute audit prices. This allows us
to make welfare inferences about the audit market and determine whether auditors extract
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economic rents from clients due to their market power. Merely examining absolute audit
fees does not allow researchers to make welfare inferences: since fees are transfers between
clients and auditors, they are netted out in the market as whole.
3.2.2 Audit Market Competition
There is an ongoing debate about whether audit market concentration generates problems
in the audit market and, if so, what the extent these problems is (Newton et al. [119]).
On one hand, audit market concentration can be problematic because auditors in highly
concentrated markets may provide low-quality audits and charge high fee premiums for rent-
seeking purposes. Various government-issued reports raises these concerns. In the U.S.,
the government-mandated studies conducted by the U.S. Government Accountability Oce
(Oce [123, 124]) document that audit market concentration may threaten audit quality
because the Big N's market dominance may reduce competition, fostering entrenchment and
thereby lowering auditor incentives to provide high-quality audits. In the European Union,
regulators have expressed concerns about a high level of market concentration restricting
companies' auditor choices and causing market disruptions if one of the Big 4 audit rms
fails (Commission [40]). Prior studies document evidence of audit market concentration
impairing audit quality as captured by increased earnings management and lower accrual
quality (Boone et al. [26], Lennox et al. [105]).
On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that audit market concentration may not
be problematic. For instance, audit quality may improve as threats from client importance
decline and clients have fewer opportunities to shop for opinions (DeFond and Zhang [49]).
Some studies document that Big 4 concentration improves audit quality, as measured by
fewer restatements and increased earnings quality (Newton et al. [119]). The Oce [124]
report points out that oligopolic competition can be intense. Also, the auditors with the
highest market shares tend to do better-quality work (DeFond and Zhang [49]).
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3.2.3 Mechanisms of Audit Market Friction
There are two possibilities how the distance between clients' headquarters and auditors'
oces may lead to loss of value in the audit market. First, clients' ideal auditors may not
be located close by. Prior studies suggest that audit services are a dierentiated product,
meaning that dierent clients place dierent values on various auditor characteristics (e.g.,
Gerakos and Syverson [75], Guedhami et al. [84], Copley and Douthett Jr [42], Fields et al.
[63], Dechow et al. [47], Zimmerman [152]). It would be thus ideal for each client to engage
its ideal auditor based on its preference function, and each auditor to provide service to
its preferred client in a similar manner. Whether clients do actually have the opportunity
to work with their rst-choice auditors and vice versa is an empirical question. As spatial
economics and mechanism design studies in the matching market suggest, markets where
the economic goods being traded are indivisible and scarce may not obtain eciency from a
social welfare perspective, i.e., goods may not be allocated to the economic agents who need
them most (Roth [134]).
For example, suppose a client is receiving audit services from a particular auditor who
is located 50 miles away from the client's headquarters and has a medium level of industry
expertise. This auditor might be the optimal choice based on the clients' preferences and
auditor availability. However, the client might prefer to engage an auditor with higher indus-
try expertise, even if such an auditor is located further away. From the client's perspective,
the benets stemming from industry expertise may justify the costs associated with addi-
tional distance. If such an auditor does not exist in the area, the client must settle for the
second-best choice.
Second, friction in the audit market stem from the failure of the supply of audit services
to keep up with shifts in demand. As local economic conditions change, client pools may
grow in some regions and decline in others. If there is a time lag between these shifts in
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demand and auditor oce openings and closures, we might expect to see market friction,
i.e., extra costs for clients in regions characterized by shortages of audit services.
3.2.4 Client-Side Trade-Os
As we alluded in prior section, the extent of friction in the audit market is based on audit
market participants' valuation of their counterparts  namely, clients' valuation of dierent
clients. From a client's perspective, audit benets vary across auditors due to (i) hetero-
geneity in auditor attributes and (ii) heterogeneity in the value the clients place on those
heterogeneous auditor attributes.
Prior studies provide evidence that companies reap capital market benets from better-
quality auditors (dened as industry expert auditors or Big N auditors).4 Pittman and Fortin
[128] document a positive association between ERC and auditor quality. Better quality
auditors are also associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy, higher disclosure quality,
and lower likelihood of future restatements (Behn et al. [21], DeFond and Zhang [48]). This
evidence suggests that variation in auditor quality generates variation in audit benets for
clients.
Audit benets vary based on not only auditor-side characteristics but also client-side
characteristics. Politically connected clients are more likely to choose Big N auditors (Gued-
hami et al. [84]), which enables them to obtain higher nancial statement transparency and
to get cheaper equity nancing. Clients are more likely to choose auditors whose incum-
bent clients have high nancial statement similarity (Brown and Knechel [29]). Copley and
Douthett Jr [42] document that clients that are dicult to value are more likely to switch
to Big N auditors before they le for IPOs. Gerakos and Syverson [75] show that clients'
heterogeneous xed preferences for each of the Big4 auditors vary based on dierent client
4The debate on whether Big N auditors add value or not is ongoing. Lawrence et al. [104] challenge
long-standing evidence of positive Big N eects. In this paper, we rely on prior studies that document Big
N eects to develop our argument.
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characteristics. Additionally, managers make decisions with the aim of maximizing their ob-
jective functions (e.g., rm value, nancial statement reporting) given a set of inputs; audit
services are one of the many mechanisms they may choose (e.g., Fields et al. [63], Dechow
et al. [47], Zimmerman [152]). Therefore, managers may choose their auditor based on the
unique set of other mechanisms already implemented inside their rms.
Distance factor plays an important role in audit benets for client's perspective. There
exist benets for being proximate to auditors. The benets are based on informational
advantage that auditors may have by having soft and local information. By interacting with
clients more often, observing how the internal audit system works, and understanding the
issues in operation more clearly, clients would be able to get better quality audit service. On
the other hand, costs for being proximate to auditors also exist. Proximity might increase
the audit independence risk. Due to increased personal ties developed between managers in
clients and auditors, auditors may be more exible to managers' discretion on their nancial
statements, which may lead to restatements.5
Clients will consider the net benets/costs associated with the distance between them
and auditors while making their selection on auditors. Because distance is one of many
factors that clients may consider selecting their best auditors, clients will trade-o between
distance and other auditor factors if those other auditors can give clients higher benets.
3.2.5 Auditor-Side Trade-O
From an auditor's perspective, audit costs vary across clients. Similar to the client's per-
spective, variation in audit costs exists because of (i) heterogeneity in client attributes and
(ii) heterogeneity in the value auditors place on those heterogeneous client attributes.
Prior studies provide evidence that auditors have dierent preferences for specic client
5Appendix C provides a graphical and more intuitive explanation of the costs and benets associated
with proximity and other client and auditor attributes.
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characteristics. The rst evidence of auditors choosing clients is commonly referred to as
client portfolio management in the literature (e.g., Johnstone and Bedard [97]). Johnstone
and Bedard [97] show that auditors are more likely to stop providing audit services to clients
that have a higher audit risk relative to other incumbent clients. They also document that
auditors are more likely to accept new clients with lower audit risk relative to incumbent
clients.
Second, auditors' client preferences are also evident in prior studies of audit quality.
The evidence of Big N eects (e.g., Francis [68], Lawrence et al. [104], DeFond et al. [50])
or industry expert eects (e.g., Minutti-Meza [117]) might be driven by better auditors
having better-quality clients. This self-selection issue has been addressed as a challenge in
audit quality studies (e.g., Francis [68], Hay et al. [88], Lawrence et al. [104], Minutti-Meza
[117], DeFond and Zhang [49], Donovon et al. [52]). Such self-selection, i.e., better-quality
agents on one side of the market pairing with better-quality agents on the other side of the
market, is described as sorting behavior in matching market literature in economics (e.g.,
Gale and Shapley [72], Becker [20], Roth and Sotomayor [135], Sørensen [139], Fox [66]). In
this literature, such sorting behavior is commonly referred as the evidence of who prefers
whom.
The distance factor plays an important role in audit costs from an auditor's perspective
as well. Proximity to clients yields benets; for instance, because auditors can provide better
guidance on internal control systems and oer timelier feedback, they will be able to maintain
stronger client-auditor relationships and build a reputation for providing good audit services.
On the other hand, auditors increase the risks of threatening audit independence when they
are located close to their clients. If auditors apply more lenient audit standards to clients
located nearby, auditors will be exposed to costs associated with future reputational loss
coming from restatements or PCAOB inspections.
Like clients, auditors will consider the net benets and costs associated with their distance
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from client headquarters. Because distance is one of many factors that clients may consider
in selecting their clients, auditors will sacrice lower distance for other client characteristics
if the latter can oer higher benets.
3.3 Identication
3.3.1 One-Sided Decision vs. Two-Sided Decision
Prior studies have used primarily single-agent choice models (e.g., probit, logit, OLS re-
gression model) to understand client-auditor selection and audit fee determination. These
models analyze the decision from one side, taking the other side's decision as given. This
approach likens client/auditor selections to a simple consumer transactions where only con-
sumer's preference matters, like choosing a soda from a convenience store. In contrast,
two-sided matching models assume that agents from both sides take into account the other
side's decisions and the equilibrium outcome depends on both.
A match between an auditor and a client is formed by mutual agreement between the
two. In other words, the formation of client-auditor matches at equilibrium depends not only
on the client's preferences but also on the auditor's preferences (i.e., whether the auditor is
willing to provide audit services to that client).
Therefore, it is appropriate to model the audit market as a two-sided market Gale and
Shapley [72], Roth and Sotomayor [135]), whereby the market outcome consists of joint de-
cisions by both clients and auditors. A two-sided matching model incorporates these key
features, thus allowing us to examine the interplay between auditors and clients from a
market-wide perspective. We follow the empirical framework of Fox [65] and Akkus et al.
[6]. Using the structure of two-sided matching market models, we jointly model the prefer-
ences of auditors and clients regarding their counterparts, including audit fees as an input
of their preference functions. We depart from the existing model by changing the fee re-
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cipient's function (in our setting, the auditor-side function) to include non-pecuniary terms
(in our setting, audit cost terms) and allow for a trade-o between pecuniary terms and
non-pecuniary terms. Thus, the novel aspect of our two-sided matching market model is
that both sides consider both non-pecuniary terms and pecuniary terms. In other words,
audit fees as well as unobserved audit benets (for clients) and unobserved audit costs (for
auditors) are jointly determined.
3.3.2 Match Specic Audit Benet and Audit Cost Variation
As mentioned in Section 2, it is challenging to properly capture the heterogeneity in the value
clients place on heterogenous auditor attributes and vice versa. Prior studies in economics
and nance suggest the inclusion of interaction variables of client attributes and auditor
attributes as a potential solution (e.g., Roth and Sotomayor [135], Pan [126]). This is similar
to the interaction variables used in the client utility model in Gerakos and Syverson [75].
Our model includes not only client attributes and auditor attributes but also interaction
variables for both. Adding these variables reects the idea that dierent clients (auditors)
value the same auditors (clients) dierently. Therefore, in contrast to reduced-form esti-
mation, which contains the strong assumption that every client or auditor has homogenous
valuation, We assume neither homogenous valuation nor heterogenous valuation. We allow
let the data speak to this issue.
3.3.3 Constraints on Client-Auditor Pair Formation: Competition
and Bargaining Power
As we alluded in prior sections, prior studies using reduced-form implicitly assume that an
agent in the market makes choices independent of other agents. In other words, the discrete
choice model makes two strong assumptions: (i) clients choose their preferred auditors inde-
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pendently of other clients; and (ii) auditors choose their preferred clients independently of
other auditors (Mindruta et al. [116]).
While discrete choice models may be appropriate in contexts where clients face few con-
straints in forming relationships with their preferred auditors, their applicability is limited
when clients are constrained by competition for desirable auditors. In short, the major
shortcoming of the standard choice models is their inability to accommodate the complex
structure of correlated errors that emerges due to the constraints in the auditor-choice di-
mensions imposed by the preferences of all clients participating in the market (Mindruta
et al. [116], Train [146], Hay et al. [88]).
We overcome this issue by utilizing the equilibrium concepts embedded in the two-sided
matching market models. The equilibrium pairs of clients and auditors are formed only when
the pairwise stability condition holds. In other words, the equilibrium matches in the market
exist when neither clients nor auditors deviate from their matched pairs. Section 4 provides
a more detailed explanation of this concept.
3.4 Empirical Methodology
In this model of auditor-client matching as a two-sided matching game, every auditor-client
pair realizes a joint match value, i.e., total surplus. Then, clients and auditors split this
total surplus into two by transferring utility via audit fees. Each client (auditor) matches
with an auditor (client) who can maximize its payo given the constraints that it faces in
the selection process. In equilibrium, matched clients and auditors receive a higher payo
from observed match partners than they could have received from counterfactual partners.
In the model, we construct many possible counterfactual matches to each observed match
within a matching market, generating many inequalities for each observed match. Given
these inequalities and a parametric form for the match value function, we choose the param-
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eter vector that maximizes the fraction of inequalities that hold.
We largely follow the rank-order properties introduced by Fox [65, 66] to estimate the
two-sided matching markets where stable matches are assumed to be satised. The model
is based on the two-sided matching models in Akkus et al. [6] and Pan [126], extending on
Fox's initial setup of empirical two-sided matching models. The major improvement from
the model in Fox [65, 66] to the model in Akkus et al. [6] is that the latter includes the
transfer of utility information (i.e., monetary transaction information between two parties).
We develop a related estimator that uses transfer data and allows for auditors' non-
pecuniary terms, i.e., audit costs, to be captured in the model. These non-pecuniary terms
allow for the estimation of (i) the unobserved audit costs in auditors' payo functions and
(ii) any possible trade-o auditors make among audit costs including audit fees.
3.4.1 Model Setup
For a total number of My matches in matching market y, we denote clients by c = 1, . . . ,My
and auditors by a = 1, . . . ,My. We assume there is one national audit market for each
industry and the markets are independent of one another. The matched pair (c, a) realizes
a client-auditor match value of U(c, a), which is a summation of F (c, a) and G(c, a) :
U(c, a) = F (c, a) +G(c, a) (3.1)
where F (c, a) is the client surplus, and G(c, a) is the auditor surplus. The client surplus
F (c, a) is composed of audit benets, denoted by f(c, a), minus audit fees, denoted by
p(c, a).
F (c, a) = f(c, a)− p(c, a) (3.2)
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The auditor surplus G(c, a) is composed of audit fees minus audit costs, denoted by g(c, a).
G(c, a) = p(c, a)− g(c, a) (3.3)
The matched pair (c, a) maximizes its paired value U(c, a) across possible counter factual
matches. To attain a general equilibrium of matched pairs in the market, the client c and
auditor a in match pair (c, a) is better o than having alternative counter party, e.g., (c, a′)
for client c or (c′, a) for auditor a. Each client c maximizes F (c, a) across auditors. In other
words, each client derives higher value from the observed client-auditor match than from
any other counter factual match. This inequality concept provides insight into an important
identication condition (i.e., pairwise stable condition) in any two-sided matching market
(Fox [66], Akkus et al. [6]).
Let's assume the paired matches (c, a) and (c′, a′) are the observed matches in the market.
Because client c is matched with auditor a, we can infer that c derives more value from a
than it would have derived from a′. This can be expressed as follows.
F (c, a)≥F (c, a′) (3.4)
f(c, a)− p(c, a)≥f(c, a′)− p(c, a′) (3.5)
Solving this inequality requires p(c, a′), the audit fee that client c would have paid if the
client had selected potential auditor a′ instead of actual auditor a. Unfortunately, p(c, a′) is
not observed. Akkus et al. [6] propose overcoming this issue as follows. In equilibrium, each
auditor receives the same surplus, G(c, a′), across clients; thus, for auditor a′, G(c, a′) =
G(c′, a′). The logic is the following. Under equilibrium pairs (c, a) and (c′, a′) Client c′,
whose equilibrium matching pair is a′, would not share additional surplus with auditor a′
because a higher auditor surplus would reduce its own payo. Therefore, G(c, a′) < G(c′, a′)
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will not hold at equilibrium. Likewise, G(c, a′) > G(c′, a′) would not hold under equilibrium
pairs (c, a) and (c′, a′). If auditor a′ would receive a higher surplus from matching with client
c, i.e., G(c, a′) > G(c′, a′), auditor a′ would deviate from the current pair c′, and therefore,
(c′, a′) would no longer be a stable equilibrium. In sum, G(c, a′) = G(c′, a′) in equilibrium.
G(c, a′) = G(c′, a′) (3.6)
Using equation (3), we can rephrase equation (6) as the following:
p(c, a′)− g(c, a′) = p(c′ , a′)− g(c′, a′) (3.7)
p(c, a′) = g(c, a′)− g(c′, a′) + p(c′, a′) (3.8)
Now, replace p(c,a') in equation (5).
f(c, a)− p(c, a)≥f(c, a′) + g(c′ , a′)− g(c, a′)− p(c′, a′) (3.9)
Pairwise Condition 1:
f(c, a)− f(c, a′)− g(c′ , a′) + g(c, a′)≥p(c, a)− p(c′, a′) (3.10)
A similar derivation is performed for the inequality F (c′, a′) ≥ F (c′, a), yielding the
following inequalities:
F (c′, a′)≥F (c′, a) (3.11)
f(c′, a′)− p(c′, a′)≥f(c′, a)− p(c′, a) (3.12)
Similar to Pairwise Stability Condition 1, G(c′, a) = G(c, a) holds at equilibrium. Using
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equation (3), we can rephrase G(c′, a) = G(c, a) as the following:
p(c, a)− g(c, a) = p(c′ , a)− g(c′, a) (3.13)
p(c′, a) = g(c′, a)− g(c, a) + p(c, a) (3.14)
Now, replace p(c′, a) in equation (12).
f(c′, a′)− p(c′ , a′)≥f(c′ , a)− g(c′ , a) + g(c, a)− p(c, a) (3.15)
Pairwise Condition 2:
f(c′, a′)− f(c′ , a)− g(c, a) + g(c′ , a)≥p(c′, a′)− p(c, a) (3.16)
3.4.2 Estimation of Matching Model
To use the maximum-score estimator, we specify a functional form for client's audit benets
and auditor's audit costs as follows:
f(c, a) = αXa + βXcXa + γXca+ ε(c,a) (3.17)
g(c, a) = ᾱXc + β̄XaXc + γ̄Xca+ ε(c,a) (3.18)
where Xa represents auditor attributes and Xc represents client attributes. Therefore, the
audit benet function for clients, f(c, a), depends on auditors' independent characteristics
and their interactions with client characteristics. The audit cost function for auditors, g(c, a),
depends on the independent eects of client characteristics and their interaction eects with
auditor characteristics. We examine two auditor characteristics: industry expertise and
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whether the auditor is a Big N accounting rm. We examine four client characteristics:
size, nancial condition, absolute discretionary accruals (ADA), and audit governance. Xca
represents the client-auditor pair characteristics, which are jointly determined at the pair
level. Two variables are considered: distance and tenure. Distance, the main variable of
interest, is the distance between the client headquarters location and auditor oce location.
We also add the interaction variables of distance and client characteristics. The Tenure of
the client-auditor relationship in years (as of the beginning of the scal year) is the last
variable in the functional form. ε(c,a) is the match-specic error term that we assume to be
independent across matches in our dataset. We use a maximum score estimator similar to
Fox [65, 66] and Akkus et al. [6].
We estimate the set of parameters (ω) that maximizes the objective function:6
Q(ω) =
∑∑∑
1[f(c, a|ω)− f(c, a′|ω)− g(c′, a′|ω) + g(c, a′|ω)
≥p(c, a|ω)− p(c′, a′|ω)
⋂
f(c′, a′|ω)− f(c′, a|ω)− g(c, a|ω) + g(c′, a|ω) (3.19)
≥p(c′, a′|ω)− p(c, a|ω)]
3.4.3 Obtaining the Functional Form
This section presents the functional form of the objective function (19). Equation (19) can
be rephrased using the functional form specied in equations (17) and (18). The functional
form of Pairwise Stability Condition 1 is
Xa + βXcXa + γXca − αXa′ − βXcXa′ − γXca′)−(ᾱXc′ + β̄Xc′Xa′ + γ̄Xc′a′−
ᾱXc − β̄XcXa′ − γ̄Xca′)≥p(c, a)− p(c′, a′) (3.20)
6The rst inequality in the objective function is Pairwise Stability Condition 1 and the second inequality
is Pairwise Stability Condition 2.
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α(Xa −Xa′) + β(XcXa −XcXa′) + γ(Xca−Xca′)+ᾱ(Xc −Xc′) + β̄(XcXa′ −Xc′Xa′)+
γ̄(Xca′ −Xc′a′)≥p(c, a)− p(c′, a′) (3.21)
The functional form of Pairwise Stability Condition 2 is the following.
(αXa′ + βXc′Xa′ + γXc′a′ − αXa − βXc′Xa − γXc′a)−(ᾱXc + β̄XcXa + γ̄Xca − ᾱXc′−
β̄Xc′Xa − γ̄Xc′a≥p(c′, a′)− p(c, a) (3.22)
α(Xa′ −Xa) + β(Xc′Xa′ −Xc′Xa) + γ(Xc′a′ −Xc′a)+ᾱ(Xc′ −Xc) + β̄(Xc′Xa −XcXa)+
γ̄(Xc′a −Xca)≥p(c′, a′)− p(c, a) (3.23)
3.4.4 Subsampling of Condence Interval
To generate point estimates, we run the dierential evolution optimization routine from 10
dierent starting points and select the set of parameter estimates that generate the highest
value for the above objective function. For statistical signicance, we subsample 1/3 of
total sample and take 100 randomly selected subsamples (S =100) to construct condence
intervals. For each of the 100 subsamples, we estimate the set of parameters that maximizes
the above objective function and recover the sampling distribution for the parameters. The
sampling distribution for the set of parameters can be computed as follows:
ωs = (ns/N)
1/3(ωs − ωfull) + ωfull (3.24)
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where ωs denotes the parameter estimates from the sth subsample, ωfull denotes the param-
eter estimates from the original full samples, N denotes the observations in the full sample,
and ns denotes the observations in a subsample. The procedure accounts for the N
1/3 con-
vergence of the maximum score estimator. We calculate the 95% condence intervals for the
set of parameters by taking the 2.5th percentile and the 97.5th percentile of these sampling
distributions.
3.5 Data
We collect data from the Audit Analytics, Compustat, and BoardEx databases. The data
span all client-auditor matches in the United States for scal year 2015 that have the neces-
sary data for variable calculation available. At the beginning date of year 2015, we calculate
client characteristics, auditor characteristics, client-auditor pair characteristics. The main
variable of interest is the Distance between the client headquarters and the auditor oce.
We dene these locations at the state-city level and use longitude and latitude to calculate
the distance between them. We consider four client characteristics. Size is dened as the
natural log of a client's total assets. Financial Condition is the natural log of the Altman Z
score. Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADA) is a proxy for the level of managers' discretion
in nancial statements, measured as the natural log of the absolute number of discretionary
accruals using the modied Jones model and adjusting performance following Kothari et al.
[102]. Audit Governance is dened as the number of audit committee members divided by
the total number of board members.
We consider two auditor characteristics: auditor industry expertise and Big N. Auditor
characteristics are dened at the auditor oce level. We identify the auditor oce for each
year from Audit Analytics  Audit Opinions. Auditor Industry Expertise is dened as the
total assets of an auditor's clients in a given industry divided by the total assets of all rms
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in that industry. Industry is dened by two-digit SIC. Big N is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if the audit oce is one of the Big N audit oces.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics. Though we only use year 2015 data, We repre-
sent year by year sample from year 2000 to year 2015 in Panel A. Panel A. provides yearly
information on the number of total client-auditor matches, client-auditor matches where au-
ditors are Big N accounting rms, and client-auditor matches where auditors are non-Big N
accounting rms. Similar to the ndings in Aobdia et al. [10], client-auditor matches for Big4
auditors decrease while matches for non-Big4 auditors increase over time. Panel B. shows
the descriptive statistics of nal sample (only year 2015) of client characteristics, auditor
characteristics, and audit fee. The mean audit fee in this sample is $2,282,081
3.6 Results
In this section, We rst present results estimating the eect of distance on client and auditor
surplus. Second, We document the loss of market-wide total surplus due to stickiness of audi-
tor oce locations. Third, We examine cross-regional variation in audit market performance.
Finally, We document the eect of audit oce re-location and openings on market-wide sur-
plus in local audit markets.
3.6.1 The Eect of Distance on Client/Auditor Surplus using Struc-
tural Form Estimation
We conduct a structural estimation using the estimation model (equation 19). Panel A of
Table 3.2 presents the estimation results for audit benets on the client side, or f(c,a) in
equation (2) and (17). Panel B presents estimation results for audit costs on the auditor
side, or g(c,a) in equations (3) and (18). In column (1) of Panel A and Panel B, We estimate
parameters with standalone auditor characteristics variables as well as interaction variables
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of client attributes and with auditor characteristics. In column (2) of Panel A and Panel B,
We include interaction variables of distance with client characteristics.
First, % of Satised in column (1) and column (2) tells us how well the model is specied.
Both column (1) and column (2) have values of about 99.7% for the % of Satised, which
suggests that the estimated parameters meet the pair-wise stability condition by 99.7% of
the time. In other words, this model almost fully explains the matching pattern.
In column (1) of Panel A, the Distance variable is signicantly negative at the 5% level.
The negative coecient shows that, on average, a higher distance between client headquarters
and auditor oces reduces client surplus. The coecient value of -1,948.1 implies that a 50%
increase in distance relative to paired client-auditor distance will reduce the client surplus
by $11,688, which is approximately 1.9% of the average client surplus.
In column (2) of Panel A, we include interaction terms, interacting distance with other
client characteristics, which allows us to make two additional inferences. First, We can
document the variation in the impact of distance on client surplus conditional on client char-
acteristics. Second, we can isolate the trade-o between proximity and auditor characteristics
conditional on each client characteristics.
The interaction of Size and Distance is statistically negative at the 5% level. The negative
coecient suggests that as client size increases, the value clients place on proximity to
auditors increases on a per-unit basis. In other words, a higher distance from auditors lowers
larger clients' surplus more substantially.
Size also impacts how clients weigh the costs associated with higher distance against
auditor industry expertise. The interaction of Size and Auditor Industry Expertise is sig-
nicantly positive, suggesting that as size increases, larger clients value industry expertise
disproportionately more than smaller clients (on a per-unit basis). Thus, the decreases in
client surplus associated with a higher distance from auditors can be mitigated by additional
auditor industry expertise. In other words, even if Auditor A is located farther from a client
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than Auditor B, the client could retain Auditor A if its industry expertise relative to Auditor
B is suciently high. Table 3.3 reports trade-o conditional on size. For clients in between
50th percentile and 75th percentile of size distribution, clients should get auditors with at
least 53% higher industry expertise relative to their paired-auditor's industry expertise to
mitigate the loss of surplus from 10% increase of distance relative to the distance between
client location and paired-auditor location. The test results in Table 3.3 suggest that the
trade-o between distance and auditor industry expertise shows decreasing trend moving
from small size clients to large size clients.
The interaction term of Audit Governance and Distance is signicantly positive. This
suggests that, conditional on a client's audit-related governance structure, higher distance
from auditors generates a higher client surplus, on average. Clients with better-quality audit
governance systems benet more from increases in distance, on a per-unit basis, than those
with lower-quality audit governance systems. Also, the interaction term of Audit Governance
and Auditor Industry Expertise is signicantly negative. Clients with better-quality of audit
governance systems value disproportionately less for an additional unit increase of auditor
industry expertise than those with lower-quality audit governance systems. Therefore, con-
ditional on audit-related governance quality, lower auditor expertise can mitigate the loss of
surplus from being more proximate to auditors. This might be somewhat counterintuitive.
However, this trade-o between distance and auditor expertise conditional on audit-related
governance quality might be related to the fact that the internal audit function and the
external audit function are, to a degree, substitutes for each other. Table 3.3 exhibits that
for clients in between 25th percentile and 50th percentile of Audit Governance variable dis-
tribution, clients should get auditors with at least 89% higher industry expertise relative to
their paired-auditor's industry expertise to mitigate the gain of surplus from 10% increase
of distance relative to the distance between client location and paired-auditor location.
Panel A of Table 3.2 contains additional important results. First, the interaction vari-
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able of ADA (absolute discretionary accruals) with Distance is statistically insignicant and
negative. This shows that, as the level of discretion in nancial statements increases, clients
with higher discretion level in nancial statements value disproportionately less for a unit
increase of distance than clients with lower discretion level in nancial statements do. Prior
studies present some evidence that clients' receiving audit services from distant auditors
may be doing so for opportunistic purpose (Choi et al. [36], Jensen et al. [95]). Although the
coecient in this paper is not statistically signicant and its magnitude is relatively small,
its negative sign contradicts the opportunistic choice hypothesis.
Second, the interaction variables of client characteristics and auditor characteristics ex-
hibit the complementarity/substitutability relation between the two. We highlight two vari-
ables: Audit Governance interacted with Auditor Industry Expertise and Audit Governance
interacted with Big N. The interaction variable of Audit Governance with Auditor Indus-
try Expertise is negative while the interaction variable of Audit Governance with Big N is
positive. The results suggest that audit governance is substitutable for auditor industry
expertise: on a per-unit basis, clients with better audit-related governance systems value
auditor industry expertise less than clients with poor audit-related governance systems do.
On the other hand, clients with better audit-related governance systems value Big N auditors
more than clients with poor audit-related governance systems do. These results suggest that
clients with better audit governance systems demand less auditor expertise but value other
unique audit functions (orthogonal to auditor expertise) of Big N auditors (e.g., reputation).
Panel B of Table 3.2 documents auditor-side results. Distance is positively related to audit
costs at 5% level.7 The positive coecient suggests that on average, increases in distance
between client headquarters and auditor oce reduce auditor surplus. A few important
dierences exist between the impact of distance on client surplus and auditor surplus. First,
distance aects auditor surplus more than client surplus. Based on the coecient value for
7Note that the parameters on the auditor side estimate audit costs, g(c,a) in equation (3).
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the former (2880.5), a 50% increase in distance relative to paired client-auditor distance
reduces auditor surplus by $17,280 on average, which is approximately 2.8% relative to
average auditor surplus. Second, auditors have xed preferences for proximity. Even after
including interaction terms, the standalone impact of distance in the auditor-side estimation
does not vary conditional on client characteristics as much it varies on the client side.
3.6.2 Do Clients Get Audits from Worse Auditors because their
Preferred Auditors are Located Farther Away?
The prior section suggests that, on average, increases in distance generates lower surpluses
for both clients and auditors. Although these distance-related surplus losses would be com-
pletely mitigated if auditor oces were locate next to every client headquarters, the costs of
implementing such a strategy would almost certainly outweigh the benets. This idea moti-
vates the tests conducted in this subsection. In particular, we examine whether clients forgo
potential alternative auditors with better match value but located farther from their head-
quarters than their actual paired-auditors because the costs of greater distance outweigh any
benets the alternative auditor oers. If clients forgo better auditors because the location of
auditors is too far away from client headquarters, this represents that clients would rather
choose alternative auditors if the alternative auditors were located in the same distance with
their paired-auditors. Because additional benets coming from the alternative auditor are
greater than the benets from the matched-auditor, those additional benets are a loss of
value caused by the immobility of auditor oce locations, i.e., friction. In this section, we
examine to what extent such friction exists in the overall audit market.
One simple way of documenting the extent of the friction caused by immobility of audit
oce locations is comparing the surpluses of the following: (i) the predicted new equilibrium
pairs assuming oce location does not matter and (ii) the actual equilibrium pairs assuming
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oce location does not matter. A simple intuitive illustration at a micro-level could be
outlined as follows. Suppose client C1's current auditor, BDO, is located 40 miles away.
There is another audit oce, PWC, located 120 miles away from C1. The PWC oce
has higher audit expertise than the audit expertise that C1's current auditor, BDO, has.
However, because the costs associated with 80 additional miles for PWC exceed benets of
higher audit expertise for PWC, C1 retains BDO for its audit services at equilibrium. If
the PWC oce had been as close as BDO, in contrast, C1 would have chosen PWC and
generate additional benets from higher industry expertise. Of course, not all clients would
benet in such a scenario, because there is a limited set of auditors to choose from, and the
ideal auditor for a client may simply not exist (or already be retained by another client).
Therefore, some clients may be worse-o. The extent to which the loss of surplus caused by
immobility of audit oce locations impacts the audit market overall is an empirical question.
Table 3.4 reports the results of the above counter-factual analysis. The results show that
the average total surplus of actual pairs when the distance between the client and auditor
locations does not matter is $1,351,520. Under the new equilibrium pairs predicted following
the matching process described in Baccara et al. [13], the average total surplus increases by
$21,920 (approximately 1.6%). 166 clients are left better-o, while 55 are left worse-o and
2,002 experience no change. Note that these results take the tenure eect into account.
Without the eect of tenure on client-auditor matching, the new predicted equilibrium pairs
generate a 17% higher surplus and the majority of clients are better-o. Overall, the results
suggest that, on average, due to the immobility of audit oce locations, a substantial loss
of welfare occurs in the audit market and a signicant number of clients experience loss of
surplus.
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3.6.3 Cross-Region Variation of Local Audit Markets
We now examine the variation across local audit markets in (i) market participants' economic
welfare (i.e., total surplus) and (ii) how this surplus is split between clients and auditors. The
base level of local audit market variation in this study is the metropolitan statistical area
(MSA). MSA-level analysis is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Newton et al. [119], Dunn
et al. [54], Numan and Willekens [122]). We calculate the ratio of the number of auditors
to the number of clients for each MSA (auditor/client ratio) and compare this ratio across
MSAs. We take the 10 regions with the highest (lowest) ratios and dene them as overserved
(underserved) regions.
Table Table 3.5 presents descriptive statistics for under- and overserved MSA regions; a
list of all MSAs can be found in Appendix A. Panel A of Table 5 depicts the Auditor/Client
Ratio for underserved areas; it ranges from 0 to 0.174, and remains similar when considering
only Big N auditors and their clients. Panel B shows the Auditor/Client Ratio for overserved
areas, which ranges from 0.386 to 0.917. Auditor/Client Ratio is at least twice as large in the
overserved regions as in underserved regions. Figure 1 presents a graphical representation
of Auditor/Client Ratio across states, presented at the state level for simplicity. Texas and
California are examples of underserved regions at the state level, while Missouri and Florida
are examples of overserved regions.
In Table 3.6, we examine total surplus and auditor surplus ratio across dierent regions.
Auditor Surplus Ratio is dened as auditor surplus divided by total surplus. For each
individual pairs, both clients and auditors can be located in either an overserved MSA, an
underserved MSA, or a MSA that is neither over- nor underserved (We refer to these regions
as middle MSAs). The rst three rows of Panel A of Table 3.6 represent client-auditor
pairs for which clients' headquarters are located in an overserved MSA. The next three rows
represent client-auditor pairs for which clients' headquarters are located in an underserved
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MSA. The last three rows represent client-auditor pairs where clients' headquarters are
located in an MSA that is neither under- nor overserved.
Client-auditor pairs in which both clients and auditors are located in overserved areas
show an average total surplus of $1,245,660. Client-auditor pairs in which both clients
and auditors are located in overserved areas show an average total surplus of $1,203,130 -
marginally lower than overserved areas. Interestingly, middle MSAs have the highest average
total surplus: $1,402,080. The average total surplus is higher for client-auditor pairs in which
both parties are located in the same MSA relative to paired clients and auditors located
in dierent MSAs. This is partly driven by shorter distance between client and auditor
locations. Turning to auditor surplus ratio, client-auditor pairs in which both parties are
located in underserved MSAs have the highest auditor surplus ratios. These results suggest
that auditors have bargaining power over clients in areas where fewer auditors compete,
allowing them to extract rents by charging relatively higher audit fees compared to other
regions.
Panel B presents the Spearman correlation between Auditor/Client Ratio and other vari-
ables at the individual client-auditor pair level. Auditor/Client Ratio has a positive but
insignicant relation with Total Surplus. This relation might be consistent with the MSA-
level evidence that total surplus is highest in the middle MSAs. In contrast, Auditor Surplus
Ratio and Auditor/Client Ratio are negatively correlated, indicating that a greater number
of auditors in a local market results in a loss of bargaining power and a decrease in audit
fees relative to audit costs. Viewed together with the negative but insignicant correlation
between Auditor/Client Ratio and Audit Fee, the negative coecient on Auditor Surplus
Ratio suggests that audit fees alone, which have been the main focus of prior studies, may
not be sucient to make accurate inferences without taking audit costs into account.
Panel C compares rst-best pairs to actual pairs. The rst-best pair is dened as the
client-auditor pair that provides clients with the highest surplus among all possible auditors.
114
The actual pairs are the client-auditor pairs observed in the audit market at equilibrium.
For some clients, these pairs might overlap; for others, they dier. Comparing rst-best
pairs to actual pairs across local audit markets will provide insight into how much loss of
surplus exists across these markets due to clients' inability to engage with their ideal auditors,
i.e., audit market friction. Clients are least likely to match with their preferred auditors in
underserved MSAs and most likely to do so in overserved MSAs; in other words, as clients
have a larger auditor pool to choose from, they are more likely to be matched with their ideal
auditor. Consequently, the total surplus lost due to friction is lowest in overserved MSAs.
3.6.4 The Eect of Relocating Auditors from Overserved MSAs to
Underserved MSAs
In the prior section, we show that both overserved and underserved MSAs exhibit lower total
surplus and that auditors in underserved MSAs may exercise their relatively higher bargain-
ing power by extracting rents from clients. In this section, we perform a counter-factual
analysis of the consequences of relocating auditor oces from overserved areas to under-
served areas. Specically, we examine how the total surplus in underserved and overserved
regions would change if one randomly-selected auditor in each of the 10 overserved regions
is relocated to one of the 10 underserved regions (one auditor per region). We perform 20
iterations of this random selection process and report the average results of those 20 itera-
tions. We predict a new equilibrium matching pairs and calculate pair-specic total surplus
following the matching process described in Baccara et al. [13].
Table 3.7 shows that relocating auditor oces from overserved to underserved MSAs can
improve the economic welfare of both regions. Accounting for the eect of tenure in the
client-auditor matching process, relocating audit oces increases average total surplus by
0.34% in underserved MSAs and 0.28% in overserved MSAs. Ignoring the tenure eect, the
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average total surplus increases by 3.41% and 2.73% in underserved and overserved MSAs,
respectively.
3.6.5 The Eect of New Auditors Entering a Local Audit Market
In this section, we perform two additional analyses by focusing on specic audit markets
at the state level. Conducting a counter-factual analysis for a specic local audit market
allows us to track individual equilibrium pair changes under dierent scenarios and gain
insights into the consequences of structural market changes in the market. Additionally, if
regulators and policy-makers are particularly interested in a particular local audit market,
these analyses oer a blueprint for studying that market.
We rst examine the eect of auditor entry into a local audit market, focusing on the
chemical and allied manufacturing industry (SIC = 28) in California. We select this market
because California generates one of the lowest total surpluses among all states, and chemical
and allied manufacturing generates one of the lowest total surpluses among all industries.
The majority of clients in the chemical and allied manufacturing industry are located in
California.
As Figure 3.4 shows, clients and auditors are clustered in two California regions: the area
around San Francisco (Area 1) and the area around Los Angeles (Area 2). Table 3.8 Panel
A-1 presents descriptive statistics for this local audit market. The number of chemical and
allied manufacturing industry clients located in California is 112, about a quarter of total
clients in the state. The average total surplus for these client-auditor pairs is $637,810, which
is about 36% less than the average total surplus for all client-auditor pairs in California. The
average distance between clients and auditors is 114 miles, which is about 40% greater than
the average distance between all clients in California and their respective auditors (81miles).
Among the 112 chemical and allied manufacturing industry clients, 5 are paired with auditors
outside California and 3 are paired with auditors in a dierent area of the state (e.g. clients
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located in Area 1 receive audit services from auditors located in Area 2).
We examine a situation where one audit oce enters Area 1 and another enters Area 2.
Table 3.8 Panel A-2 reports the test results. The location of each new entering auditor is
the midpoint of incumbent auditor locations in each area. We simulate dierent scenarios
by varying the auditors' characteristics, i.e., auditor industry expertise, Big N classication,
and the number of clients auditors can accept. In Case #1, the entering auditors are non-Big
N auditors with average industry expertise and the same capacity as the average incumbent
auditors in the area. In this scenario, the overall total surplus in these areas increases by
1.2% and one client who previously matched with an auditor outside California now switches
to a local auditor. If the entering auditors are Big N auditors, total surplus increases by an
additional 0.2%. If the entering auditor has more capacity to handle clients, total surplus
increases by an additional 0.8% (See Case #2 and #3).
In sum, auditor entrance into the California audit market increases market-wide total
surplus. Moving from Case #1 to Case #4, the results in Table 3.8 suggest that Big N
auditors with higher industry expertise and higher resource capacity will incrementally aect
total surplus. Also, clients who engage auditors outside California will be incentivized to
work with local auditors. However, the three clients who receive audit services from a
dierent area of the state continue to do so under the new market equilibrium.
In Panel B, we examine the eect of auditor oce relocation in a slightly dierent way,
considering individual auditors' oce management strategies. Specically, we analyze the
consequences of the following hypothetical situation: KPMG closes its St. Louis oce and
moves it to Las Vegas. The motivation of this analysis is the following. We desire to provide
audit rms with an approach for conducting a cost and benet analysis to evaluate opening,
closing, or relocating audit oces. It diers from the counterfactual analysis in Table 3.7
because it is based on each auditor's oce management objectives, while the analysis in Table
3.7 is based on social planners' objectives  maximizing the total audit market welfare. We
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focus on the Las Vegas area since it is one of the fastest-growing MSAs in America; St.
Louis, in contrast, is selected as representative of an MSA that does not attract many client
headquarters. Therefore it would be a reasonable strategy for KPMG to open an oce in
the Las Vegas area.
KPMG's St. Louis oce provides audit services to one client in the business services
industry (SIC = 73). In Nevada, there are two clients in the business services industry,
both located in Las Vegas. Those two clients receive audit services from non-Big N auditors
located outside of Nevada. If the KPMG oce moves to Las Vegas, the St. Louis client will
continue to receive audit services from KPMG rather than switching to a dierent auditor.
However, because the distance between the client headquarters and audit oce location is
greater, total surplus will decrease. Under the new predicted equilibrium matches, the two
clients in Las Vegas also continue to get audit services from their current auditors. The
hypothetical total surplus for pairing with the KPMG oce in Las Vegas is $540 and $-3,200
for the client with GVKEY of 178494 and the client with GVKEY of 066261, respectively.
Therefore, there is no reason for the Las Vegas clients to switch to the new KPMG oce.
Although the KPMG oce in Las Vegas will not be able to provide audit services to those
two clients under the predicted equilibrium, the following strategy would enable it to do so.
Assuming that the two incumbent auditors are not willing to bear the negative surplus of
providing audit services to clients, KPMG's Las Vegas oce will be able to provide audit
services to those clients if it is willing to bear $506,930 in additional costs for the client with
GVKEY of 178494 and $185,110 additional costs for the client with GVKEY of 066261.
Then, both clients would be better o using KPMG's Las Vegas oce instead of their
current auditors. The additional costs that the KPMG Las Vegas oce bears in Year 1 can
be recovered in Year 2 for GVKEY of 066261 and in Year 3 for GVKEY of 178494.
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3.6.6 What Does Total Surplus Represent? Shareholder Value vs.
Agency Costs
Conceptually, the estimated surplus, particularly client surplus and total surplus, may in
part represent agency costs. That is, surplus measures may reect managers' willingness to
reap opportunistic benets that may reduce shareholder value. We argue both conceptually
and empirically that surplus measures capture shareholder value, i.e., the higher the surplus,
the higher the shareholder value.
The client surplus measure estimated in this paper is conceptually same as the client
surplus measure estimated in Gerakos and Syverson [75] and Guo et al. [85]. Gerakos and
Syverson [75] argue that the empirical evidence documented in their paper  the positive
association between tenure and surplus  is in line with evidence from prior studies docu-
menting a positive association between tenure and shareholder value. Prior studies provide
evidence that audit quality increases over audit rm tenure (e.g., Johnson et al. [96], Myers
et al. [118], Ghosh and Moon [76], Chen et al. [33]). Because we nd a similar relation be-
tween tenure and client surplus in our estimation, the estimated client surplus in our model
represents shareholder value. Additionally, even if some part of the client surplus reects
managers' opportunistic benets, total surplus is more robust in representing shareholder
value. The denition of total surplus is the sum of client surplus and auditor surplus, or
the dierence between unobserved audit benets and audit costs. Therefore, even if some
portion of audit benets reects agency costs, those opportunistic benets are canceled out
by the portion captured in audit costs. In other words, any potential opportunistic benets
that clients may enjoy by having auditors who may allow opportunistic behaviors will exert
costs on auditors (for instance, in the form of future reputational loss).
Nonetheless, we empirically test whether total surplus reects shareholder value. We
regress audit quality measures on pair-specic total surplus. Table 3.9 presents the test
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results. The rst column presents results using absolute discretionary accruals, the second
column presents results using restatements, and the third column presents results using
auditor change in the next period. Total surplus is negatively associated with absolute
discretionary accruals, restatements, and auditor changes. These empirical results support
our argument that total surplus represents shareholder value rather than agency costs.
3.6.7 Does proximity add value to clients  Does proximity improve
audit quality?
In this section, we examine whether clients having proximate auditors adds have better
quality nancial statements by having better quality audits. There has been long existing
literature in audit on whether higher quality auditors provide better quality of audit services
to their client rms. The ultimate goal of these papers are trying to answer the following
questions on whether client rms are value added by better quality auditors. Becker et al.
[19] document that compare to clients of non-Big six auditors, clients of Big six auditors
have lower signed and absolute discretionary accruals, providing evidence of Big six auditors
are associated with less client rms' earnings management. Willenborg [148] nds national-
wide Big N auditors are negatively associated with IPO underpricing. Mansi et al. [110]
document the evidence of audit rm size and tenure (duration of client relationship) is
negatively associated with cost of debt. Additionally, using the auditors' within-industry
market share as the auditor industry specialization, prior studies nd a positive association
between auditor industry specialization and clients' earnings response coecients (Balsam
et al. [18]), and a negative association between auditor industry specialization and the clients'
absolute value of discretionary accruals Reichelt and Wang [132]).
Though many prior studies document a positive relation between cross-section variation
of auditor quality and some outcome measures of client rms, these studies contain the
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issues of endogeneity, more precisely self-selection issues (e.g., Francis [68], Lennox et al.
[105], DeFond and Zhang [49]). The association between the proxies of auditor quality and
the clients' outcome variables might be reecting the fact that higher quality auditors' client
rms are better than lower quality auditors' client rms. The association might be correlated
with both observed and unobserved characteristics of client rm characteristics. More recent
papers challenge prior studies' ndings on higher quality auditors being associated with
better outcome of client rms. Lawrence et al. [104] document the association between
Big N auditors and discretionary accruals, cost of equity, and analyst forecast accuracy
disappear once they match Big 4 and non-Big 4 client rm characteristics.8 Minutti-Meza
[117] also document that there is no evidence of dierences of outcome variables (absolute
discretionary accruals, meet-or-beat analyst forecast, auditors' propensity to issue going
concern opinions) between industry specialist auditors and non-industry specialist auditors
after matching client rms' characteristics in the number of dimensions.Lennox et al. [105]
document the fragility of inferences on prior studies that document the relation between Big
N auditors and audit outcomes (e.g., discretionary accruals, cost of capital) using Heckman
selection model.
We use the matching equation model that we use in this paper to control the sorting
eects and identify the eect of distance on the audit quality. This method is similar to the
models in Akkus et al. [5]. Specically, we use the following two-stage equation.
The rst stage is estimating the equation (19). In this section, we only use six variables:
distance, tenure, Big N, auditor industry expertise, size, and nancial condition. Table 3.10.
Panel A presents result of the rst-stage estimation using those six variables. Similar to
Table 3.2 results, distance is signicantly negative for clients.
8DeFond and Zhang [48] rebut Lawrence et al. [104] and document the sensitivity of results in Lawrence
et al. [104] by using dierent variable denitions, dierent proxies of audit outcomes, and dierent matching
methods.
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Once we estimate the rst stage, then we estimate the following second stage equation.
FSQca = γ(Pca − βXca) + δca (3.25)
, where FSQca is the proxy of nancial statement quality in year 2016, Pca is the proxy of Uca,
i.e., match value of client-auditor, βXca is the product of rst-stage estimated coecients
(β) and the client and auditor characteristics (Xca), and δca is independent of Pca and Xca.
9
Table 3.10 Panel B presents results of equation (25). Distance_client is signicantly
negative at 10% level. This shows that the eect of increase of distance on client utility
negatively aects nancial statement quality measured by absolute discretionary accruals in
the following year after client-auditor match.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper uses surplus estimation to examine the eect of auditor location on the audit
market. By utilizing two-sided matching market models developed in the economics litera-
ture, we identify unobserved audit benets that clients receive from their auditors, as well as
unobserved audit costs that auditors incur by providing audit services to their clients. This
allows us to estimate the eect of distance between client headquarters and auditor oces
on client and auditor surplus.
Because auditor location matters for on-site examination and providing feedback on in-
ternal control systems, a greater distance between the client headquarters and the auditor
oce reduces both client and auditor surplus, on average. The sensitivity of client surplus
to distance varies based on client characteristics. Bigger clients place a higher value on
proximity to auditors than smaller clients, while clients with better audit governance sys-
tems benet more from engaging a more distant auditor compared to clients with poor audit
9Akkus et al. [5]documents detail explanation on model setups.
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governance.
Using the estimated parameters, we also examine the audit market structure, quantifying
the market friction driven by the stickiness of auditor oce locations. First, we document
the market-wide loss of surplus due to immobility of audit oces. About 8% of clients would
have been better o if an alternative auditor oce (located farther out) had been as close
as their actual paired auditor, leading to a 1.6% loss of market-wide total surplus. These
results suggest that auditor oce stickiness generates friction, leading clients to match with
less preferred auditors. Additionally, this paper documents that clients in underserved audit
markets are less likely to nd auditors that are a good t for them relative to clients in
overserved audit markets. Auditors in underserved markets charge higher audit fees relative
to their audit costs compared to auditors in overserved markets. The simulation results
suggest that audit oce relocations and openings can mitigate these issues.
The ndings in this paper can inform the work of policymakers, regulators, and auditors.
The new approach and the estimation model that we propose are useful for understanding
various dimensions of audit benets and costs. Also, by taking advantage of the structural
estimation approach to estimate both client and auditor surplus, our model can be useful for
predicting the consequences of changes in the audit market environment, including regulatory
changes.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A reports the number of client-auditor matches by year. Panel B reports summary statistics
for the nal sample of client characteristics, auditor characteristics, and mutual characteristics used
in subsequent analyses.








2000 535 0.1197 523 0.1191 12 0.1484
2001 1,035 0.1202 1,013 0.1188 22 0.1855
2002 1,125 0.1213 1,096 0.1174 29 0.2691
2003 2,367 0.1359 2,051 0.1219 316 0.2266
2004 2,646 0.1324 2,152 0.1166 494 0.2014
2005 2,731 0.1292 2,043 0.1134 685 0.1764
2006 2,669 0.1297 1,910 0.1100 759 0.1792
2007 2,705 0.1289 1,796 0.1009 909 0.1842
2008 2,571 0.1300 1,713 0.0959 858 0.1981
2009 2,421 0.1235 1,632 0.0941 789 0.1843
2010 2,307 0.1205 1,589 0.0901 718 0.1876
2011 2,273 0.1186 1,555 0.0827 718 0.1964
2012 2,242 0.1132 1,558 0.0798 684 0.1892
2013 2,282 0.1114 1,566 0.0668 716 0.2090
2014 2,347 0.1133 1,576 0.0690 771 0.2040
2015 2,223 0.0958 1,491 0.0575 732 0.1739
Panel B.
Variable Obs. Mean 25th 50th 75th
Distance 2,223 0.095 0 0.013 0.033
Size 2,223 6.224 4.700 6.263 7.843
Financial Condition 2,223 0.968 0.699 1.323 1.780
ADA 2,223 0.152 0.034 0.077 0.183
Audit Governance 2,223 0.443 0.357 0.441 0.511
Auditor Industry
Expertise
2,223 0.019 0.0002 0.003 0.015
Big N 2,223 0.671 0 1 1
Tenure 2,223 6.339 2 5 12
Audit Fee 2,223 2,282,081 425,750 1,088,580 2,399,000
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Table 3.2: Maximum Score Structural Estimation
This table presents the results of the match value function (equation 19) using maximum score estimation.
Panel A shows the estimation results of the client value function (equation 17). Panel B shows the estimation
results of the auditor value function (equation 18).
Panel A: Client Panel B: Auditor
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Distance -1948.1^ 924.8 2880.5^ 2247.9^
Size 32.6 20
Financial Condition -6.8 -34.4
ADA 16.4 33.7
Audit Governance -74.7^ -1326^
Big N -3693.1 -6100.8
Auditor Industry Expertise -8396.3 -5352.7
Size*Distance -928.5^ 164.4^
Financial Condition*Distance 330.8 53
ADA*Distance -2.5 -354.1^
Audit Governance*Distance 1996.0^ -35.2
Size*Auditor Industry Expertise 2578.7^ 1912.0^ -7956.7^ -2098.8^
Size*Big N 682.3^ 926.6^ -232.3^ -940.3^
Financial Condition*Auditor Industry
Expertise
-5520.8 -5576.9 8152.9^ 9335.5^
ADA*Auditor Industry Expertise -2008.9 -6997.7 7939.1^ 5339.8
Audit Governance*Auditor Industry
Expertise
-9626.6^ -728.8^ -2539.5 5167.5
Financial Condition*Big N 196.9^ 911.2^ -109.1 336
ADA*Big N 179.3^ 407.3^ -167.1^ -194.2
Audit Governance*Big N 1197.3^ 3073.7^ 1240.0 6012.1
Tenure 9985.4^ 9601.4^ -9761.7^ -9975^
No. of Pairs 208,397 208,397 208,397 208,397
% of Satised 0.99729 0.99733 0.99729 0.99733
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Table 3.3: Trade-o between Distance and Auditor Industry Expertise
This table presents the trade-os that clients make between distance and auditor industry expertise. We
exploit the following situation: how much auditor industry expertise must increase to mitigate the loss
(gain) of surplus from a 10% increase in distance relative to paired-auditor's location. We group samples
into four categories based on the distribution of corresponding variables. We exploit two variables: Size
and Audit Governance. For example, 25th< <=50th represents that trade-o analysis is conducted using
observations between the 25th percentile and 50th percentile of size or audit governance. We use the average
of size/audit governance, the average of distance between clients and auditors, and the average of auditor






Size <=25th 10% 360%
Size 25th < <=50th 10% 115%
Size 50th < <=75th 10% 53%
Size 75th < 10% 5%
Audit Governance <=25th 10% 81%
Audit Governance 25th < <=50th 10% 89%
Audit Governance 50th < <=75th 10% 120%
Audit Governance 75th < 10% 205%
Audit Fee 2,223 2,282,081 425,750
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Table 3.4: Do Clients Get Audits from Worse Auditors because Their Preferred Auditors are
Located Farther Away?
This table documents whether clients forgo alternative auditors with better match value but located farther
away than paired-auditors because costs of distance outweigh benets from other auditor characteristics. We
perform counter-factual analysis by predicting new equilibrium pairs in a scenario when distance between
clients and auditors does not matter. Then, We compare total surplus under the new predicted pairs to total
surplus under the actual pairs when distance does not matter. We predict a set of new equilibrium matches
following the matching process described in Baccara et al. (2012). Avg. Total Surplus is the average of
total surplus for actual client-auditor pairs in the market. Change in Avg. Total Surplus is the average of
total surplus of the new predicted pairs less total surplus of actual pairs. Change in Avg. Total Surplus
(%) is Change in Avg. Total Surplus divided by Avg. Total Surplus. # of Clients Better O is the number
of clients who have a higher total surplus under the new equilibrium pairs than actual total surplus. # of
Clients Worse O is the number of clients who have a lower total surplus under the new equilibrium pairs
than actual total surplus. # of Clients Equal is the number of clients who have a same total surplus under
the new equilibrium pairs to the actual total surplus. Tenure Considered? represents whether the counter-
factual matching process to nd a set of new predicted equilibrium pairs is conducted with considering tenure
eect in the surplus calculation. Yes represents with considering tenure eects in matching process and No
























#1 1,351,520 21,920 1.622% 166 55 2,002 Yes
#2 66,030 11,270 17.07% 1,429 315 479 No
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Table 3.5: Underserved and Overserved MSAs
This table presents descriptive statistics for underserved and overserved regions. We calculate the Audi-
tor/Client Ratio, dened as the number of auditor oces divided by the number of clients, at the MSA level.
We then sort MSAs by Auditor/Client Ratio and denote the 10 MSAs with the lowest (highest) ratios as
underserved (overserved). MSA is each MSA's ocial identication number from the US Census database.
# Clients represents the number of clients with headquarters in the corresponding MSA. # Clients w/ BigN
represents the number of clients with headquarters in the corresponding MSA receiving audit services from
Big N accounting rms. # Client w/ Non-BigN represents the number of clients with headquarters in the
corresponding MSA receiving audit services from non-Big N accounting rms. # Auditors represents the
number of auditor oces located in the corresponding MSA. # BigN Auditors represents the number of Big
N auditor oces located in the corresponding MSA. # Non-BigN Auditors represents the number of non-Big
N auditor oces located in the corresponding MSA.


















640 23 14 9 4 2 2 0.174
2080 50 30 20 8 4 4 0.160
7360 81 71 10 12 5 7 0.148
3360 98 63 35 14 4 10 0.143
1600 82 59 23 9 4 5 0.110
7400 113 90 23 10 4 6 0.088
2800 13 8 5 1 1 0 0.077
1123 162 118 44 12 5 7 0.074
5775 53 35 18 1 0 1 0.019
875 21 7 14 0 0 0 0.000


















2680 12 4 8 11 2 9 0.917
8960 11 7 4 7 2 5 0.636
3480 11 10 1 6 4 2 0.545
7160 18 11 7 9 4 5 0.500
1520 17 13 4 8 4 4 0.471
1640 11 7 4 5 4 1 0.455
5000 14 6 8 6 3 3 0.429
1680 19 15 4 8 4 4 0.421
2160 23 17 6 9 4 5 0.391
5945 44 18 26 17 4 13 0.386
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Table 3.6: Audit Market Welfare in Underserved and Overserved MSAs
This table presents the total surplus and auditor surplus ratio in under- and overserved MSAs. Underserved
and overserved MSAs are dened as in Table 5; all other MSAs are grouped and dened as middle MSAs.
Avg. Total Surplus is the average of total surplus for client-auditor pairs whose headquarters (client) and
oce (auditor) are located in MSAs belonging to the indicated groups. Avg. Auditor Surplus Ratio is the
average of auditor surplus ratio for client-auditor pairs whose headquarters (client) and oce (auditor) are
located in MSAs belonging to the indicated groups. Avg. Distance is the average distance between client
headquarters and audit oce location. Panel B presents the Spearman correlation between Auditor/Client
Ratio and Total Surplus, Auditor Surplus Ratio, Distance, and Audit Fee. The correlation is calculated at
the client-auditor pair level. The numbers in parentheses are p-values. Panel C presents the comparison
between rst-best pairs and actual pairs. For each client, the rst-best pair is the client-auditor pair that
would provide the client with the highest surplus. The actual pair is the client-auditor pair formed at
equilibrium. # of Pairs is the number of clients located in the MSA group. First-Best = Actual is the
number of clients whose rst-best pair is the same as their actual pair. First-Best =^ Actual is the number
of clients whose rst-best pair diers from their actual pair. Ratio is First-Best =^ Actual divided by
First-Best = Actual. Avg. Rank Ratio is the relative rank of the actual auditor within the auditor pool
for client-auditor pairs where the rst-best pair diers from the actual pair. Avg. Di Total Surplus is the
average of total surplus in the rst-best scenario minus actual total surplus for client-auditor pairs where
the rst-best pair diers from the actual pair. Total surplus numbers are in dollars and distance numbers












Over Under 3 431,420 0.459 0.586
Over Over 158 1,245,660 0.490 0.011
Over Middle 19 950,950 0.442 0.318
Under Under 605 1,203,130 0.540 0.021
Under Over 8 719,250 0.466 0.957
Under Middle 83 824,070 0.434 0.513
Middle Under 101 1,091,090 0.479 0.295
Middle Over 91 1,062,460 0.477 0.227








Auditor/Client Ratio 0.013 -0.109 -0.311 -0.045












Under 696 598 98 0.141 0.159 57,450
Over 180 168 12 0.067 0.139 41,180
Middle 1347 1194 153 0.114 0.156 55,240
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Table 3.7: Audit Oce Relocation from Overserved MSA to Underserved MSA
This table presents the results of a counterfactual analysis of the impact of relocating auditor oces in
overserved MSAs to underserved MSAs. In each iteration, We randomly pick one audit oce located in
each of the 10 overserved MSAs and relocate it to one of the 10 underserved MSAs (one per underserved
MSA). We perform 20 iterations and report their average results. We predict new equilibrium matches
following the matching algorithm described in Baccara et al. (2012). Avg. Total Surplus is the average of
total surplus for actual client-auditor pairs in under- and overserved MSAs. Avg. Total Surplus New is the
average of total surplus for new client-auditor pairs in under- and overserved MSAs that are formed under
the counterfactual scenario. Di. Surplus (%) is Avg. Total Surplus New less Avg. Total Surplus divided by
Avg. Total Surplus. Tenure Considered? indicates whether the counterfactual matching algorithm to nd
new predicted equilibrium pairs considers tenure in its surplus calculation. Yes represents with considering











Random Re-location Under 1,203,130 1,207,180 0.34% Yes
Random Re-location Over 1,245,660 1,249,210 0.28% Yes
Random Re-location Under 42,160 43,650 3.41% No
Random Re-location Over 34,300 35,260 2.73% No
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Table 3.8: Audit Oce Entry into a Local Audit Market
This table presents the results of two counterfactual analyses. In Panel A-1 and Panel A-2, We simulate a
scenario in which two auditor oces enter the California audit market.
Panel A-1.






































Average 830,330 1.2% 3 4
#2 Y Average Average 1,012,400 1.4% 3 4
#3 Y Average Max 1,626,630 2.2% 3 3
#4 Y Max Max 1,903,470 2.6% 3 3
In Panel B-1 and Panel B-2, We simulate a scenario in which the KPMG St. Louis oce in Missouri moves


















































506,930 540 506,930 198,070 395,540 593,010
066261 73 Anton &
Chia LLP
Newport, CA
185,110 -3,200 185,110 194,300 391,770 589,240
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Table 3.9: Total Surplus and Audit Quality
This table presents the test results on the relation between audit quality and client-auditor pair total surplus.
We run regressions with three dependent variables: ADA(Absolute Discretionary Accruals), Restatements,
and Auditor Change. The main variable of interest is Total Surplus, calculated as the sum of client surplus
and auditor surplus estimated using the parameters in Table 2. Distance is dened as the distance between the
city level client headquarters location and the corresponding audit oce location, calculated using latitude
and longitude. Big N is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the audit oce is one of the Big N audit
oces. Market Value represents a rm's market capitalization. ROA is calculated as net income divided by
total assets. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities divided by total assets. Current Ratio is calculated
as current assets divided by current liabilities. Quick Ratio is dened as current assets minus inventory
divided by current liabilities. ROA_Loss equals ROA multiplied 1 if the client has negative income before
extraordinary items and 0 otherwise. ABS(Extraordinary Items) is the absolute value of extraordinary items
divided by total assets. *, **, *** indicate signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
ADA Restatements Auditor Change(t+1)
Intercept -2.469*** 0.015 0.171***
(-29.095) (1.048) (14.345)
Total Surplus -0.004** -0.001** -0.008***
(-2.073) (-2.069) (-14.544)
Distance 0.104*** 0.004 -0.007
(4.363) (0.727) (-1.569)
Big N -0.134*** -0.002 -0.107***
(-5.380) (-0.373) (-18.938)
Market Value -0.068*** -0.001 -0.001
(-12.376) (-0.609) (-1.273)
ROA -0.062*** 0.001 0.001
(-3.083) (0.470) (1.108)
Leverage 0.080*** 0.001 -0.003***
(4.052) (0.616) (-3.132)
Current Ratio -0.003 -0.001*** -0.001***
(-1.274) (-3.736) (-2.579)
Quick Ratio 0.646*** 0.003 -0.014
(9.842) (0.185) (-1.093)






Industry Fixed Eects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Eects Y Y Y
No Obs. 34,139 34,139 34,139
Adj. R^2 0.126 0.036 0.093
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Table 3.10: Does proximity add value to clients?  Two stage estimation
This table presents the results of the match value function (equation 19) using maximum score estimation. In
this estimation, we use six client-auditor characteristics: distance, tenure, Big N, auditor industry expertise,
size, and nancial condition. Panel A presents rst-stage estimation. Panel B shows the estimation results
of second-stage estimation after controlling sorting eects. The variable denitions and estimation using
maximum score estimator is identical as previous tests. Standard errors are clustered by 2digit SIC industry
classication in Panel B.





Auditor Industry Expertise -20.6
Big N -3.3
No. of Pairs 208,397







No. of Pairs 208,397
% of Satised 0.9012
Panel B. Second-stage Estimation





Auditor Industry Expertise -0.0133*** (-3.6590)
Big N -0.0003 (-0.0809)
Size 0.0131*** (5.2039)




Figure 3.1: Client and Auditor Distribution by State  Auditor/Client Ratios in 2015
This gure displays 2015 auditor/client ratios by state, dened as the number of audit oces divided by the number of client
headquarters.
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Figure 3.2: Total Surplus by State - Average Total Surplus in 2015
This gure displays the average total surplus for client-auditor pairs by state in 2015. Total surplus is calculated as the audit
benets that clients receive from their paired auditors less the costs that auditors incur in providing audit services to those
clients. Total surplus is measured at the individual client-auditor pair level. A detailed explanation of the total surplus and its
estimation procedure can be found in Section 4.
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Figure 3.3: Auditor Surplus Ratio by State  Average Auditor Surplus Ratio in 2015
This gure displays the average auditor surplus ratio for client-auditor pairs by state in 2015. The auditor surplus ratio is
calculated as auditor surplus divided by total surplus. Auditor surplus is dened as the audit fee that auditors receive from
paired clients less the costs that auditors incur in providing audit services to those clients. Total surplus is calculated as the
audit benets that clients receive from their paired auditors less the costs that auditors incur in providing audit services to those
clients. Both total surplus and the auditor surplus ratio are measured at the individual client-auditor pair level. A detailed
explanation of total surplus, the auditor surplus ratio, and their estimation procedures can be found in Section 4.
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Figure 3.4: Locations of Clients and Auditors in California
Locations of Clients in California
Locations of Auditors in California
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A.1 A Maximum Score Estimator for NTU Matching
A.1.1 Pairwise Stability
The proposed estimator is based on the pairwise stable condition of the matching model.
Following Roth and Sotomayor [135], this section introduces the concept of this equilibrium
condition. I start with the one-to-one matching.
Let µ be the matching function. Let a and s denote a participant from each side of the
market respectively. Let Ω be the set of all possible matching given the participants in the
market. We say µ(a) = s and µ(s) = a if and only if a and s are matched in A, where
A ∈ Ω,. Note that both a and s can be a null set. If x = Ø and µ(y) = x, then y is not
paired with anyone in the matching.
Denition: Let µ(x) = y. A matching A is blocked by a pair (x′, y′) if (x′, y′) is
matched in A and there exists a pair (x, y) in A such that x prefers y′ than y and y′ prefers
x than x′.
Denition: A matching A is (pairwise) stable if and only if it is not blocked by any
matches.
Denition: A matching A is group stable if and only if it is not blocked by a coalition
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of any size.
The scenario is more complex in the many-to-one matching. Still let a and s denote a
participant from each side of the market respectively. Now agent as can be matched with
multiple agents from the other side of the market. Let µ(a) denote the set of all s which are
matched with a in a matching.
Denition: Matching A has feature of responsive preference if for any a, s, s′in
A ∈ Ω such that s ∈ µ(a) and s′ /∈ µ(a), a prefers {µ(a)\s}
⋃
{s′} than {µ(a)} if and only
if a prefers s′ than s.
With responsive preference, one can show that a matching is group stable (no group/subset
of agents has incentive and feasibility to deviate) if and only if it is pairwise stable. In this
case, the many-to-one matching can be viewed as a one-to-one matching with any a with
capacity C being replaced by randomly ordered a1, a2, ... , aC , which all have capacity one.
Let ua(.) and us(.) be the utility functions for the two sides respectively. Let 1(.) be the
indicator function. Then the mathematical condition for pairwise stability can be written
as: For some A ∈ Ω, A is stable if and only if for any pair of matches [(a, s) (a′, s′)] ∈ A,
1[ua(s) < ua(s
′)] ∗ 1[us′(a′) < us′(a)] + 1[us(a) < us(a′)] ∗ 1[ua′(s′) < ua′(s)] = 0
A.1.2 Rank Order Property and Maximum Score Estimator
Imposing weak assumptions on the distribution of unobservable quality, Fox [64, 66] proposes
maximum score estimators to study the discrete choice model and TU matching game with
a so-called Rank Order Property.
Rank Order Property :
For any given agent w, where w can be from either side of the market, all of her possible
partners are captured by a set Mw from the other side of the market. Let X be the set of
observable factors of agents and θ be the parameter set. Denote f(w, m : θ) be the func-
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tion of w's deterministic utility from observable factors of a given match between w and
m. That is, uw(m) = f(w, m : θ) + ω
wm, where uw(m) is w's utility of matching with m
and ωwm is the unobserved term. For any m1,m2 ⊆ Mw. The rank order property says,
f(w, m1 : θ) > f(w, m2 : θ) if and only if the probability of w prefers m1 is larger than the
probability of w prefers m2.
The intuition is that the unobserved quality does not change the preference determined
by observed factors in expectation. The result of Manski [111] indicates that the rank order
property holds under the assumption that ωwm has support equal to the real line and an
absolutely continuous, independent, and identical distribution across all potential matches
in Mw. Goeree et al. [79] and Fox [64] show that a weaker sucient condition for the rank
order property is to assume the unobserved quality follows an exchangeable distribution.
For binary choices, i.e. when there are only two possible partners in Mw, Manski [111, 112]
shows that it is enough to have a median independence assumption on the distribution for
unobservable, i.e. MED(y|x) = xβ. I develop my estimator for NTU matching based on
this rank order property.
Assumption 1 : Dene fa(a, s : θa) as the function of a's deterministic utility from a given
match between a and s. a's utility of matching with s is given by ua(s) = fa(a, s : θa) + ω
as
a ,
where ωasa satises the median independence assumption.
Theorem 1 : For two matchings A1 and A2 such that A1\{a, s, a′ s′}=A2\{a, s, a′ s′}, where
a, s, a′ s′ are agents in the market and {(a, s) (a′ s′)} are observed in A1, {(a′, s) (a s′)} are
matched in A2. With Assumption 1, and if A1 and A2 cannot both be stable, the rank
order property and the pairwise stability condition indicate that Pr(A1 Stable|X : θ) >
Pr(A2 Stable|X : θ) if and only if the following condition does NOT hold:
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CONDITION:{fa(a, s : θa) < fa(a, s′ : θa) & fs(a′, s′ : θs) < fs(a, s′ : θs)} OR {fa(a′, s′ :
θa) < fa(a
′, s : θa) & fs(a, s : θs) < fs(a
′, s : θs)}
Denote θ = {θa, θs) and Sta((a, s) (a′ s′), θ) = 1 if the above condition does not hold; oth-
erwise Sta((a, s) (a′ s′), θ) = 0. The above result can be written as Pr(A1 Stable|X : θ) >
Pr(A2 Stable|X : θ) if and only if Sta((a, s) (a′ s′), θ) = 1.
The proof is trivial and therefore omitted. Note that because Theorem 1 requires only
two pairs of matched partners to compare the alternative scenario by switching partners,
each agent faces a binary choice. Therefore, it is sucient to have the median independence
assumption for the unobservable.
Let Γ denote the set of all possible A2 for a given A1. By imposing a specic matching
utility model as the following, I can show that for any A2 ⊆ Γ , A1 and A2 cannot both be
stable.
Assumption 2 : Agents a and s in the match (a, s) share a total matching utility Uas
with a xed sharing rule (ea, ta) determined by a. That is ua(s) = (1 − ea)Uas − ta and
us(a) = eaUas + ta.
Theorem 2 : With Assumption 2, A1 and A2 cannot both be stable almost surely (except for
the indierence condition).
Proof: Following the notations in the text, without indierence condition, this indicate
the following conditions:
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A1: (a, s) (a
′ s′) stable A2: (a
′, s) (a s′) stable
IF a) ua(s) > ua(s
′) & us(a) > us(a
′) IF 1) ua(s
′) > ua(s) & us′(a) > us′(a
′)
OR b) ua(s) > ua(s
′) & ua′(s
′) > ua′(s) OR 2) ua(s
′) > ua(s) & ua′(s) > ua′(s
′)
OR c) us(a) > us(a
′) & us′(a




′) > ua′(s) & us′(a
′) > us′(a) OR 4) ua′(s) > ua′(s
′) & us(a
′) > us(a)
which means that A1 is stable if and only if any one of the a), b), c) or d) holds; A2 is
stable if and only if any one of the 1), 2), 3) or 4) holds.
Assume both A1 and A2 are stable. The only possibilities are {b) & 3)} hold or {c) & 2)}
hold. Given that ua(s) = (1−ea)Uas− ta and us(a) = eaUas+ ta, when ea 6= 1 or 0, {b) & 3)}
gives ua(s) > ua(s
′) & ua′(s
′) > ua′(s) & eaUas′ +ta > ea′Ua′s′ +ta′ & ea′Ua′s+ta′ > eaUas′ +ta.
This form a contradiction of inequality after some simple algebra. When ea = 0 or 1, it is a
contradiction also as its indicating ta > ta′ and ta′ > ta.
Same proof goes for {c) & 2)}. QED.
Assumption 2 ts the accelerator admission market as well as many other real-life scen-
arios, such as the matchings between retail shelf space and whole seller and between real
estate broker and buyer. Sørensen [139] is a special case of such setting by restricting ea and
ta to be the same across all as.
Now I can dene the objective function for the NTU matching maximum score estimator.
For a given market, researchers observe a realized stable match A.10 Randomly draw any
two pairs of matched agents from A, (a, s) and (a′, s′). Denote Ci = {(ai, si), (a′i, s′i) and
C ′i = {(a′i, si), (ai, s′i) for each draw i and i = 1, 2, 3...n, where n is the size of the sample.
Let G(X) be the deterministic part of the total matching utility. So Uas = G(X
as : θ) +ωas,
where ωas is the unobservable satisfying the assumptions in Theorem 1. With Assumption
2, we can write fa(a, s : θ) = (1 − ea)G(Xas : θ) − ta and ua(s) = fa(a, s : θ) + ωasa , where
10This model is also applicable for multiple markets.
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ωasa = (1 − ea)ωas. It is easy to see that median independence feature is preserved for ωasa .
Similarly, we get fs(a, s : θ) = eaG(X
as : θ) + ta and us(a) = fs(a, s : θ) + ω
as
s . As in
Theorem 1, let Sta(Ci, θ) = 1 if and only if 1[fa(a, s : θ)− fa(a, s′ : θ) < 0|Ci, θ]1[fs(a′, s′ :
θ) − fs(a, s′ : θ) < 0|Ci, θ] = 0 and 1[fa(a′, s′ : θ) − fa(a′, s : θ) < 0|Ci, θ]1[fs(a, s :







(1[Sta(Ci, θ) = 1]− 1[Sta(C ′i, θ) = 1]) (26)
Because the proposed estimator takes the observed matching as stable and compares
it with a specic neighbourhood of the observed matching, in which no other matching is
stable, it allows for the existence of multiple equilibria.
A.1.3. Identication
Following Manski [112] and Fox [64], it is straightforward to see the identication results for
cases like Pr(a|X) > Pr(b|X) if and only if f(xa) > f(xb) AND g(xa) > g(xb), for some
utility functions f(.) and g(.) 11. The scenario is more complex when one needs to deal with
Pr(a|X) > Pr(b|X) if and only if f(xa) > f(xb) OR g(xa) > g(xb), as in the case of NTU
matching. In detail, the condition in Theorem 1 is equivalent to at least one of the following
conditions holds:
 CONDITION A: {fa(a, s : θa) > fa(a, s′ : θa) & fa(a′, s′ : θa) > fa(a′, s : θa)}
 CONDITION B: {fa(a, s : θa) > fa(a, s′ : θa) & fs(a, s : θs) > fs(a′, s : θs)}
 CONDITION C: {fa(a′, s′ : θa) > fa(a′, s : θa) & fs(a′, s′ : θs) > fs(a, s′ : θs)}
 CONDITION D: {fs(a′, s′ : θs) > fs(a, s′ : θs) & fs(a, s : θs) > fs(a′, s : θs)}
11See Akkus et al. [6] for an application.
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The model cannot be identied without additional information as all four conditions can
generate the same matching pattern. For example, while there is no conict between B and
C, these two conditions can indicate totally opposite ranking sequences of the underlying
matching utilities. Further, there are two utility functions to be estimated, fa(.) and fs(.),
but condition A (D) provides no information on fs(.) (fa(.)).
With an exclusion restriction condition, Tamer [143] proves the identication for the
incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria. Following a similar
intuition, if there is a factor xa ⊆ Xa, where Xa is the set of factors from one side of the
market, such that xa has full support on R conditional on all the other factors in Xa, and
if we know fs(.) is strictly increasing (or decreasing) in xa, we can show that condition A
and/or B (or C and/or D) have to bind for some subset of the observed matches. This is
because with full support assumption on xa, there exist some agents a and a
′, who are the
same except xa > xa′ . Then only condition A and/or B can hold for some pairs of matches
including both a and a′. This result in turn indicates that fa(a, s : θa) > fa(a, s
′ : θa) binds,
identifying fa(.). Similarly, the same assumptions on the other side of the market identify
fs(.). The discussion here has similar assumptions and results as in Agarwal and Diamond
[4], who show that one can recover parameters of fs(.) and fa(.) up to positive monotone
transformation assuming full support for fa(.) and fs(.) and a sign restriction.
In this paper, we can write fa(a, s) = eaUas− ta and fs(a, s) = (1− ea)Uas + ta. Consid-
ering the share ea and money transfer ta as the exclusion restrictions, the following theorem
shows a sucient condition for identication:
Theorem 3 : If 1) there is a continuous support for ea or ta conditional on Xs and Xa, 2)
there is a variable xs ⊆ Xs such that Uas has strict monotonic correlation with xs, and 3) xs
has a full support in R conditional on all other variables in Xs, then Uas is identied.
Sketch of Proof: Previous argument shows that the feature of ea or ta indicates condition
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A and/or B must bind for some subset of matches. Given the functional form, we also
know that fa(a, s : θa) > fa(a, s
′ : θa) identies Uas's variation with s and fs(a, s : θs) >
fs(a
′, s : θs) identies Uas's variation with a. Therefore, the full model identication requires
that some subset of matches must satisfy condition B, because condition A only contains
information for fa(.).
Assume Uas strictly increase with xs (the case for strictly decreasing follows the same
proof). With the full support assumption as in 3), there exist xs1 and xs2 such that xs1 > xs2
for any given a. We then have Uas1 > Uas2, which contradicts with condition A.
12 QED.
For ea, ta, and xs, all one needs in practice is to have the support to be rich enough as
discussed in Tamer [143]. In the accelerator market, I use the startup age as xs. In appendix
A.2, I show that the startup age is non-trivial to determine the startup value and there is
enough variation in this variable after controlling for other observables.
A.1.4 Estimator Asymptotic Property and Non-Random Sample Consistency
To demonstrate its consistency, I show that the proposed estimator is a special case of the
method provided by Chernozhukov et al. [34] (CHT hereafter).
I start with dening the data generating process (DGP): In one (or multiple) nite two-
sided matching market, denote the sets of the two sides as A and S respectively. Given the
true parameter β0 and realized agents types (including both deterministic and unobservable
parts), one stable match/equilibrium (which can be dierent across markets in the case of
multiple markets) is formed. Denote this equilibrium (or the set of equilibria for multiple
markets) to be A. The set's existence is guaranteed given the market assumptions of nite-
ness and responsive preference. To form a sample, arbitrarily index all the agents in S with
12If we also know its correlation with Uas, xs can be considered as another exclusion restriction to identify
fs(.) as discussed previously. Here I allow it to be either increasing or decreasing and the identication can
still be established.
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i = 1, 2, 3.... For each si, randomly draw s
′
i from S and ai and a′i from A in the same market.
Let C1i = {(ai, si)(a′i, s′i)}and C2i = {(a′i, si)(ai, s′i)}. Dene Y 1i = 1(C1i ⊆ A), meaning that




i ⊆ A). Since the
market is nite, the Pr(Y 1i = 1) and Pr(Y
2
i = 1) have some positive measure in a sample.
Let X denote the observable factors and ε be the unobservable part. Dene Sta(Ci, β)






{1[Y 1i = 1|X, ε : β0,S](1[Sta(C1i , β) = 1|X]− 1[Sta(C2i , β) = 1|X])
+ 1[Y 2i = 1|X, ε : β0,S](1[Sta(C2i , β) = 1|X]− 1[Sta(C1i , β) = 1|X])} (27)
The proposed estimator is to nd β to maximize the value of Q. In practice, random
sampling as described here is inecient because the chance to sample four agents who form
stable matches observed in A is low. Instead, since only those pairs observed in A contribute
to the total score, we can randomly draw pairs of matches from A and this brings us to the
estimator described previously in 5.3.
Assumption 3 : Given Sta(Ci, β0) = 1, the equilibrium selection mechanism, S, gener-
ates the observed equilibrium, A, with at least the same probability than any other possible
equilibrium. i.e. denote the set for all possible stable matching be Λ. For any A′ ⊆ Λ,
Pr(A′ chosen|Λ, Sta(Ci, β0) = 1,S) ≤ Pr(Achosen|Λ, Sta(Ci, β0) = 1,S).
Assumption 3 makes sure that
Pr(Astable|Sta(C1i , β0) = 1) > Pr(A′ stable|Sta(C1i , β0) = 1)
⇒Pr(Achosen|Sta(C1i , β0) = 1,S) > Pr(A′ chosen|Sta(C1i , β0) = 1,S)
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So that following Theorem 3, we have
Pr(Achosen|S) > Pr(A′ chosen|S) if Sta(C1i , β0) = 1
Following the notation in CHT, I can dene the moment function as
mi = ({1[Y 2i = 1|X, ε : β0,S]− 1[Y 1i = 1|X, ε : β0,S]}1[Sta(C1i , β) = 1|X]Z ′i,
{1[Y 1i = 1|X, ε : β0,S]− 1[Y 2i = 1|X, ε : β0,S]}1[Sta(C2i , β) = 1|X]}Z ′i)′
where Zi is some instrument dened in section 2.2 of CHT. The result of Theorem 1 and
Assumption 3 imply that EX({Pr[Y 2i = 1|X : β0,S]−Pr[Y 1i = 1|X : β0,S]}1[Sta(C1i , β0) =
1|X]) < 0 and EX({Pr[Y 1i = 1|X : β0,S]− Pr[Y 2i = 1|X : β0,S]}1[Sta(C2i , β0) = 1|X]) < 0
by taking expectation over ε.






{(1[Y 1i = 1|X, ε : β0,S]− 1[Y 2i = 1|X, ε : β0,S])1[Sta(C1i , β) = 1|X]












2 (β) ‖2+ with W (β) being an identity







2 (β) ‖2+ is the proposed estimator in CHT.
Based on the pairwise comparison, the proposed maximum score estimator has the ad-
vantage of generating consistent estimation even with a non-randomly selected sample. Based
on results of Fox [64], I briey sketch the intuition here. Assume that the researcher has
data on the whole population, P, (or, equivalently, a random sample) with unobservable, the
pairwise comparison says Pr(Y 1i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1,P) > Pr(Y 2i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1,P).
With any sample S selected by sampling method M , the pairwise comparison says Pr(Y 1i =
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1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1, S) > Pr(Y 2i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1, , S). Assume the sampling method M
be independent (but can be non-random) of equilibrium selection mechanism S, meaning
Pr(Achosen|Λ, S) = Pr(Achosen|Λ,P). The probability of obtain S can be written as
Pr(S|P;M) > 0. The pairwise comparison generates consistent estimation because:
Pr(Y 1i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1,P : β0) > Pr(Y 2i = 1|Sta(C2i , θ) = 1,P : β0)
⇔Pr(Y 1i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1, S : β0) ∗ Pr(S|P;M)
>Pr(Y 2i = 1|Sta(C1i , θ) = 1, S : β0) ∗ Pr(S|P;M)
A.2 Value of Startup Age
The empirical estimation requires the normalization of one parameter. Such a parameter
cannot associate with a trivial factor, which has no impact on the matching. Also, the
associated factor can serve as the exclusion restriction for identication if it has rich enough
support conditional on other observables. I choose the factor to be business age, which is
dened as the number of years the startup has been founded before joining an accelerator.13
Startups that survived for a long time tend to be dierent from those newly founded,
which is reected as having higher expected value before joining accelerators. For early-stage
startups, those with longer operating history are more likely to have an established business
model and customer base, which are helpful to attract potential investors. Moreover, their
founders are also more likely to have a better idea of how to run the company. However,
it is not clear whether the older business ts the accelerator model well. On the one hand,
an established startup can gain more as they know what they want and are ready to obtain
venture nancing. On the other hand, older rms may have accumulated sucient capital
and knowledge, making the accelerator experience less valuable. In general, evidence shows
13I use startup age, business age and rm age interchangeably in this paper.
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that older graduates from accelerators still have higher survival rates and are more likely to
attract venture nancing.14
The relationship between startup age and its performance is unlikely to be caused by its
correlation with founder experiences. Pearson correlation value is at 0.003 with the existence
of experienced founder and at 0.091 with average founder age. Similarly, the relationship is
not caused by sorting in the market because there is no apparent variation in startup ages
across accelerator tiers. In practice, I normalize the business age parameter to the negative
and positive one and pick the one that reports the highest matching value. Consistent with
the reduced form evidence, positive normalization generates a better score.
A.3 The Announcement of Start Fund in 2011
On January 28, 2011, Yuri Milner and SV Angel announced that their Start Fund would
oer all Y Combinator companies $150K in convertible debt. The terms of this convertible
debt oer is general with the following main points 15:
 Interest rate: higher of 2% or applicable federal rate.
 Maturity date: two years or maturity date of other convertible notes.
 Automatic conversion: on a $1m equity nancing with no conversion discount and no
price cap, provided that the transaction documents provide for a right to purchase a
pro rata share of future nancings.
 Optional equity conversion: on other equity nancings with no conversion discount
and no price cap.
14This evidence is consistent with the increasing trend of average rm age during my data period: 1.58 in




A.4 Choice of Matching Value Proxy
In Section 1.7, a consistent estimation requires a measure for the match value, which repres-
ents the expected rm value at accelerator graduation. Any unbiased proxy for this value is
proper, but coarse proxies can lead to higher variance in estimation. An ideal candidate is
the startup valuation at graduation. However, such data are rare even for the well-known
startups. In this paper, I pick the long-term (ve years) survival status to be the proxy.
Another candidate is the long-term funding status/amount, but it suers from a lack of
equity information and biases due to survival. With additional data collection, I might also
use rm website trac/media coverage. However, it is not clear that these measures would
signicantly improve the estimation results.
Alternatively, I can have Zδ + γ [P + Z ′λ− (Xβ)] + e, where the true matching value
is proxied as U = P + Zλ + υ′, where E[υ′|P,Z] = 0. While the second approach has a
weaker assumption, these two models generate equivalent empirical estimation with slightly
dierent interpretations.
A.5 CrunchBase Data for Startups Without Accelerators
To show some general dierence of startup proles between accelerator participants and
non-participants, I collect a random sample of non-accelerator participants with 7,131 U.S.
based technology startups founded from 2003 to 2011 from CrunchBase. The following table
shows some key summary statistics.
It is worth noting that the CrunchBase sample tends to suer a selection bias as more
successful startups are more likely to have a record. This bias exists in most available
databases for private rms. As a result, it is not surprising to see that about half of the
rms obtained venture nancing. Based on the Kauman Firm Survey, a random panel
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survey for new rms founded in 2003 in the U.S., high-tech startups see about 3% venture
funding rate over seven years.
Note: The table shows summary statistics of a random sample of non-accelerator participants with 7,131 U.S. based
technology startups founded from 2003 to 2011 collected from CrunchBase. This data is likely to have a selection bias because
more successful startups have a higher chance to report their information. According to the Kauman Firm Survey, a random
panel dataset for new U.S. startups founded in 2003, only about 3% of high-tech startups receive venture nancing over the
seven-year follow-ups. The funding rates are even lower for non-high-tech rms.
Obs Mean
% of Startup received Venture
Financing
7131 50.72%
Average Startup Age @ 1st Venture
Financing
3617 3.13
Graduate Degree Founder in Team 7131 40.34%
A.6 Complementary Policy Evaluation Results
This section provides two sets of complementary results to the policy evaluations. Because
of market competition, policy interventions in part of the market can potentially impact
the whole market. The rst part reports the entire market changes of the two subsidies
discussed in Section 1.6. The second part provides a set of comparable results under a
dierent equilibrium mechanism.
A.6.1 Whole Market Impacts
The following tables show the percentage changes of rm value and founder factors due to
the policy interventions. Taking female founder participation as an example, I calculate the
percentage change as the following: denote number of female founders in the baseline as N bf
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and in the counterfactual as N cff . FemaleFounderChange% = (N
cf
f − N bf )/N bf . Neither
policy intervention generates a strong impact to unsubsidized accelerator participants.
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents in startup hubs. This table shows the percentage changes concerning
rm values and startup factors for each policy interventions based on the simulated benchmark. In this counterfactual, I impose
policies to oer equity-free accelerators to entrepreneurs with disadvantages in accelerators. Under these policy interventions,
accelerators do not take any equity from the subsidized startups and compensate for the loss, which is the original equity share
times the expected startup value at graduation, from the subsidy. As a result, this subsidy changes the preference of startups
but not that of accelerators. The rst policy called Gender Subsidy supports female applicants to Tier 1. The second policy
called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity to enter Tier 3. The last policy called T3 Subsidy









Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 SH Non-
SH
Firm Value % 0.06% 0.00% -0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 1.55%* -0.01% 3.17%*
Female % -0.19% 0.18% 0.08% -0.08% -0.15% 0.13% -0.08% 0.10%
Inexperienced % -0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04% -0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 0.07%
#Startup
Outside SH %
0.07% -0.07% -0.03% -0.01% -0.03% -0.05% 0.02% -0.07%
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents in startup hubs. This table shows the percentage changes concerning
rm values and startup factors for each policy interventions based on the simulated benchmark. In the second counterfactual,
I evaluate the policy interventions to provide a grant of $150k to startups but do not change the equity funding structure.
Compared with the previous approach, this type of policies often involves bigger subsidies because part of the support indirectly
goes to accelerators due to the equity share. These grants change the preference of both accelerators and startups. The rst
policy called Gender Subsidy supports female applicants to Tier 1. The second policy called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time
founders to increase their opportunity to enter Tier 3. The last policy called T3 Subsidy aims to help Tier 3 accelerators










Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 SH Non-
SH
Firm Value % 0.06% -0.01% -0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 2.31%* -0.01% 4.27%*
Female % 0.25% 0.35% -0.15% -0.44% -0.53% 7.08%* -0.13% 0.18%
Inexperienced % -0.08% -0.03% 0.12% 0.01% -0.08% 3.52%* 0.01% 0.10%
#Startup
Outside SH %
0.16% -0.05% -0.06% 0.06% -0.08% 0.41% 0.02% -0.09%
A.6.2 Market Dynamics
This section reports the number of startups which join another accelerator from the baseline,
and the number of startups which leave the accelerator market due to policy interventions.
The capital injection causes a much higher impact on the equilibrium by moving more
startups in the Gender Subsidy and Exp Subsidy. One reason is that the capital injection
involves a larger subsidy; another reason is that oering equity-free accelerators only changes
the preference of one side of the market and therefore does not change the equilibrium much.
Neither policy causes a large change in the Tier 3 Subsidy.
Note: This table reports the number of startups which change or leave accelerators due to the impacts of oering equity-free
accelerators.
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Change 0.11 0.35 0.38 0.61 0.16 0.42
Leave
(alone)
0.42 0.61 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Exp
Subsidy
Change 0.51 0.76 0.42 0.75 0.26 0.57
Leave
(alone)
0.05 0.21 0.04 0.18 0.68 0.81
Tier 3
Subsidy
Change 0.77 0.87 0.85 0.91 1.39 1.27
Leave
(alone)
0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 2.23 1.46
Note: This table reports the number of startups which change or leave accelerators due to the impacts of capital injection
of USD 150k.
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Change 1.16 1.23 0.96 0.93 0.87 0.90
Leave
(alone)
5.46 2.16 0.28 0.57 0.24 0.49
Exp
Subsidy
Change 2.10 1.37 1.36 1.16 3.20 1.71
Leave
(alone)
0.58 0.73 0.46 0.71 33.34 4.77
Tier 3
Subsidy
Change 0.89 0.91 1.10 1.00 0.52 0.70
Leave
(alone)
0.01 0.10 0.02 0.12 2.05 1.37
A.6.3 Accelerator Proposing
A caveat of the counterfactual analysis in this paper is that I do not know the equilibrium
mechanism of the market, and therefore I cannot replicate the baseline case as realized in
the data. In Section 1.6, I construct the equilibrium using Gale and Shapley [72] algorithm
with startup proposing, which I argue is likely to be close to being the real case. This section
oers a robustness check by providing results using Gale and Shapley [72] algorithm with
accelerator proposing. With minor dierences, the general patterns are very similar to the
case of startup proposing.
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents in startup hubs. This table shows the percentage changes concerning rm
values and startup factors for each policy interventions based on the simulated benchmark. I form the matches using Gale and
Shapley [72] algorithm with accelerator proposing. In this counterfactual, I impose policies to oer equity-free accelerators to
entrepreneurs with disadvantages in accelerators. The rst policy called Gender Subsidy supports female applicants to Tier
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1. The second policy called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity to enter Tier 3. The last









Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 SH Non-
SH
Firm Value % 0.07% -0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 1.54%* 0.00% 3.15%*
Female % -0.13% 0.08% 0.02% -0.12% 0.00% 0.20% 0.05% 0.09%
Inexperienced % 0.01% -0.04% 0.01% -0.04% 0.02% 0.07% -0.01% 0.06%
#Startup
Outside SH %
0.01% -0.03% -0.01% 0.02% 0.02% -0.08% 0.01% -0.07%
Note: * indicates within 95% CI. SH represents in startup hubs. This table shows the percentage changes concerning rm
values and startup factors for each policy interventions based on the simulated benchmark. I form the matches using Gale and
Shapley [72] algorithm with accelerator proposing. In this counterfactual, I evaluate the policy interventions to provide a grant
of $150k to startups but which do not change the equity funding structure. The rst policy called Gender Subsidy supports
female applicants to Tier 1. The second policy called Exp Subsidy assists rst-time founders to increase their opportunity to










Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 SH Non-
SH
Firm Value % 0.06% -0.01% -0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 2.27%* 0.00% 4.28%*
Female % 0.07% 0.27% -0.22% -0.55% -0.42% 7.21%* -0.06% -0.24%
Inexperienced % 0.06% 0.01% 0.02% -0.01% -0.04% 3.37%* 0.01% 0.01%
#Startup Outside
SH %
0.12% -0.08% -0.09% 0.07% 0.04% 0.00% -0.02% -0.05%
Chapter 2
B.1 Choice of Matching Value Proxy in 2nd Stage
Proper second stage estimation for funding probability requires a measure for the matching
value, which can be interpreted as the expected rm value at accelerator graduation in this
project. Any unbiased proxy for value is proper, but those coarse ones can lead to higher
variance in estimation. An ideal candidate is the startup valuation at graduation. However,
such data is rare even for the well-known startups. In this project, I pick the long-term
(ve year) survival status to be the proxy. Another candidate is the long-term funding
status/amount, but it suers from a lack of equity information and biases due survival.
With additional data collection, I may also use rm website trac and/or media coverage.
However, it is not clear that these measures can signicantly improve the estimation results.
Alternatively, I can have Zδ + γ [P + Z ′λ− (Xβ)] + e, where the true matching value is
proxied as U = P + Zλ + υ′, where E[υ′|P,Z] = 0. Note that these two models generate
equivalent empirical estimation with dierent interpretations, while the second approach is
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more exible. As one cannot separately identify δ and γλ, the second stage result interpret-
ation discussed previously does not hold in the alternative setting. However, it is still valid
to form MF = Z(δ + γλ) for the third stage estimation.
Chapter 3
C.1 Dierences in inferences drawn from modeling the audit market
as a one-sided market vs. a two-sided market
This section illustrates the erroneous conclusions researchers may reach by omitting one side
of the audit market when examining audit pricing. Note that the simple illustration provided
here oers an intuitive explanation to guide readers but does not provide a comprehensive
picture. Therefore, the illustration does not reect the complex structure of the audit market;
rather, it is a thought experiment designed to explain assertions made in this paper.
Suppose there are two clients C1 and C2. C1 values each unit of audit expertise at $2
and has a governance quality of 15. C2 values each unit of audit expertise at $2 and has a
governance quality of 20. Therefore, a one-sided market model would lead us to conclude
that both C1 and C2 place the same value on audit services  i.e., $2 per unit of audit
expertise.
Now, let's incorporate auditor-side characteristics and preferences. Suppose there are two
auditors A1 and A2. A1 provides clients with 3 units of audit expertise at a cost of $6 and
requires a minimum client governance quality of 6. A2 provides 5 units of audit expertise at
$9 and requires a minimum governance quality of 19. Thus, the cost of A1's audit service is
$2 per unit of audit expertise ($6/3 = $2), while the cost of A2's audit service is $1.8 per unit
of audit expertise ($9/5 = $1.8). Because A2's services are cheaper on a per-unit basis, both
C1 and C2 would prefer to purchase audit services from A2. However, A2 cannot provide
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audit services to C1 because C1's governance quality (15) is lower than A2's threshold of 19.
Therefore, the client-auditor relationships that will form in this case are (C2, A2) and (C1,
A1).
Simply observing this equilibrium outcome, without properly incorporating auditor-side
preferences in the formation of equilibrium pairs, suggests that C1 and C2 value audit
expertise dierently (C1: $2 per unit of audit expertise, C2: $1.8 per unit of audit expertise).
In fact, C1 and C2 place the same value on audit expertise ($2 per unit of audit expertise);
to avoid an erroneous conclusion, it is essential to consider both sides of the market.
C.2 Explanation of the diculties of making ex-ante predictions
Let's assume researchers are running an OLS regression by regressing audit fee on a proxy
of governance.
ln(AuditFees) = a+ β1ClientGovernance+ ε
The coecient on β1 will be either positive, negative, or zero. Regardless of the outcome,
researchers will not be able to disentangle whether the audit benets, the audit costs, or both
are driving the results. Therefore, the conventional approach inherently limits our ability to
understand whether and how client governance matters for client- (auditor-) side demand
for (supply of) audit services.
For example, if researchers nd a positive coecient for β1, the result may stem from
clients with better governance systems valuing better audit services and thus paying more
for such services (e.g., DeFond and Zhang [49], Hay et al. [88]). Alternatively, it may be
driven by auditors putting in more eort to provide better audit services in order to avoid
higher reputational loss from not properly auditing clients with better governance (e.g.,
DeAngelo [46]). Alternatively, the positive coecient might be driven by the combination
of the bottom arrows in the client-side prediction and the top arrows in the auditor-side
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prediction. Overall, the conventional approach does not reveal the economic story behind
the β1 coecient, which is researchers' ultimate goal.
C.3 Costs and Benets associated Proximity / Auditor Industry Ex-
pertise / Big 4
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